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This study aimed to map the interlinkages among institutions, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and economic growth for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region for 
the period 1996 to 2016. The researcher examined the effects of the interaction of institutions 
and FDI on economic growth. In the process, the researcher examined the interrelationship 
between institutions and FDI and whether there is a complementary relationship between 
institutions and FDI in determining the economic growth of the FDI-recipient country. 
The results of this study show that institutions play a significant role in determining FDI inflows 
into SADC countries and there is a positive correlation between FDI and economic growth. 
The results further reflect that the effect of FDI on economic growth is both negative and 
positive across the estimated models, indicating the heterogeneity in terms of the initial host 
country conditions.  
The study found that institutions are generally weak in SADC countries,and there is both a 
positive and a negative relationship between institutions and economic growth for these 
countries. Moreover, the impact of FDI on economic growth is dependent on the quality of 
these institutions. Countries with good institutions are better able to absorb the positive 
spillovers from FDI. What is critical, however, is that FDI on its own (without institutional 
indicators) can lead to an increase in economic growth for the SADC countries. The effect of 
institutions on FDI and economic growth was not significant in the full sample.  
After eliminating countries endowed with strategic natural resources, ‘good’ institutional 
indicators led to an increase in economic growth, eliminating the natural resource endowment 
bias. Thus, the results show that institutions can have a direct role in influencing economic 
growth. Therefore, government stability, a reduction in corruption, less involvement of the 
military in politics, democratic accountability and enhanced regulatory quality and governance 
structures can lead to better economic growth outcomes for SADC countries.  
In terms of policy imperatives, SADC countries should sustain the institutional reform policy 
agenda that is already in place to benefit more from FDI inflows into the region and limit the 
negative effects of spatial contagion. Future studies should examine the sector-specific effects 
of FDI on host countries’ economic growth. Furthermore, future studies should focus on 
country-specific cases for policy-specific recommendations and should endeavour to 
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The role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been explained by Stephen Hymer (1976), as 
well as Todaro and Smith (2003), and is expected to play an essential role in host countries’ 
economies; this is particularly true in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Over the years, FDI has 
become an important element of the global economy, mainly due to the expected benefits it is 
supposed to bring to the host countries. FDI promotes employment creation, technological 
progress, productivity improvements and economic growth (Jensen, 2003). However, to the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no model beyond common sense that has 
explained the flow of FDI, especially for the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) countries. Thus, FDI may be critical in providing benefits that may not be available in 
the host countries.  
 
Investment in emerging markets and developing economies has been, and is still, playing an 
important role in promoting economic growth. Numerous empirical studies have shown that 
there is a positive association between investments and economic growth. Thus, several 
countries find it necessary to create favourable conditions that can attract investment flows 
into their economies. This justifies the need to examine and clearly understand the barriers to 
investment, especially in the African context.  
 
Existing empirical studies show that investment is low across the African continent and this is 
a threat to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This notion is 
shared by Anyawu (2011), who argues that SADC lags behind other regions in terms of 
receiving FDI. It is thus imperative to mobilise foreign resources in order to cover the financing 
gap. However, for this to be realised, policymakers first need to appreciate the barriers to 
investment and from there make the right policy choices to encourage investments in these 
countries.  
 
The theoretical and empirical literature advocates divided opinions and split suppositions on 
the impact of FDI on economic growth. Within SADC, existing literature does not offer much 
information on the interlinkages of institutions, FDI and economic growth. The discussions on 
the path of economic growth and the aspects which influence economic growth date back to 
the time of Adam Smith (1776) who, in his book titled “An inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
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of the Wealth of Nations”, philosophised about sources and wealth variances across the globe. 
The significant variances in per capita income levels across global countries is a true reflection 
that some countries grew faster than others and have sustained periods of high economic 
growth for long periods, while other countries have remained stagnant. At the same time, the 
role of institutions in attracting or repelling FDI and how FDI relates to economic growth has 
not been adequately determined for SADC countries.  
 
Furthermore, the existing empirical literature on the topic has several gaps, ranging from 
conceptual and measurement issues to methodological and data issues. This has contributed 
to the lack of conclusive evidence about the factors that really determine the flow of total 
investment and how FDI and economic growth are linked. For example, the impact of political 
stability and democracy on total investment flows is still the subject of academic debate. 
Empirical research results on these institutional variables – political stability and democracy – 
are mixed and sometimes provide contradictory results. The results seem to vary depending 
on the sample of countries used, as well as the period under study. An example is found in 
the study by Busse (2004), which showed a strong positive relationship between democracy 
and FDI from 1990 onwards, but found no evidence during the 1970s and 1980s for a sample 
of emerging economies. There is a need to conduct an independent study that clearly 
demonstrates the linkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth, focusing on SADC 
countries.  
 
One of the key objectives of developing economies is attracting FDI. This has seen countries 
such as South Africa hosting its second annual investment summit (November 2019)  in a bid 
to attract foreign capital. The Africa investment forum was also established by the African 
Development Bank to raise capital, among other objectives. Countries such as Botswana, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, among others, have implemented regulatory frameworks and 
institutional settings that aim to promote the flow of FDI. It has also been generally accepted 
that a virtuous investment climate is a necessary condition to support private sector-led 
economic growth; the expectation being that the private sector will bring the much-needed 
capital through FDI. Abubakar and Bala (2016) argue that countries gain more by measures 
that aim to improve the investment climate. Furthermore, the World Bank has made improving 
the investment climate one of its developmental strategies.  
 
There is a risk created due to the rapidly changing international economic and political 
environment; therefore, credibility and certainty through rules of social interaction reduce this 
risk and create a good investment climate. Given the role of FDI in the development process, 
SADC and Africa, in general, have to find the means to attract and gain an improved share of 
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the increasing flow of the world’s FDI. Since SADC countries suffer from a financing gap, FDI 
inflows can play a significant role in the host countries in terms of increasing the supply of 
funds for domestic investment (Pegkas, 2015). Pegkas (2015) regards investment, either 
foreign or domestic, as the engine of economic growth. Karim and Abu (2016) further agree 
that given the low savings in many developing countries, attracting FDI could be a solution in 
reducing the investment savings gap and promoting long-term economic growth.  
 
The SADC region has been performing poorly compared to other regions in terms of economic 
growth and FDI inflows. According to the SADC report (2019), total FDI inflows into the region 
fell by almost 50 percent between 2009 and 2018. Furthermore, various SADC reports, for 
example, the economic development report (2012), indicate a shortfall between investment 
and savings, although investment is viewed as the primary driver of economic growth. This 
means the SADC region needs to attract FDI inflows to cover the finance gap. However, in 
the literature reviewed for this study, there is little agreement regarding the real impact of FDI 
on economic growth. Some studies suggest that FDI may result in the crowding out of 
domestic manufacturing firms. Moreover, other studies, such as the work of Abubakar and 
Bala (2016), argue that FDI displaces domestic savings. Other researchers, including Pegkas 
(2015), Szkorupova (2014), Karim and Abu (2016), Stancheva-Gigov (2016) and Silajdzic and 
Mehic (2012) claim FDI may result in a dependency syndrome. Further studies propose that 
the relationship between FDI and economic growth is not stable. This shows how contentious 
the matter is in relation to policy.  
 
Although there is still debate regarding the impact of FDI on economic growth, governments 
across SSA still make deliberate efforts to attract FDI inflows. Fiscal incentives are one of the 
most popular instruments for attracting FDI. However, over the years this has failed to attract 
or deliver the expected levels of FDI inflows into Africa, even though African countries and the 
world at large have deliberately made investment a key development priority (Khalil & Dahou, 
2007). SADC countries need not only political and macro-economic stability but also 
institutional quality and credibility (Cleeve, 2012), such as adequate protection of property and 
investors’ rights, efficient contract enforcement and flexible employment regulations.  
 
It is with these factors in mind that the majority of African countries have embarked on an effort 
to facilitate and increase the flow of FDI through policy changes that include institutional and 
political reforms in a bid to remove barriers to trade and FDI inflows (Cleeve, 2012). Access 
to foreign capital and investment gives countries the chance to exploit opportunities that 
otherwise would not have been possible. This demonstrates the importance of a good 
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investment climate for economic growth. Such a climate ideally provides firms with an 
environment that minimises the cost and risks of doing business and promotes competition. 
 
Kirkpatrick (2014) mentions that one of the critical conditions for economic development is 
effective economic governance. This is demonstrated by the fact that even donor support to 
developing countries is gradually focusing on regulatory reforms, which may lead to more 
efficient markets, in the process creating a stable and supportive environment for investment 
and private sector development through market-led economic growth (Kirkpatrick, 2014). 
Khalil and Dahou (2007) further support this notion by stating that development assistance 
and debt relief on its own would not be sufficient to achieve the MDGs. SADC countries require 
both domestic and sustainable foreign investment to increase the pace of economic growth 
and reduce poverty and inequality.  
 
Economic theories, such as those developed by Joseph Schumpeter (1934), Roy Harrod 
(1939) and Evsey Domar (1946), Arthur Lewis (1954) and Paul Romer’s (1990) AK models, 
suggests there is a range of factors that support long-term economic growth. However, recent 
studies have confirmed that encouraging private sector-led growth plays a more significant 
role in the economy as a whole (Korutaro & Biekpe, 2013). Many researchers have argued 
that a good investment climate is crucial for small, micro and medium enterprises’ (SMMEs) 
development; it is claimed to generate employment creation in the fight against poverty and 
inequality, which is a major problem facing emerging economies. Foreign capital inflows are 
a vital source of funds to finance investments in developing countries (Gwenhamo & Fedderke, 
2013). This, therefore, cements the argument that there is a need to clearly understand the 
determinants of capital flows, including FDI, in the investment climate, which includes the 
institutional environment. 
 
According to Korutaro (2010), an investment climate is the business environment in which 
firms operate. The World Development Report (World Bank, 2005) defines an ‘investment 
climate’ as a set of specific location factors that influence the available prospects as well as 
the incentives for firms to invest productively, thus creating an increase in development. 
Moreover, Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu (2006) define a ‘productive investment 
climate’ as an environment where economic governance and institutions support 
entrepreneurs in well-functioning markets to generate economic growth and development.  
 
Stern (2002) defines an ‘investment climate’ as the policy as well as both the present and 
expected institutional and behavioural environments that influence investment returns and the 
risks associated with such investments. A positive investment environment must make it 
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possible for the firm to expand by capitalising on the inflow of investment capital, thereby 
increasing the competitiveness of the firm and giving the firm additional resources to expand 
its reach into a larger market share to realise greater returns. This is, of course, highly 
theoretical, holding other things constant.  
 
Within South Africa, firms are generally the primary source of wealth creation which calls for 
the establishment of a good investment environment. Furthermore, firms create employment, 
provide goods and services, and the much-needed revenue in the form of corporate tax which 
adds to national income. This could imply that a good investment climate should consider the 
needs of firms through costs and risk reduction as a result of poor government policies and 
poor-quality institutions, among other constraints. 
 
According to Silajdzic and Mehic (2012), an institutional environment comprises political 
systems, policy-making and policy-enforcing institutional structures, which then determine 
economic structures at the national and sub-national levels. North (1990:3) defines the 
institutional framework as “a set of informal and formal rules of the game that constrain or 
promote political, economic and social interactions”. Institutions and property rights also play 
a significant role in determining the extent of investment flow as well as the efficiency with 
which inputs are allocated. This notion is also supported by Silajdzic and Mehic (2012), who 
state that institutional reforms and progress increase the level of investment flows, especially 
in transition economies. It should, however, be acknowledged that scholars perceive the role 
and significance of the various institutional components differently, including the role played 
by formal and informal rules and agreements.  
 
Silajdzic and Mehic (2012) conclude that the quality of institutions plays a significant role in 
attracting total investment flows into a particular host country. Formal institutions normally 
include regulations, laws and rules that establish a basis for production, exchange and 
distribution (Seyoum, 2009). Seyoum (2009) argues that giving reference to various 
institutional indicators, such as the rule of law, corruption, property rights and contract 
enforcement, is evidence that the institutional environment has an impact on total investment 
flows and economic growth. Similarly, institutions are important determinants of FDI in the 
sense that they constitute the crucial locational advantage of host countries (Silajdzic & Mehic, 
2012). Institutional quality will determine whether the institutional environment is virtuous or 




The institutional environment determines who has authority, who makes decisions, how other 
players make their voices heard and how accountability is rendered. A ‘good’ institutional 
environment should ideally be able to establish incentives and structures that reduce 
uncertainty while at the same time encouraging efficiency and positively contributing to 
economic growth. When there is no clarity regarding the rules of the game, it becomes difficult 
to predict outcomes. Thus, uncertainty discourages the inflow of FDI into a particular country. 
Uncertainty also discourages firm-level decisions about the expansion of operations and 
decisions on whether or not to set up new businesses in a foreign country. However, the key 
question is whether countries with relatively strong institutions are able to attract higher levels 
of FDI compared to those with weaker institutions (perceived or real).  
 
Lastly, investment is defined to mean total investment, comprising FDI, portfolio investment 
and other investments1 (Gwenhamo & Fedderke, 2013). Thus, an investment climate includes 
macro-economic and financial elements or conditions in an economy, along with political and 
institutional factors. It also includes physical infrastructure and the necessary human capital 
for productive investment. This means a good investment climate should ideally provide firms 
with an environment that minimises the cost and risks of doing business, and promotes 
competition that creates market efficiency. This is a necessary condition to promote firm 
profitability and growth.  
 
What determines an investment decision and whether it is possible to identify a set of policies 
that promote investment flows in different countries is a subject of academic interest. Various 
empirical studies, such as Malikane and Chitambara (2017), Iamsiraroj and Ulubbasoglu 
(2015), Batten and Vo (2009), Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee (1998), Al Nasser (2010) and 
Okodua (2009) have shown the positive impact of FDI on the economic growth of the host 
countries. These positive impacts may have different results as the distribution of foreign 
investment across countries is not uniform, and the types of investment are also diverse 
across the globe.  
 
The limited studies that have examined the investment environment, such as the work of 
Silajdzic and Mehic (2016), Su and Liu (2016), Sen, Senturk and Ozkan (2012), Pegkas (2015) 
and Al Nasser (2010), concentrated on Europe, Asia and Latin America. A good investment 
climate should ideally warrant that there is credibility and certainty when it comes to economic 
 
1 FDI refers to investment in a firm, where the foreign investors own at least 10 percent of the firm’s voting rights and it is a long-
term arrangement. Portfolio investment includes the purchase by foreign investors of a host country’s bonds and equities with 
less than 10 percent voting rights and is short-term arrangement. Other investments refer to private and foreign loans and 
deposits (OECD 2017). 
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and social interaction for potential investors. Some of the factors to be considered include the 
protection of property and investor rights, effective and efficient contract enforcement, and 
flexible labour regulations. Many studies provide evidence on the role of these factors on 
investment and economic growth.  
 
The concept of an investment climate is also not well understood, as evidenced by the fact 
that there are significant differences in investment climates across countries, hence the need 
for further studies, especially in the African context. These sentiments are shared by Asiedu 
(2006), who questions what determines FDI inflows into Africa, as well as the role of the host 
country’s institutions in directing FDI flows into the African region. Furthermore, most of the 
existing studies include the qualitative aspects of institutional variables, implying that there are 
challenges in the measurement of the variables; hence, the reliability of sources and data 
become questionable.  
 
The critical question on whether the factors that determine FDI flows are well understood 
becomes inevitable. Does Africa, and SADC in particular, lag behind in terms of FDI attraction, 
and what is the impact on the host country’s economic growth? This question is of paramount 
importance in the fields of economics, business, politics and academia, hence the need for a 
better and collective understanding of the barriers to investment and the FDI/economic growth 
nexus in these economies. It follows that a careful analysis of the influence of institutions and 
FDI on the economic growth of SADC countries is imperative.  
 
There are several reasons why this analysis is important. First, the United Nations has 
indicated in its millennium declaration that an increase in FDI will assist the African continent 
in achieving its MDG of reducing the poverty rate by 50 percent. Similarly, the 2005 New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) declaration also highlights the importance of 
FDI in eradicating poverty in Africa.  
 
Research thus seems to suggest that there is a positive correlation between the quality of host 
country institutions for various countries and their attractiveness to outside investors and 
economic growth. What is lacking and required is to empirically test this expectation in the 
African context, where the abundance of scarce natural resources may make investors 
overlook the quality of governing institutions.2 Similarly, Asiedu (2006) undertook research to 
determine whether African countries that lack natural resources can attract FDI inflows.  
 
2 The availability of strategic natural resources such as gold in Zimbabwe, diamonds in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
crude oil in Angola may mean foreign direct investors do not to consider the quality of institutions (Asiedu 2006). Therefore, 
FDI will still flow to these countries even if they have poor institutions.  
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This study attempts to fill the gap in the existing economic literature through the exploration 
and study of diverse aspects of the interaction and relationship between institutions, FDI and 
the associated links to economic growth. The study examines a case of all the SADC countries 
and a case where SADC countries endowed with strategic natural resources are excluded 
from the sample. This is necessary to understand the extent to which the presence of strategic 
natural resources leads to a bias in terms of FDI decisions, and whether countries without 
strategic natural resources can attract FDI inflows. Thus, this study sought to determine 
whether the relationship between institutions and FDI has any implications for economic 
growth and whether there is complementarity between institutions and FDI aiding economic 
growth.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS STUDY 
 
1.2.1 Problem statement 
 
The NEPAD declaration stipulates that in order for the African continent to achieve the MDGs, 
the region needs to fill an annual resource gap of US$64 billion, which is about 12 percent of 
Africa’s GDP (Khalil & Dahou, 2007). Economic theory has long tried to prove that there is a 
correlation between savings and economic growth. This stems from classical economists who 
believed that the existence of savings is a necessary and sufficient condition for investment 
creation. They believed that if savings go up, investment increases because the interest rate 
and economic growth will be imminent. Even though there is an obvious relationship between 
savings and economic growth, the direction of causality is not obvious.  
 
In a study, by Najarzadeh, Reed and Tasan (2014), using a Vector Error Correction Model for 
the period 1946-1992 between the relationship of savings and economic growth, private 
savings proved to have both a direct and indirect effect on economic growth. It was further 
established that the effect of savings through private investment and economic growth was 
positively correlated to savings (Najarzadeh et al., 2014). 
 
SSA suffers from a financing gap and, hence, low savings. Consequently, several SSA 
countries need to attract finance from outside their borders. However, official assistance to the 
region has been declining over the years (Asiedu, 2006). One way of getting finance and 
covering the financing gap is through FDI. However, it is critical to understand the factors that 
attract and repel FDI. One of the factors that have not been studied is the role of institutions 
in attracting or repelling FDI. Available literature has not investigated the interlinkages that 
exist among institutions, FDI and economic growth; thus, there is a need to develop a model 
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that determines or explains the linkages of the said three variables. This notion is shared by 
Asiedu (2006), who points out that there is a lack of research on the factors that affect FDI 
into Africa. This should not be the case, given the importance of FDI for the African region.  
 
The World Investment Report from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD, 2019) states that corruption and the political outlook of a country or region is a 
significant restraint to the flow of FDI. Unfortunately, very little institutionally focused research 
has been done to measure the impact of these factors on FDI inflow in the SADC region. Much 
research has been conducted on the traditional factors that affect FDI, such as macro-
economic stability, trade openness, human capital, economic infrastructure, tax breaks and 
market size. Yet there is scant research on the role of institutions in determining the flow of 
FDI, especially for African countries. In her article, Asiedu (2005:2) states that “A search of 
the Econlit database using ‘foreign direct investment’ and ‘Africa’ as keywords yielded only 
five journal articles on the determinants of FDI to Africa”.  
 
The role of political risk and institutional factors in determining the flow of FDI remains unclear 
and contested. Thus, studies have had limited success in determining whether and to what 
extent formal institutions can influence FDI inflows. There are also conceptual and 
measurement problems because of the lack of clear and mutual understanding on which 
institutions matter and why they matter. It should also be emphasised that the factors that 
attract FDI cannot provide answers or solutions to what actually discourages investment. This 
study therefore investigated the factors that actually repel or attract FDI, thereby avoiding the 
mistake of assuming that the opposite of what attracts FDI is what discourages it.  
 
These are two distinct, independent issues that warrant empirical research and the need for 
this study, namely the role and quality of institutions of the host countries. These factors have 
been largely ignored by most academic researchers, such as Nayak and Choudhury (2014), 
Luo (2003), Lin (2014) and Kapingura, Ikhide and Tsegaye (2018), especially for the SADC 
countries. Thus, how host country institutions affect investment flows, primarily through their 
coordination mechanisms, has received limited attention in previous studies. Most of the 
available studies on the role of institutions in determining FDI flows have been limited to 
specific institutional indicators without examining the impact of all indicators. The studies tend 
to focus on one aspect of the quality of institutions, for example, democracy or corruption and 
how it impacts on investment flows.  
 
Although market size, availability of natural resources, low inflation and a good investment 
framework can promote FDI inflows, institutional variables such as corruption and political 
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instability can have the opposite effect (Asiedu, 2006). Thus, institutional differences can be 
used to understand variances in the patterns of investments across countries. Multilateral 
organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund can play a 
significant role in promoting FDI inflows into SADC by assisting in undertaking institutional 
reforms. However, the empirical evidence on the subject is mixed, resulting in diverse 
conclusions on the role of institutions in attracting total investment inflows. The issue is not 
whether various institutional variables are important, but to understand which institutional 
variables are decisive drivers in firms and governments making decisions to invest in a 
particular country. 
 
Historically, it has been a challenge to measure the performance of institutions and their 
subsequent impact on discouraging or attracting FDI. Thus, researchers such as Addison and 
Heshmati (2004), Alfaro and Johnson (2013) and Iamsiraroj and Ulubasoglu (2015) who 
analysed the impact of institutions and regulations across different countries relied on very 
few sources; for example, the indicators of political risk or government effectiveness indicators 
from the Annual Global Competitiveness report. The problem is that the indicators derived 
from these institutions are based on executive opinion surveys, such as the perceived level of 
corruption or the rule of law in a country. 
 
The accuracy of such information used to measure the differences in institutions across 
countries may be compromised due to its qualitative nature. Therefore, measurements used 
in quantifying the role of institutions as determinants of an investment climate becomes a 
concern for analysts and policymakers alike. Above all, the question of how institutional factors 
impact on investment flows and the interlinkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth 
remains a gap in academic economic literature. 
 
1.2.2 Justification and contribution of the study 
 
This study examined the various institutional factors that influence FDI and investigated how 
this differs across various SADC countries and how it is linked to economic growth. There is, 
therefore, a need to examine the relationships among institutions, FDI and economic growth 
for the SADC countries. Recent studies have focused on either the role of institutions or FDI 
in determining economic growth. This area thus lacks empirical research, which is another 
contribution of this study.  
 
There are several reasons why the study focused on SADC countries. Firstly, the debate on 
the nexus between FDI and economic growth is still inconclusive, suggesting that the results 
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may differ according to geographic areas in terms of regions. This could mainly be due to 
historical factors and/or sub-regional differences. Secondly, focusing on SADC countries 
would help to capture the unique characteristics of these countries. This could assist in 
recommending economic policies which are in line with the SADC region’s existing conditions. 
This supports the findings of Iamsiraroj and Ulubasoglu (2015), who studied 140 countries 
globally and concluded that the effect of FDI on economic growth varies according to the 
economic region. 
 
How FDI influences economic growth via institutions is a fundamental academic question with 
significant policy implications. This study provides the basis for appropriate policies to attract 
FDI and for reforming certain institutional indicators with the aim of improving the FDI-growth 
nexus in the SADC region. As a further contribution to the academic debate, this study has 
created an additional interactive variable of FDI and institutions. Thus, this variable allowed 
the researcher to determine how the interaction of FDI and institutions impact on economic 
growth. This result is then compared to the effect of FDI on economic growth without the 
influence of institutions. As a result, this study focused on examining the three-way linkages 
among institutions, FDI and economic growth, using a dynamic panel data General Methods 
of Moments (GMM)-equation model applying the growth model framework. The study used 
secondary data from the Political Risk Services, UNCTAD, World Bank, as well as the SADC 
countries’ central banks, and the model was run using Eviews software.  
 
Furthermore, unlike other studies, this study also analysed the impact of FDI on economic 
growth for a sub-sample of countries not endowed with strategic natural resources. This was 
done to ascertain whether the availability of strategic natural resources such as gold, 
diamonds and crude oil can influence FDI decisions by Multinational Corporation Companies 
(MNCs) for the SADC countries, regardless of the quality of institutions in the host country. 
This is in line with the study by Asiedu (2006), which determined that the flow of FDI in Africa 
is mainly related to exogenous factors, and the availability of natural resources determines the 
volume of FDI inflows a country attracts, regardless of the policies the country pursues.  
 
This then becomes an important policy consideration as it provides a clear understanding of 
the interrelationship and complementarity between institutions and FDI, and how this 
influences economic growth without the element of natural resource bias.  
 
This study intends to contribute to the pool of academic literature by developing an 
understanding of why some previous studies could not establish a significant correlation 
between FDI and institutions. Using few chosen indicators and, in some instances, even a 
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single institutional indicator to demonstrate the relationship between institutions and FDI, 
could be one of the reasons previous studies failed to obtain significant results. Another critical 
contribution is that the study provides empirical evidence that is used to assess the importance 
of each institutional indicator in determining FDI flows and the subsequent effect on economic 
growth.  
 
Furthermore, the data on institutions – from well-known and reputable institutions, such as the 
Political Risks Services Group (PRS) – does not include countries such as Mauritius, 
Seychelles and Swaziland. This study constructed and calculated the institutional indices of 
these countries for the first time in the academic literature and developed a model for SADC 
countries. Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the implications of weak 
institutions on FDI flows in a system of institutional deficiency such as the SADC region which 
is also largely under-researched. 
 
1.2.3 Objectives of the study 
 
The study examined the linkages that exist among institutions, FDI and economic growth in 
host countries for a better understanding of the contribution of FDI to economic growth. The 
study sought to conceptually explain the location of FDI within a framework derived from 
institutional theory. The study examined the implication of the interrelationship as well as the 
complementarity that could exist between institutions and FDI, and the contribution of FDI to 
economic growth.  
 
The study further examined the determinants of FDI with a special focus on the role of 
institutions in attracting or repelling FDI. SADC countries offer the proper context in which to 
examine the relationship between institutions, FDI and economic growth. The first reason is 
that there is not much literature on FDI into Africa, and even less on the SADC region. 
Secondly, existing surveys show that the factors that attract FDI to Africa and SADC are 
different from those that influence FDI to other regions. Lastly, there is a perception that Africa 
as a continent is structurally different from the rest of the world. The importance of this study 
is evident as it connects with the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which stated that an 
increase in FDI would help the continent achieve its MDG of reducing poverty rates by half in 
2015. 
 
It is in this regard that an empirical analysis focusing on FDI inflows in SADC will have greater 
influence and credibility among policymakers, both internationally and in Africa. Furthermore, 
MNCs are considered to possess superior technology; in the SADC region, foreign partners 
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will constitute important external sources of learning and information. The role of institutions 
on FDI flows and the impact on economic growth was achieved through the following sub-
objectives: 
 
i. Examining trends in FDI in the SADC region. 
ii. Examining the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows in SADC.  
iii. In terms of examining the role of institutions, this study goes further to develop a 
quantitative index for the other SADC countries, especially for those countries not 
currently covered by existing institutional indexes. 
iv. Developing a model to measure the influence of institutions on FDI inflows for all the 
SADC countries. 
v. Empirically examining the interrelationship and complementarity between institutions 
and FDI, and the effect on economic growth. 
vi. Empirically examining FDI impacts on economic growth through the improvement of the 
quality of institutions of the host country. 
vii. Empirically examining the effect of strategic natural resources on how institutions and 
FDI influence economic growth. 
viii. Providing policy recommendations for SADC countries, given the outcome of the results. 
 
1.3 LAYOUT OF THE STUDY 
 
As stated earlier, the aim of this study was to develop a model that would empirically examine 
the linkages between institutions, FDI and economic growth in the SADC region. To this effect, 
this study contains interlinked essays in five chapters. In Chapter 2, the origin of FDI and 
theories which explain FDI and its determinants are discussed. Chapter 2 goes further to 
examine trends in FDI within the SADC region. Chapter 3 examines the role of institutions in 
determining FDI flows into the SADC region. Chapter 4 determines the interlinkages among 
institutions, FDI and economic growth. Thus, the chapter examines whether FDI impacts 
positively on economic growth by working through the improvements of the quality of 
institutions in the host country. Chapter 5 provides a summary, considers the academic 




The main objective of the study was to empirically examine the interlinkages that exist among 
institutions, FDI and economic growth in SADC countries. Most existing studies examine only 
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the role of institutions in attracting FDI flows, and very few studies examine how institutions 
can aid the effect of FDI on the host country’s economy. Existing studies encountered data 
and measurement errors. This study contributes to the academic literature by focusing on the 
examination of the three-way linkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth using a 
dynamic panel GMM-equation, applying the growth model framework.  
 
This study separated countries endowed with strategic natural resources from those that are 
not so endowed in modelling the interlinkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth; 
this is essential for policy decisions. The study also constructed and calculated the institutional 
indices of countries such as Mauritius, the Seychelles and Swaziland, which were not 
previously covered by existing institutional data providers such as PRS in the academic 
literature, and developed a model for SADC countries. Moreover, unlike most previous studies 
that examined only a single aspect of the institutional variables, this study used 12 institutional 
























BACKGROUND: AN EXPLORATION OF THE FOREIGN DOMESTIC 
INVESTMENT THEORIES, TRENDS AND FLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT 





According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) definitions, FDI is classified as a category of cross-border 
investment whereby an investor resident in one country creates a lasting interest in and a 
significant degree of influence over a firm resident in another country. The ‘lasting interest’ 
implies a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment firm. 
The direct investor has a significant degree of influence regarding the management of the 
established foreign firm. Usually, the direct investor owns at least 10 percent of the voting 
power in the established firm in another country.  
 
The expansion of FDI took off after the Second World War due to the emergence of the forces 
of globalisation. It was the increasing importance of MNCs and foreign investment during the 
1950s and 1960s, especially from the United States of America (USA) to the European 
countries, which motivated many academic researchers to critically examine the issue of 
MNCs and the existence of international production (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). As a result 
of this development, many theories were written to explain capital movement internationally. 
It is in this context that the chapter aims to review the various theories of FDI, modes of entry 
of FDI, and the motivations behind FDI. The influence of institutions on the flow of FDI is 
paramount to establish a suitable link with the various theories of FDI.  
 
A comprehensive understanding of the theories behind FDI as a significant component of total 
investments in emerging and developing countries, including South Africa, is required for an 
analysis of institutions’ role on FDI. However, it should be emphasised that there is no single 
theory that can be used to sufficiently explain the determinants of FDI, given the number of 
contrasting theories on the subject. This is supported by Agarwal and Weekly (1980), who 
concluded that there were so many competing theories attempting to explain the determinants 
of FDI that they treated them as hypotheses rather than theories. 
 
Previous studies have attempted to understand the factors that determine investment flows 
but focused on FDI only. To adequately deal with and understand the factors that determine 
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outward or inward FDI, there is a need first to understand the theoretical structure used to 
explain the behaviour of foreign investors. This is because FDI contributes significantly to the 
total stable investment in emerging and developing countries. According to UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report (2019), there has been a global decline in FDI flows, but Africa escaped it.  
 
FDI inflows to the continent rose to US$46 billion in 2018, which is an increase of 11 percent 
compared to the previous year. This was mainly due to the growth in non-resource seeking 
investments in a few economies within the continent. These developments highlight the 
importance of establishing credible institutions to attract a larger share of FDI inflows into the 
SADC region. For example, while FDI in some large economies on the continent (such as 
Nigeria and Egypt) contracted, this was outweighed by a surge in flows to other regions; most 
significantly, South Africa (UNCTAD, 2019). 
 
Research on FDI has focused more on the economic motives, for example, market 
attractiveness, the behaviour of competitors and productive efficiency. However, of late, 
researchers have been utilising institutional theory as a way of showing that there are other 
social, governance and regulatory issues that play a significant role in FDI decisions. This 
chapter combines and contrasts the key elements of both the economic perspective and the 
institutional perspective of FDI. 
 
This section therefore traces the evolution of the theories relating to FDI over the past decades 
and attempts to explain the growth of FDI flows in developed countries and the SADC region. 
Thus, the objectives of this chapter are to review the various theories concerned with FDI, 
understand the basic reasons or motivation for firms to invest abroad, and briefly highlight the 
weaknesses of the FDI theories. 
 
2.2 AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
 
There are several ways of classifying FDI theories and a considerable number of theories that 
explain the modes and motivations of FDI. Over the years, researchers have classified these 
theories in diverse ways with varying degrees of accuracy and relevance.  
 
Capital markets and portfolio investment theories were initially used to explain FDI. This is 
because the direct investment was taken as international capital movement only 
(Kindleberger, 1969). Before 1950, FDI was regarded as a subset of portfolio investments due 
to the postulation that capital flows were as a result of the differences in interest rates (Nayak 
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& Choudhury, 2014). The argument was that, assuming no risk or uncertainty, capital should 
flow to economic regions where it will receive the highest interest. Thus, this assertion did not 
consider the fundamental difference between portfolio investment and FDI.  
 
A proper attempt to explain FDI began during the 1960s. FDI theories in the 1960s and 1970s 
assumed imperfect markets and hence the decision to invest in foreign countries was based 
on the assumption that foreign firms have a comparative advantage over local firms. The early 
1980s saw the FDI theories evolve and start considering issues of political economics. The 
theories claimed that FDI was a new form of imperialism where developed countries take 
advantage of the less developed countries because they have the financial resources to do 
so. During the late 1980s, FDI theories began to be concerned about the size of the market in 
the host economy, availability and price of the factors of production, and the quality of 
institutions. The 1990s saw theories which emphasise the role of institutions in determining 
FDI flows. This section briefly discusses how various researchers, such as Petrochilos (1989), 
Hennart (1982) as well as Agarwal and Weekly (1980), grouped theories of FDI. The evolution 
of the theories of FDI over the past few decades are thus unpacked.  
 
According to Petrochilos (1989), the theories can be classified as macro, micro and strategic. 
Macro theories are more concerned with, for instance, the size of the market in the host 
country, price of the factors of production, interest rates, levels of expected profits, and 
protection in the form of property rights by the host country. Regarding the micro determinants, 
Petrochilos (1989) argues that they follow from the theory of industrial organisation, which has 
to do with the investing firm enjoying a particular comparative advantage. This, he claims, 
could be in the form of product differentiation, technology, and the effects and impact of 
advertising. The third category refers to other strategic long-term factors which can directly or 
indirectly influence the decision to invest abroad. These long-term strategic factors can also 
directly affect the profitability of the investing firm.  
 
Hennart (1982) placed the theories of FDI into three categories as follows: 
 
i. The theory of imperialism – this theory claims that FDI is a way for rich countries to 
exploit less developed countries. This is mainly motivated by the fact that there will be 
monopoly rents from foreign operations. Hennart (1982) argues that the rents are 
obtained because the direct investors enjoy discriminatory favours from the local 
authorities and, in the process, exclude competitors. 
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ii. Product cycle hypothesis – this theory considers FDI as one of the stages where a 
product is introduced or entered into a foreign market. This is discussed in detail in the 
next section. 
iii. Market imperfection approach – this theory assumes that FDI is based on 
imperfections in the goods and factor markets. The industrial organisation approach, 
which was first developed by Hymer (1976), falls under this category. The theory is used 
to explain FDI under imperfect market conditions. Section 2.3 of the study provides a 
detailed discussion of this theory. 
 
Hennart’s (1982) theories suggest that output and factor markets are imperfect (imperfect 
markets are discussed under group two in the next section). This renders it more relevant in 
explaining the actual FDI among countries. Following the above, Agarwal and Weekly (1980) 
state that FDI can be classified into three groups, as explained next. 
 
• Group One comprises theories that assume full or nearly full competition on factors as 
well as product markets. These include the portfolio theory, the output theory, and the 
differential return and market-size theories. This is not a realistic assumption; hence, the 
theories cannot be used to practically explain the mode and motives of FDI flows. For 
example, the theories cannot explain FDI flows into the European Union (EU) from Asian 
countries such as South Korea; the assumption that FDI should flow from developed 
countries (EU) to developing countries (South Korea) does not hold. Furthermore, in 
reality, perfect markets do not exist.  
 
o Portfolio Theory – The hypothesis does not only consider the rate of return in 
making investment decisions, but also the risk associated with the investment 
decision. Empirical evidence on this theory seems weak or non-existent. The 
theory is over-generalised; for example, the theory does not even attempt to 
explain why MNCs prefer direct investment over portfolio investment, which 
ideally could provide a better instrument for geographical and sectorial 
diversification of their portfolios.3 Thus, the theory fails to take cognisance of 
the fundamental difference between portfolio investment and FDI. FDI entails 
control; this is the greatest weakness of the portfolio theory, as it does not 
explain control. This is mainly because if an investor lends money to a foreign 
firm, there is no logical expectation that the investor should take control of the 
firm to which the money is lent (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). For example, most 
 
3 Preference of FDI compared to portfolio investment could be due to security market inefficiencies. 
19 
capital-intensive projects in Africa are funded through debt from multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and various domestic financial 
institutions. That, however, does not entail that the funding institutions have 
ownership in the funded capital projects, receiving firms or governments. 
Rather, the funding institutions and, in some instances, funding governments, 
are mainly interested in getting back their capital plus interest. In other 
instances, the funding foreign institutions will insist in the establishment of a 
Special Purpose Vehicle without having any ownership in the firm borrowing 
the funds.  
 
o Differential Rate of Return Theory – The theory takes its origins from the 
traditional theory of investment, which assumes that all firms aim to maximise 
profits. It hypothesises that FDI is a function of international differences in the 
interest rate on the return of capital. The theory assumes that FDI should flow 
from countries with low-interest rates to those with high-interest rates (Nayak & 
Choudhury, 2014). This is because countries with a higher interest rate are 
expected to yield high returns to capital. However, this theory has not been 
empirically proven. For example, it is not always the case that MNCs want to 
maximise profits. MNCs may accept lower returns on investment to achieve 
higher economies of scale in a domestic market. Thus, the reasons for investing 
in a particular country are many and varied.4  
 
The hypothesis seemed appropriate and in line with the pattern of FDI flows 
recorded in the 1950s, a period where MNCs from the USA received high-
interest rates from investments in Europe. However, the pattern was reversed 
but the USA’s MNCs continued to invest in Europe despite higher rates of return 
being received from investing in their domestic economy (Nayak & Choudhury, 
2014). Furthermore, SADC countries comprise of developing countries which 
can earn a higher return, but there is also a higher risk.  
 
This risk mainly comes from the quality of institutions in the region. SADC has 
weak institutions which entail a lack of property rights enforcement in countries 
such as Zimbabwe, political instability, as well as high levels of corruption in 
countries such as South Africa and Angola (Country Watch, 2017). However, 
 
4 This could be a reaction to a competitor’s move in a foreign country or creating barriers to entry of new competitors. 
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MNCs still provide FDI to SADC countries regardless of the negative 
institutional variables which may impact on their expected profits. 
 
o Market Size and Output Theory – In this theory, FDI is assumed to be a 
function of output or sales. The GDP of the host country is used as a proxy for 
market size. The primary basis of this theory is that firms will increase their 
investment in a particular host country in response to increased sales (Shin 
1992). 
 
Empirical studies conducted to determine the impact of the market size 
hypothesis found positive results which agree with the hypothesis. For 
example, Frenkel, Funke and Stadtmann (2004) examined the host and home 
country determinants of FDI inflows into 22 emerging economies and found that 
the market size and output hypothesis hold. Hsiao and Hsiao (2004), in a study 
of the determinants of FDI inflow into China from the USA, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South Korea, found that the market size was significant in 
determining the FDI inflows. Using a Vector Error Correction Model to examine 
the relevancy of the market size hypothesis for Botswana, Tsaurai (2015) 
concluded that the market size determines the inflow of FDI for Botswana.  
 
However, there is no theoretical basis to expect this association. The growth of 
GDP and FDI can be endogenous, meaning that the statistical association that 
can be found between them does not say much in terms of their structural 
relationship. Furthermore, the size of the market is most likely to be a 
consideration when FDI is for domestic consumption and not the export market.  
 
• Group two – These theories focus on the ability of countries and industries to invest 
offshore. The currency area theory, as suggested by Aliber (1972), is covered under this 
group. The theory argues that imperfections in the capital markets are the main drivers 
of FDI. The theory is based on the strength of one country’s currency compared to that 
of another.  
 
The assumption was that a country with a weaker currency would attract more FDI as 
MNCs will take advantage of the exchange rate. Thus, weaker countries (such as SADC 
countries) are in a position to attract more FDI inflows; countries with stronger currencies 
will want to take advantage of the differences in the market capitalisation rate. This 
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theory was empirically tested by Aliber (1972), and the results were in line with FDI in 
the USA, the United Kingdom and Canada (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014).  
 
However, the theory cannot explain FDI between two developing countries with weaker 
but equal currency strength or two developed countries that have currencies of equal 
value. Furthermore, the theory cannot be used to explain the FDI by a developing 
country (weaker currency) to a developed country (stronger currency). For example, the 
theory cannot justify investments in the USA, UK and Canada by Chinese and Indian 
firms. This is because the theory seems to suggest that FDI will happen if the investing 
country has an advantage in the capital market compared to host country firms.  
 
Globalisation has allowed perfect mobility of capital, so that any firm can access 
domestic and offshore funds. Moreover, portfolio investments are not border restricted, 
making capital available to host countries’ firms (Coady et al., 2019). The theory also 
fails to appreciate that investing firms tend to get most of their finance from local sources 
and transfer of capital is not a significant variable in the FDI process (Nayak & 
Choudhury, 2014).  Group three theories are explained under section 2.3.  
 
2.3 FDI THEORIES BASED ON IMPERFECT MARKETS (Group three). 
 
The hypothesis of these theories is based on the condition that there is an imperfect market. 
The theories in this group took market imperfections for granted and assumed that the decision 
for firms to invest into foreign countries is based on the fact that there are comparative 
advantages over the host country’s competitors. The argument is that when a firm establishes 
business in a foreign country, it has some disadvantages (lack of knowledge about the local 
customers’ tastes and preferences, the legal systems, and institutional frameworks, among 
other variables) compared to the host firms. To establish itself in the foreign country, it has to 
have some advantages that the host country firms are unable to access (Agarwal & Weekly, 
1980). An example is the presence of General Electric in various countries across the globe.  
 
General Electric is an international company present in 130 countries, including 10 African 
countries. The company is mainly in the business of providing energy. The demand for energy 
in Africa is expected to increase by more than four percent per annum by 2040. Most African 
countries rely on a combination of hydroelectric power, coal-fired and diesel-fuelled generation 
power (World Bank, 2019). Therefore, closing the expected energy gap is difficult for most 
countries in Africa. Africa needs faster, cheaper and reliable sources of energy which 
unfortunately cannot be self-generated given their level of technology. General Electric has 
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superior technology, such as aero-derivative gas turbines5 which can provide efficient, fuel-
flexible solutions for power generation. This gives them a comparative advantage, hence their 
motivation to invest in Africa.  
 
MNCs such as Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Alstom also have a significant presence in the African 
energy sector. For instance, in South Africa, projects such as Medupi and Kusile power plants 
are undertaken by these MNCs due to their comparative advantage in terms of technology 
(World Bank, 2019). Ideally, these advantages should allow foreign firms to earn more than 
the host country firms and more than they can earn at home. The advantages can be cheaper 
sources of finance, brand name, patents, exclusive access to markets, and competitive 
managerial skills.  
 
The theories which are used to explain FDI dynamics include the Behavioural Theory as 
proposed by Aharoni (1966), the Product Cycle Theory developed by Vernon (1966), the 
Oligopolistic Theory proposed by Knickerbocker (1973), the Internationalisation Theory 
proposed by Buckley and Casson (1976), the famous Eclectic Theory by Dunning (1977), and 
lastly the Kojima Theory by Kojima and Ozawa (1973). These theories are discussed next. 
 
2.3.1 Understanding FDI Dynamics Through the Behavioural Theory 
 
During the earlier years before the Second World War, the share of international production 
to international business was very small; this also includes the share of FDI. Economists 
mainly focused on international trade to explain international business transactions. The end 
of World War II saw a dramatic change in the characteristics and features of international 
business as countries such as Japan and some from Europe started a reconstruction process. 
This period saw the emergence of MNCs, especially from the USA, which provided the capital 
for reconstruction (Nayak & Choudhury 2014). This led to the process of international capital 
movements, hence FDI.  
 
The role of MNCs grew over the years, and economists began to formulate theories aimed at 
explaining this new development. The trade economists failed to apply the theory of 
comparative advantages to explain FDI and tried to apply the Neoclassical Theory of portfolio 
flows. However, the portfolio theory could not explain other forms of investments such as FDI. 
 
5 The aeroderivative gas turbine is a lighter weight variation of a gas turbine. Despite being classified as a gas turbine, the fuel 
source for the aeroderivative turbine is not really gas. Actually, they are designed so that fuel and air are mixed and then ignited 
to achieve the desired output. The design of gas turbines is comprised of a compression device to facilitate the taking in of air 
and compressing it (the “gas” in this case) and then applying heat by means of a burner. Source: 
https://turbinetechnics.com/understanding-aeroderivative-gas-turbines 
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The Neoclassical Theory was detached from reality, and this gave birth to the various theories 
of FDI, including the Behavioural Theory (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). The argument is that 
once economics include proper and realistic assumptions, it becomes possible to explain the 
mode and motives of FDI. It is in this context that many theories were developed in a bid to 
explain international capital movements.  
 
Behavioural economics argues that neoclassical economics is too narrow to deal with the 
complexity involved in international production and FDI in general. This, however, should not 
be a problem for behavioural economics, since behavioural economics attempt to align 
economic theory with the accumulated knowledge in almost all behavioural sciences. These 
include psychology, sociology, organisation theory and the application of the decision 
sciences (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014).  
 
Secondly, behavioural economists put more emphasis on empirical research and the 
explanation of observed behaviour than relying on deduced economic behaviour, which is 
assumed to be valid at all times across different cultures and geographic boundaries. Thirdly, 
the Behavioural Theory rejects the notion of rationality and optimal behaviour by economic 
agents (Shin, 1992). Instead, the Behavioural Theory argues that MNCs face complex and 
uncertain political, socio-economic and cultural dynamics, hence decision making on where 
and how to invest is complex and situational. Therefore, this means that MNCs that intend to 
invest offshore need to understand the host country’s institutions and how they will be affected 
by those institutions. 
  
There are typically three factors that are critical in making FDI decisions, namely uncertainty, 
information and commitment. Managers of MNCs tend to over-estimate the risk and 
uncertainty of doing business in foreign countries. Consequently, there have to be some initial 
forces that cause management to consider investing offshore. The initiating forces for 
undertaking offshore investments may also be external or internal (Shin, 1992).  
 
External forces include proposals from the foreign or host government, distributors of the 
investing company’s products, or the fear of losing the market. It could also be because of 
strong competition from companies in the home market. Shin (1992) claims that internal 
factors include the influence of high-ranking officials or executives in the MNCs. 
 
If the idea or proposal to invest offshore is considered, it can then lead to a search for 
information that enables the appraisal of the project. Aharoni (1966) argued that during the 
project appraisal process, some key executives would become emotionally attached to the 
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project, to the extent that they want to see it realised. This is because it would benefit their 
careers and the company, and in the process, promote FDI inflows into the host country. 
 
Lastly, the implementation of the project will depend on the commitment and the persuasive 
capability of the key executive in convincing top management that FDI is worth the MNC’s 
time and effort. 
 
2.3.1.1 Limitations of the use of Behavioural Theory 
 
The Behavioural Theory is not without limitations. The first weakness of the theory is that it 
cannot be tested empirically. The Behavioural Theory is based on a very small sample of 
American firms that is not a true representative of the American firms involved in FDI (Shin, 
1992). Moreover, the USA alone cannot be taken to represent the concept and reasons behind 
FDI globally. The concept that there are some initial internal and external forces to the MNC 
necessary for it to invest offshore can be linked with the stage of product development 
discussed under the Product Cycle Theory.  
 
2.3.2 Product Cycle Theory 
 
This theory was first developed by Vernon (1966) and adopted by Hirsch (1967). In this theory, 
FDI by MNCs is treated as a stage in the penetration of foreign markets. The theory 
emphasises the technological innovation of production among countries. The model assumes 
that products go through a lifecycle, passing through the four stages of initiation, exponential 
growth, maturity and decline. This was well articulated by Agarwal and Weekly (1980), who 
argue that in the first stage when the product is new, it is only produced by the innovator in its 
home country. This is mainly due to the need to efficiently coordinate research and 
development (R&D) and the production units. During the first stage, demand for the product 
will be available in abundance. An example is in the automobile industry for high-end vehicles 
such as Porsche. The vehicles are produced in their home country and only exported to 
African countries as finished products.  
 
Agarwal and Weekly (1980) state that in the second stage, the product market would be 
mature and exported to international markets. These countries are assumed to have the next 
highest level of income. However, a combination of demand expansion and competition in 
these international markets will eventually lead to the innovator establishing production 
facilities in these foreign countries. This is the case for the automobile industry; for example, 
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companies such as BMW, Mercedes Benz, Toyota and Ford Motor Corporation, which first 
established production plants in various countries in Europe.  
 
In the third stage, there will be complete standardisation of the product and the production 
technique. This means the innovator no longer has the sole authority to produce the product. 
This eventually leads to competition from other producers who consider investing in the 
product. Price competition will force the innovator to consider investing in developing countries 
in a bid to seek cost advantages, usually in the form of reduced labour costs. An example is 
the establishment of assembly and production plants by automobile giants such as BMW, 
Mercedes Benz and Ford Motor Corporation in South Africa. Similarly, Samsung Electronics 
is a South Korean multinational electronics company with its headquarters in Suwon, South 
Korea. Over the years, the company has established plants across 80 countries. 
 
Vernon (1966) extended the Product Cycle Theory to include the costs of land and material 
and not only labour. This made the theory universal, as it now included FDI by other developed 
countries and not only the USA.  
 
2.3.2.1 Limitations of the use of the Product Cycle Theory 
 
Nevertheless, the theory has its limitations. Researchers, such as Solomon (1976), claim that 
it is too biased and restricted to highly innovative industries, and it is too simplified to resemble 
a firm’s decision-making process in investing offshore. The Product Cycle Theory does not 
cover FDI by less developed countries (LDCs), and is limited to a particular type of FDI, which 
is the production of an innovative product abroad. It cannot fully explain other ventures such 
as the services sector; for example, hotels, car hire and the general financial services sector 
that do not involve the production of physical products (Shin, 1992).  
 
Another limitation of the Product Cycle Theory is that it explains the location of manufacturing 
firms but not their ownership. A grave concern is that the Product Cycle Theory is hierarchical, 
assuming that investment occurs only from developed countries to LDCs. This cannot explain 
FDI by South Korean firms to the developed countries. The technological space and conditions 
have changed, and the USA is no longer a dominant country in this respect. Furthermore, 
income differences across countries have drastically gone down. This makes some of the 
assumptions of this theory irrelevant; hence, it cannot explain FDI in its totality.  
 
The Oligopolistic Reaction Theory can partly deal with the limitations of the Product Cycle 
Theory. This is because what determines the decision to invest offshore is not determined by 
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the stage of economic development of a country, but by the need of MNCs to maintain their 
market share and dominance. This is discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
2.3.3 The Oligopolistic Reaction Theory 
 
This theory was first developed by Knickerbocker (1973), who argued that the oligopolistic 
reaction of firms is the main reason or cause for FDI. This means that market leaders who 
invest offshore (FDI) will be followed by their competitors in those international markets. 
Knickerbocker (1973) made use of an entry concentration index on 187 manufacturing MNCs 
in the USA in developing his theory. From the concentration index, Knickerbocker (1973) noted 
that USA firms in foreign markets were bunched in time. This led to the conclusion that 
oligopolistic firms are always trying to counter any advantage that the first MNCs can have 
from its FDI, hence they will follow up with their own FDI. It is argued that this is done to 
maintain a competitive equilibrium. Mercedes Benz, BMW and Volkswagen, which are 
German automobile MNCs, are an example of the Oligopolistic Reaction Theory. These 
automobile MNCs are concentrated in the same markets globally and in South Africa, have 
created assembly and production plants.  
 
2.3.3.1 Limitations of the Oligopolistic Reaction Theory 
 
It should be appreciated that the Oligopolistic Reaction Theory attempts to explain why MNCs 
use FDI instead of licenses or exports to enter foreign markets. However, as in the case of the 
other theories before it, the oligopolistic reaction has certain weaknesses. The first is that the 
theory has a limited value when it comes to predicting the future.  
 
In recent years, countries such as Japan, South Korea and Germany have slowly increased 
their global presence as foreign direct investors and, in the process, increased international 
competition. In addition, the theory does not explain what triggers the initial investor to go 
offshore. In this regard, it gives a partial explanation of the concept of FDI. Furthermore, the 
theory is only applicable to defensive strategies and oligopolistic market structures. This 
means it cannot explain FDI in other market structures. Lastly, the theory cannot explain firms’ 
FDI decisions related to a wide geographical spread of their investment. Some of these 
limitations can partly be explained by the Internalisation Theory, where firms try to maximise 




2.3.4 The Internalisation Theory 
 
The theory of internalisation was first proposed by Buckley and Casson (1976), who based it 
on market imperfections in an international context. They emphasised intermediate inputs and 
technology as drivers of FDI. In the presence of market imperfections, firms will try to maximise 
their profits through the internalisation of key intermediate products such as knowledge, 
marketing, human capital and management expertise. The Internalisation Theory is premised 
on three postulates, namely imperfect markets, which enable firms to maximise profits; an 
incentive to bypass imperfect markets for intermediate products through the creation of 
internal markets; and MNCs across the world are a result of the internalisation of markets. 
 
Furthermore, taxation, as well as monetary and fiscal policies of the host government, can 
lead to and support internalisation of functions; the main driver being transaction costs. This 
is because firms will have the incentives to replace market-based transactions with 
organisation-based transactions. This behaviour is directly linked to Ronald Coase’s 
(1992:716) theory of transaction costs, which states that “as long as the cost of business 
outweighs the benefits, no transaction or exchange will take place”. Thus, MNCs are analysed 
within a broad framework developed by Coase (1992). However, under the Internalisation 
Theory the focus of international investment got shifted to industry-specific investment from 
country-specific investment. 
 
When a firm is engaged in R&D, there is a possibility that it may develop new technology, 
process or inputs (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). However, due to the high costs involved in 
R&D, it may be difficult for the firm to sell or transfer this technology or inputs to other unrelated 
firms as they may find the transaction costs high. This can then force firms to internalise 
through backward and forward linkages. If the internalisation involves operations outside the 
borders of the parent company, it can be termed ‘FDI’.  
 
Thus, the firms link different activities through markets under common ownership and control 
(Shin, 1992). This, however, has severe time lags and high transaction costs, hence the 
eventual move to set up shop in international markets so that these lags and transaction costs 
can be avoided. Due to the high R&D budget, internalisation is more common in the 
manufacturing sector; for example, the energy industry is dominated by MNCs such as SGB-
SMIT Group whose headquarters are in Regensburg, Germany, and various other companies 
in Germany, the USA, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Romania, the Czech Republic, India, China, 
South Africa and France. The SGB-SMIT Group is the number one medium-sized 
manufacturer of transformers in Europe.  
28 
The pharmaceutical industry is another perfect example of internalisation. For example, 
Johnson & Johnson is a large MNC with its headquarters in the USA; it is now the world’s 
largest healthcare company. Another example of internalisation is the Bayer Group, an 
innovation company which specialises in health care and agriculture, with a history spanning 
more than 130 years. The group is a German global enterprise with companies in almost every 
country. 
 
2.3.4.1 Limitations of the Internalisation Theory 
 
The Internalisation Theory has its limitations. The first is that it cannot clearly explain the 
motive for internationalisation. Secondly, there is not much empirical evidence to support the 
theory, as it is difficult to quantify the associated and expected transaction costs. Of critical 
importance is that the theory cannot explain South Korean firms’ FDI to the EU. This is mainly 
because at the time of the theory’s development in 1976, South Korean firms’ technology was 
still very low and most of the components for its electronic products were imported, and the 
firms had little or no marketing experience to internalise their products and/or knowledge. This 
means that even though the South Korean firms did not have firm-specific advantages, they 
set up shop in the EU area. This then partially led to the discussion of the Eclectic Theory, 
which takes its hypothesis from different branches of economics.  
 
2.3.5 The Eclectic Theory 
 
The Eclectic Theory draws from different branches of economics; for example, the industrial 
organisation theory, property rights theory, vertical integration, and the theory of location, as 
well as the theory of trade. This theory was first developed by Dunning (1973), who attempted 
to explain the motives of a country’s firms to invest in international markets. It sets out a 
general framework that attempts to explain the extent and pattern of FDI inflows across 
countries. The theory is based on market imperfections following the Hymer-Kindleberger 
approach. However, it extends the approach by adding local advantages of the host country. 
This led to the idea that the propensity of a country’s firms to invest in international markets is 
determined by ownership, internationalisation and location advantages available to the firms 
making the investment as compared to firms in the host countries (Shin, 1992). 
 
According to the Eclectic Theory, a firm will invest in foreign markets if certain conditions are 
met (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). These conditions include: 
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a. The firm must first possess net ownership advantages (O) over firms of other countries. 
This could be exclusive or firm-specific proprietary rights, for example, enforced through 
patents rights. The imperfect environment should ideally enable dominant firms to 
develop new products, skills in marketing, and unique expertise, among other things. It 
is argued that these monopolistic advantages, as developed by the firm, must be 
sufficient to offset the additional costs of operating in a foreign country and an unfamiliar 
environment. If this aspect is not fulfilled, the investing firm may find it difficult to deal 
with the additional costs of operating in a foreign environment, such as the tax and 
regulatory systems, the cost of foreign administration, and issues of customer 
preferences, among other negative externalities.  
b. If the first condition is met, the firm possessing the unique assets must find it beneficial 
to continue using them through FDI rather than opting to sell or lease the rights to foreign 
firms. This advantage is called the internalisation advantage (I).  
c. Lastly, if the above two conditions are met, it must then be beneficial for the firm to use 
its unique assets through production outside its home country compared to exporting 
the products. However, for this condition to be met, there should be positive or negative 
factors deterring production at home or encouraging setting up production facilities 
abroad.  
 
It is further necessary to consider location (L) factors of both the host country as well as the 
investing country. The locational advantages can be in the form of low input costs, bigger and 
growing markets, etc. If this is not available, the foreign market can be serviced through 
exports, hence avoiding the need for the firm to set up shop in foreign countries. According to 
Nayak and Choudhury (2014), locational advantage can be used to explain why different 
countries across the globe have different FDI inflow shares. 
 
Dunning (1991) tried to identify several factors that may determine the flow of FDI to different 
countries. These locational advantages include the availability of natural resources, input 
prices, infrastructure, investment incentives and economic systems. He argued that FDI would 
take place only if all three advantages are in place. It is in this regard that Dunning and Narula 
(1993) argued that MNCs are guided by OLI when making investment decisions. This is meant 
to answer the ‘why’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ questions. It is assumed that the ownership advantage 
will determine the ‘why’ decision, the internalisation advantage will determine the ‘how’ 




2.3.5.1 Limitations of the Eclectic Theory 
 
However, just like the previous FDI theories, the Eclectic Theory has some limitations. The 
first is that the theory is not an operational model that can explain all FDI, starting from the 
firm, industry and country levels (Shin, 1992). Furthermore, the theory suggests many 
variables as potential determinants of FDI inflows (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014), which may 
undermine it as a valuable tool for analysis as it cannot be verified by any empirical tests. This 
could be because the entire empirical test focuses on one aspect of the theory as opposed to 
a holistic overview. The theory does not provide us with the importance of each variable in 
determining FDI inflows. Thus, it means there is a need for an empirical examination of the 
factors that determine FDI inflows and their levels of significance. Moreover, the framework 
does not specify how the three variables of ownership, location and internalisation advantages 
inter-relate with each other. Recent years have witnessed the growth in FDI from Asian 
developed countries, such as China and Japan, which means American and European 
countries are no longer the dominant sources of FDI.  
 
2.3.6 The Kojima Theory 
 
After the Second World War, there was an increase in FDI growth mainly as a result of 
improvement in transport and communications, which enabled firms to exercise control from 
their home countries. Secondly, there was an increased need for American capital to finance 
the reconstruction activities of Japan and Europe. However, the 1960s saw a decline in the 
demand of FDI inflows from the USA as host countries started to recover. Countries which 
used to receive FDI from the USA started to provide FDI to it. This saw the USA being a net 
recipient of FDI from Japan and Europe.  
 
Almost all the reviewed theories concentrate on the Western developed concepts of FDI. Very 
few theories have been developed to explain FDI flows from developed Asian countries such 
as Japan and South Korea (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). The past decade has also witnessed 
the growth of FDI from countries such as Argentina, Brazil, India, and the Philippines, among 
others. This is in line with the Kojima Theory developed in 1973, 1975 and 1985. This theory 
was mainly based on the argument that many of the theories of FDI are based on the Western 
experience, hence not a good measure of what happens in the rest of the world. Kojima (1973) 




Kojima (1973) argued that FDI by Japanese firms was primarily made by well-established 
industries where the home countries were losing their comparative advantage, while the host 
countries would be gaining a comparative advantage. Kojima (1973) further maintained that 
the concerned industries were more labour intensive, for example, the textile and component 
manufacturing industries. Kojima (1973) further assumed that FDI by Japanese firms was 
mainly motivated by the need to exploit natural resources not available in Japan or currently 
being underutilised in the host country. The other reason for FDI was argued as relating to the 
ability to switch labour-intensive activities from Japan to low labour cost locations (Shin, 1992). 
Kojima (1973) suggested that the FDI by American firms was motivated by the need to protect 
an oligopolistic position in world markets and respond to trade barriers. It should also be 
appreciated that the Kojima Theory tried to explain the role of a country’s structure and 
competitive advantage in trade, for example, the availability and factor endowments as well 
as specific firm advantages.  
 
2.3.6.1 Limitations of the Kojima Theory 
 
Like the theories before it, the Kojima Theory has several limitations. The first is that the theory 
is very static, and it cannot explain vertical specialisation within industrial sectors. The theory 
also failed to explain how competent domestic firms expanded their businesses into the 
international market (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). For example, Huawei, which is a Chinese 
company, is now a dominant global MNC in the telecommunications industry. Moreover, this 
theory does not attempt to talk about the motives of FDI, which are discussed in the next 
section.  
 
2.4 MOTIVATION AND MODE FOR FDI  
 
The preceding discussion on the theories of FDI makes it necessary to consider the motivation 
and mode of FDI. The reviewed theories did not consider the modes and motivation of FDI 
into a particular host country. This is briefly discussed in the next section. An understanding 
of the motivation and mode for FDI will shed more light on the determinants of FDI flows and 
what motivates the decisions to locate to a particular country. This sub-section reviews the 
main strategic reasons why firms undertake FDI; the motives include market-seeking, 




2.4.1 Motivation for FDI 
The motives for firms to undertake to make investments abroad can be categorised as market, 
efficiency and resource seeking. These are briefly discussed in the next sub-section.  
2.4.1.1  Market-Seeking FDI 
 
Market-seeking FDIs seek markets that are attractive for MNCs. This could be due to the firm’s 
size, the desire for growth, or a combination of both factors. Usually, the existence of bigger 
markets in a foreign country attracts FDI, hence market-seeking FDI. Automobile companies 
such as BMW, Mercedes Benz, Ford Motor Corporation and Toyota have established 
production and assembly plants in South Africa, partially to supply the domestic market. It is 
now common practice that market-seeking FDI considers potential markets. For example, 
China has been attracting a lot of FDI due to its market potential being buoyed by its growing 
economy and population size.  
 
Furthermore, market-seeking FDI may establish firms in foreign countries as a way of testing 
their new products in smaller markets with similar characteristics as their larger potential 
market (Luo, 2003); for example, Tata Motors; it is the biggest automobile manufacture in India 
and has also established a manufacturing plant in South Africa. Another example is FAW 
Motor Company, a Chinese MNC which established a manufacturing plant in South Africa in 
1994. South Africa is central to FAW’s business and is the gateway to other SADC countries 
such as Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia. According to Dunning (2009), 
if stakeholders such as suppliers set up business in new markets, market-seeking FDI may 
be forced to follow and open businesses in those foreign countries. This is meant to reduce 
the transaction costs that may accrue because of the geographical distance.  
 
2.4.1.2 Resource-Seeking FDI 
 
One of the major contributors to FDI is resource-seeking MNCs. This is particularly true in 
developing countries. Resource-seeking MNCs can be classified into natural resources 
seeking, production resource seeking and intangible resource seeking. Natural resources-
seeking MNCs are mostly lured to the foreign country due to the availability of abundant higher 
quality and lower cost resources as compared to their home country. Examples include oil in 
Nigeria and Angola, gold and platinum in South Africa, and diamonds in Botswana and 
Zimbabwe (SADC, 2019).  
 
On the other hand, production-seeking FDI is mainly motivated by the lower costs of 
production in the host country. This could be due to the lower costs of labour, especially in 
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developing countries. The intangible resource-seeking FDI is primarily driven by the need to 
acquire intangible resources in the host country, including technology, expertise and 
innovation (Asiedu, 2006).  
 
2.4.1.3 Efficiency-Seeking FDI 
 
This is a combination of all the necessary factors needed to attract FDI and could be linked to 
the Eclectic Theory, where all the factors need to be satisfied for FDI to take place. Efficiency-
seeking FDI requires a combination of factors such as good infrastructure, relevant skills 
levels, low production costs, and easy access to the markets of developed countries. 
Efficiency-seeking FDI is more concerned with costs, hence it is crucial that countries 
intending to attract this type of FDI ensure that the business operating environment is efficient 
and has lower production costs, especially in the manufacturing sector. An example is the 
clothing and textile industry in Lesotho; TZICC Clothing Manufacturers is a Chinese MNC 
operating in Lesotho, mainly due to the availability of cheap labour in the country. Once the 
clothes are manufactured, they are exported to the USA and other international markets.  
 
2.4.2 Mode of FDI 
 
MNCs play a particularly significant role in terms of economic development. However, the 
reasons and motives behind their investment decisions are not well understood (Nocke & 
Yeaple, 2007). Furthermore, one of the common limitations of the theories discussed above 
is that they did not consider the modes of FDI (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). It is important to 
have an understanding of how an MNC chooses the mode of FDI once a decision to invest 
abroad has been made. The mode of entry the MNC chooses determines its success in the 
foreign market (Agarwal & Weekly, 1980), since investing in a foreign country takes time and 
substantial financial resources. Once a commitment has been made with regards to the entry 
choice mode, it is difficult to change without incurring high costs. A foreign market entry mode 
involves an institutional arrangement that makes it possible for the MNC to introduce its 
products, human resources, technology as well as other resources into the host country.  
 
There are two modes of FDI, namely vertical and horizontal. Horizontal FDI implies starting a 
totally new business, which is called greenfield investment, while vertical FDI involves buying 
into an already existing business, which can be termed brownfield investment. However, both 
horizontal and vertical FDI can be either cross-border mergers and acquisitions or greenfield 
FDI (Uchida & Oyamada, 2015). 
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Mergers and acquisitions allow firms to take advantage of complementarities in their firm-
specific assets, thus entering a foreign market by buying an existing enterprise (Nayak & 
Choudhury, 2014). This means different firms can buy and sell corporate assets to exploit 
these complementarities. On the other hand, international greenfield investment entails the 
construction of production capacity in a foreign country; thus, entering a foreign country by 
building new enterprises. The fundamental assumption of the model is that two countries can 
trade freely, and factor prices’ differences should ideally lead to greenfield FDI while cross-
country differences in skills and entrepreneurial capabilities would lead to mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) further argue that American parent firms that choose the greenfield 
route are more systematically efficient than those that opt for the merger and acquisition route. 
The equilibrium of the merger market will lead to the decision of where production 
headquarters will be located, and hence FDI. This can further be explained by Uchida and 
Oyamada (2015), who used the Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) theories of vertical and 
horizontal FDI. Horizontal FDI is mainly motivated by the need to reduce transportation costs, 
while vertical integration primarily stems from the need to reduce production costs (Uchida & 
Oyamada, 2015). This is briefly discussed in the following subsections. 
 
2.4.2.1 Horizontal FDI 
 
FDI happens when multi-plant firms duplicate almost the same production processes in 
different or multiple countries. However, headquarter activities are not duplicated. This means 
that horizontal FDI involves setting up similar plants to produce the same product as the home 
country for the foreign market, but keeping headquarters and assembly plants in the country 
of origin or home country. This type of FDI is common among developed countries and occurs 
when countries are similar in size and have the same factor endowments. Figure 2.1 gives a 
pictorial view of horizontal FDI. 
 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) examined a firm’s choice between exports and horizontal 
FDI. They developed a model of international trade in which firms can choose to serve the 
domestic market, to export or to engage in FDI to cater to markets abroad. They argue that 
every industry is characterised by heterogeneity; meaning that the productivity of firms will 
differ. The implication is that firms are organised based on their productivity. The least 
productive firms shut down as they cannot generate a positive operating profit, no matter how 
they are organised. Other low-productivity firms sell only in the domestic market.  
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Figure 2.1: Horizontal FDI 
Source: Adopted from Uchida and Oyamada, 2015 
 
The rest of the firms will serve both domestic and foreign markets. However, the modes of 
operating in foreign markets will differ from firm to firm, depending on their productivity levels. 
The most productive firms will decide to serve the foreign market via FDI, while less productive 
firms will sell in the foreign market through exports. The firms that invest abroad will do so 
when the gains from avoiding transportation costs are greater than the costs of maintaining 
facilities abroad.  
 
2.4.2.2 Vertical FDI 
 
Helpman (1984) developed a general equilibrium model of international trade, where MNCs 
played a significant role. The model combines elements of ownership and location 
advantages. In this model of FDI, production processes are subdivided geographically, and 
firms produce a single product. The theory is based on firms having a single production facility, 
which could be in a different country from its headquarters. The theory assumes that there are 
no tariffs or transportation costs justifying that firms will never open more than one production 
facility.  
 
Helpman’s (1984) model is based on the fact that there are differences in factor endowments 
of diverse locations where a vertical firm can choose to put production facilities. The main 
argument of the model is that firms have a cost-minimising objective to maximise profits. It is 
in this regard that capital-intensive production processes take place in the home country, while 
labour-intensive stages of the production process are carried out in foreign or international 
countries. This is mainly because of the abundance of cheap labour and low cost of 
production. This type of FDI occurs between developed and developing countries. An earlier 
example is the clothing and textile industry in Lesotho which is dominated by Chinese firms 







then exported to the USA and Europe. The clothing and textile industry in Lesotho account for 
more than 50 percent of the people employed in the country’s formal sector. Thus, Lesotho is 
the largest SSA country which exports clothing to the USA and Europe. A pictorial view of 







Figure 2.2:  Vertical FDI 
Source: Adopted from Uchida and Oyamada, 2015 
 
Lin (2014) showed that China has been investing in foreign countries – especially developing 
countries – due to the rising cost of labour domestically. Thus, Chines MNCs are investing 
heavily in labour-absorbing industries in foreign countries such as Lesotho to take advantage 
of the low cost of labour.  
 
2.5 THE FLOW OF FDI  
 
In general, FDI flows record the value of cross-border transactions related to direct investment 
during a given period, which can be a quarter or a year (OECD, 2017). FDI consists of financial 
flows, outward flows and inward flows. Financial flows include equity transactions, 
reinvestment of earnings, and intercompany debt transactions. Outward flows are transactions 
that increase investors’ investment in the reporting economy in enterprises in a foreign 
economy. Inward flows represent transactions that increase the investment that foreign 
investors have in enterprises resident in the reporting economy, fewer transactions that 
decrease the investment of foreign investors in resident enterprises (OECD, 2017). There are 
several ways of measuring FDI flows, namely USD and as a share of GDP.  
 
2.5.1 Changes in FDI flows 
 
The reviewed theories seem to suggest that a firm must have a sustainable comparative 
advantage over the host country firms for it to be an MNC. In the same process, the host 
countries are active by creating a conducive environment for business. There is generally 





to developing countries. In 1978, 70 percent of the world’s FDI flows were received by 
developed or high-income countries (UNCTAD, 2017).  
 
However, in recent years the flow of FDI has been changing and developing countries are 
slowly becoming sources of FDI. It is therefore essential to understand the flow of FDI, 
especially inflows. This is critical in determining which countries are the major recipients of 
international capital flows. This can then be used as a case study by countries lagging behind 
in terms of attracting FDI flows. To do this, there is a need to first understand FDI flows into 
the SADC region.  
 
Over the years, there has been a dramatic increase in FDI inflows across the world. This trend 
has long been noticed and discussed by various economists. For example, Agarwal and 
Weekly (1980) acknowledged that FDI had registered significant growth over the past 
decades. Ramrattan and Szenberg (2014) argue that the period between 1492 and 1800 saw 
FDI starting to flow across countries, and the industrial revolution between 1899 and 2000 saw 
an increase in FDI flows. The average annual FDI inflows across the globe have significantly 
increased from a mere USD24 million during the 1970s to USD93 million during the 1980s. 
The 1990s witnessed a further increase in FDI flows to USD115 million. As from the 2000s, 
the flow of FDI significantly increased to USD484 million, and the trend has continued to date.  
 
This represents a factor increase of 2.87. This sudden paradigm shift from trade to FDI 
underlines the importance of FDI across the globe. The flow of global FDI further significantly 
increased from USD93 million during the 1980s to USD398 million during the 1990s. This 
represents a factor increase of 3.3. As from the 2000s, the average FDI inflows have been 
USD1042 billion. The significant increases in FDI inflows across the globe highlight the 
importance of FDI in the various economies of the world, and the need for Africa to claim a 
larger share of the pie, given its low savings rate. Moreover, most of the FDI inflows have been 
to developed countries. The changes in the flows of FDI across the world to developed and 
developing countries are presented in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 shows that about two-thirds of the world’s flow of FDI has been going to the 
developed countries, while developing countries have received the remaining third. This calls 
for an understanding of the reasons behind such differences. The fact that most developing 
countries are endowed with natural resources and labour, among other variables, could not 
help the countries receive a larger share of the FDI inflows. Therefore, other factors, such as 
the role of institutions, need to be thoroughly examined as determinants of FDI inflows, 
especially for the African countries.  
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Table 2.1: FDI Inflows, Trends and Shares 
Period 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
FDI in US Dollars at current 
prices in millions 24 93 398 1041 180 72 279 747 58 21 115 484
As a Percentage of Total 
FDI 100 100 100 100 75 75 68 68 26 25 31 29
FDI as a Percentage of 
GDP 0.46 0.64 1.4 2.57 0.43 0.62 1.25 2.38 0.61 0.72 2.08 3.12
FDI as a Percentage of 
GFCF 2.01 2.86 6.45 11.49 1.84 2.82 5.9 11.03 2.84 3.1 8.49 12.42
World Developed Countries Developing Countries
 
Source: Author’s calculation using UNCTAD Data, 2017 
 
Although developing countries are receiving less of the FDI inflows, it is vital to note that FDI 
has played, and continues to play, a significant role in the GDP composition of these countries. 
Table 2.1 clearly demonstrates that FDI as a percentage of GDP for developing countries has 
been increasing over the years from 0.61 percent during the 1970s to two percent during the 
1990s and three percent as from the 2000s. This significant rise in the percentage share of 
FDI inflows to the GDP of developing countries clearly highlights the importance of FDI to 
these countries. 
 
The ratio of FDI as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) also signifies and 
demonstrates the importance of FDI. The ratio has seen a dramatic global increase from 2.0 
during the 1970s to 11.49 during the 2000s. Likewise, the ratio of FDI to GFCF has been 
increasing over the years for developed countries, which saw a sharp increase from 1.84 
during the 1970s to 11 during the 2000s. The importance of FDI in the capital formation for 
developing countries is demonstrated by the fact that the ratio of FDI to GFCF changed from 
a mere 2.8 during the 1970s to 12.42 during the 2000s. This, therefore, means developing 
countries need to do more to attract more FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2017). 
 
2.5.2 Distribution of world FDI flows 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the World FDI flows from the year 2000 to 2016, subdivided into developed, 




Figure 2.3:  A Bar Graph to Show the Distribution of World FDI Flows 
Source: Author’s calculation using UNCTAD Data, 2017 
 
As presented in Figure 2.3, developed economies enjoy significant FDI inflows. This is 
followed by developing economies and lastly transition economies. Most developed countries 
are not well endowed with natural resources, while developing countries have natural 
resources in abundance, especially Africa. The question is thus; ‘do developed countries 
attract more FDI because of their highly regarded good institutions, strictly enforced property 
rights, and regulation, among other institutional factors?’ The role of institutions in determining 
FDI flows forms the basis of Chapter 3, in an attempt to answer this empirical question. 
 
2.5.3 FDI inflows into SSA 
 
Although the global FDI declined for the year 2018, FDI inflows increased by 11 percent 
(USD46 billion) in the continent compared to the previous year (UNCTAD, 2019). FDI flows 
into SSA recovered in 2018, increasing by 13 percent (USD32 billion) after consecutive 
contraction for the previous two years. The most significant contributors to the recovery were 
Southern African countries, which received FDI inflows of USD4.2 billion from a net 
disinvestment of USD925 million the previous year. The top five FDI inflow recipients in Africa 
between 2017 and 2018 were Egypt, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 


















Figure 2.4: African FDI Inflows: Top 5 Recipients (US Billion Dollars) 
Source: Author’s own calculation using UNCTAD, 2019 Data 
 
FDI in South Africa more than doubled to USD5.3 billion in 2018 from USD2 billion the previous 
year. However, the increase in FDI inflows for South Africa is mainly due to intracompany 
transfers by established investors. FDI flows into Angola remained negative, recording a 
contraction of USD5.7 billion. This is mainly as a result of oil and gas firms transferring funds 
to parent companies through intracompany loans. 
 
For East Africa, which is the fastest-growing region on the continent, FDI was maintained at 
USD9 billion with the biggest recipient being Ethiopia. Kenya saw an increase in FDI inflows 
by 27 percent (USD1.6 billion), primarily due to investments in the manufacturing, tourism and 
hospitality, chemicals as well as oil and gas industries. However, FDI flows to West Africa 
decreased by 15 percent to USD9.6 billion, mainly as a result of disinvestment in Nigeria by 
43 percent as well as Ghana, which experienced a decrease of eight percent.  
 
2.5.4 FDI inflows into SADC countries 
 
SADC countries compete with other nations across the world in attracting FDI inflows into the 
region. The 2008 global economic crisis, which started in 2008, affected FDI inflows into the 
SADC region to the extent that between 2009 and 2010, the region’s FDI inflow fell by almost 
50 percent (SADC, 2019). However, there is heterogeneity across all the member countries 
in terms of market size, institutional quality, infrastructure, and endowment in strategic natural 
resources, among other factors which affect FDI inflows into the region. This means the global 
economic crisis of 2008 was experienced differently by the various countries. Figure 2.5 shows 





















Figure 2.5: Average Share of FDI Inflows into SADC Countries between 1990-2018 
Source: Author’s calculation using UNCTAD, 2019 Data 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.5, over the period between 1990 and 2018, South Africa received the 
largest share of FDI inflows (37%) compared to its SADC country members. Mozambique 
received 17 percent of the FDI inflows into the SADC region followed by the Democratic 
Republic of Congo which received 10 percent of the FDI inflows. Table 2.2 provides a detailed 
analysis of the FDI inflows into the SADC countries.  
 
Table 2.2: FDI Inflows into SADC Countries between 1990 and 2018 
% Change % Change
1990-2000 2001-2010 2011-2018 1990-2010 2011-2018
Democratic Republic of Congo 12 875 1,832 7,443 306
Madagascar 25 489 507 1,896 274
Mauritius 51 163 398 221 -45
Seychelles 30 119 192 293 52
United Republic of Tanzania 135 756 1,375 460 -67
Angola 602 809 -1,404 34 -102
Botswana 20 360 241 1,700 605
Eswatini 68 53 35 -22 -163
Lesotho 24 51 62 113 81
Malawi 15 77 183 407 122
Mozambique 97 605 4,029 527 -87
Namibia 97 427 629 339 -46
South Africa 853 4,373 4,272 413 -90
Zambia 139 681 1,259 390 -69
Zimbabwe 89 58 452 -35 -108
FDI INFLOWS INTO SADC IN USD MILLIONS
 






























AVERAGE SHARE OF FDI INFLOWS INTO SADC
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The Democratic Republic of Congo was the biggest beneficiary of FDI inflows into the SADC 
region, increasing from a mere USD12 million during the 1990s to USD875 million as from the 
2000s. The country has been in a civil war, and the impact and effect of the Rwanda and 
Burundi war spilt into it. A ceasefire was signed in 1999, and a successful constitutional 
referendum was passed in December 2005; elections were carried out that same year. 
However, there is unending conflict, and the country has a scoring of 3 out of 10 on the political 
stability index (Country Watch, 2017). This signifies high volatility in the country.  
 
Furthermore, the country is ranked number 147 out of 168 countries on the corruption 
perception index by Transparent International (Country Watch, 2017). However, despite the 
negative institutional indicators mentioned above, the country still received FDI inflows, mainly 
because of the availability of strategic mineral resources such as diamonds, crude oil, coffee 
and cobalt, which outweigh the risks of the negative institutional indicators. 
 
South Africa received a larger share of the FDI inflows into the SADC region as from 1990 
onwards as a result of the positive political and institutional developments which took place 
during that period. The first interim constitution was drafted in 1993 following the abolishment 
of Group Areas Act, Land Act, and the Population Registration Act (These were the pillars of 
apartheid). The new constitution came into law in 1997. The country has a resilient constitution 
and there is rule of law, protection of property right, as well as relatively high-quality institutions 
(Country Watch Report, 2016). 
 
Other countries which also received larger shares of FDI inflows into the region between the 
1990s and 2000s include Zambia, Mozambique, Madagascar, the United Republic of 
Tanzania, Namibia and Botswana. In the case of Zambia, after the suspension of the 
Exchange Control Act in 1994, there were no restrictions in terms of foreign currency 
movements. The constitution of Zambia provides for an independent judiciary which is 
separated from the executive and legislative branches. Furthermore, there is contract 
enforcement in the country, hence investors are protected by the law. Zambia is also a 
member of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investments Disputes, and intellectual 
property is protected. These positive institutional developments led to an increase in FDI 
inflows into the country.  
 
While other countries received an increasing share of FDI inflows between the 1990s and 
early 2000s, countries such as Angola and Zimbabwe experienced massive disinvestments. 
For Zimbabwe, the institutional indicators are negative and this is one of the reasons why it 
experienced disinvestment. There are high levels of corruption in the country, rising incidence 
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of police violence and other human rights abuses, there is no rule of law and deteriorating 
levels of democracy. In 2000, there was a constitutional amendment which allowed the seizure 
of land without compensation. Furthermore, there is no protection of property rights. In 2001 
there was also the Land Decree Act which permitted the immediate government seizure of all 
commercial land (Country Watch Report, 2016).  
 
The institutional indicators are also negative in Angola. The country has widespread corruption 
and is ranked 163 out of 168 countries with a score of 15 out of 100 on the 2015 report on 
corruption published by Transparency International. There is also a lack of transparency in the 




This section presented that numerous economic theories have been put forward in a bid to 
explain the reasons for FDI or international capital movements. Some of the theories are 
based on trade theories assuming perfect market conditions, while others assume imperfect 
market conditions. There are also theories that have tried to relate FDI and international trade. 
There is, however, no single theory that can explain the reason and motive for international 
capital movements.  
 
What the discussed theories lack and have not analysed is the role of institutions in attracting 
or repelling FDI. It is also crucial that the reviewed FDI theories are in the context of developed 
countries’ MNCs, and not much has been written in terms of MNCs from developing countries. 
In terms of FDI flows and trends into the SADC region, the analysis showed that different 
member countries are experiencing different FDI inflows.  
 
The results and extent of the inflows differ, depending on the period and the variables being 
analysed. South Africa received the largest share (37%) of FDI inflows into the SADC region 
between 1990 and 2018. Moreover, the history of institutional development over the years for 
the different SADC countries impact on FDI flows. Thus, the flow of FDI into the SADC 
countries closely mirrors the activities that affected the quality of institutions in these countries. 










The main objective of this chapter is to examine the role of institutional variables on FDI inflows 
into the SADC region. For a better understanding of institutions’ role in determining FDI flows, 
a conceptual framework linking FDI determinants with the role of institutions needs to be 
developed. This means bringing together the early work of John Dunning (1973) on the 
Eclectic Theory, which attempted to explain the determinants of FDI inflows, and the work of 
Douglass North (1991) on the role of institutions. This section will review the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effect of institutions on FDI inflows.  
 
The section first considers the theoretical framework regarding the importance of institutional 
variables in determining the flow of FDI. The section also reviews past empirical research on 
the role of institutions in attracting or repelling FDI flows. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, few studies have examined the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows into 
the SADC countries. Those who have do not specifically look at the role of institutions in 
determining FDI inflows into the SADC region. For example, Kapingura et al. (2018) focused 
on the different types of capital flows, while Muradzikwa (2002) did not apply any econometric 
techniques to his studies. Furthermore, existing data and indices, for example, the 
International Country Risk Guidelines, do not cover all the SADC countries. Also, the political 
risk indices for Mauritius, Swaziland and Seychelles are not covered, mainly because of a lack 
of data. There is thus still a need to undertake a comprehensive examination of how all the 
institutional variables determine FDI inflows instead of analysing their effect as single 
indicators.  
 
Most of the available studies on the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows have been 
limited to specific institutional variables without examining their overall impact. For example, 
Addison and Heshmati (2003) only considered democracy in their study; Asiedu (2002) 
examined the effect of political risk for developed and SSA countries only; Asiedu and Lien 
(2011), in a study of 112 developing countries, considered only democracy as an institutional 
variable; and Jensen (2008) examined political risk and democracy and their impact on FDI 
inflows. This chapter aims to fill that gap by examining the effect of 12 institutional variables 
on FDI inflows. 
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In this chapter, the annual average of the 12 components under political risk is calculated for 
all the SADC countries. In previous studies, countries like Mauritius, Swaziland and Seychelles 
were not covered because there were no existing indices calculated before this study. 
Consequently, the main contribution of this chapter is the development of a model that 
measures and assesses the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows for all 15 SADC 
countries utilising 12 institutional indicators.  
 
Furthermore, previous studies used the general panel framework methodology and models 
such as the pooled effect, random effect, and the fixed-effects models. Although they take 
control of the existing heterogeneity across countries, these models do not cover the problem 
of endogeneity. Moreover, the models used in these studies are static. This study applied a 
dynamic panel methodology, which takes both the problems of endogeneity and heterogeneity 
into account. The next section presents the theoretical framework and literature review. This 
is then followed by a description of the methodology, a discussion of empirical results, a 




The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in FDI flows across countries 
(Papaionnou, 2008). However, despite this financial globalisation, most SSA countries still 
face capital challenges to finance domestic investment. Numerous studies, such as those by 
Kapingura et al. (2018), Alfaro, Ozaca and Volosovych (2008) and Akhtaruzzaman, Hazler 
and Owen (2018) have been conducted to understand why certain countries attract more FDI 
than others. Many of these papers were trying to solve the famous “Lucas paradox”6 as to why 
capital does not flow from developed to developing countries according to the standard 
neoclassical growth theory.  
 
Investment theory dictates that firms invest, expecting to get a return on investment and 
minimising the risk of doing business. However, the business environment, in this case, is the 
source of risk, which can play a significant role in investment decisions by foreign firms. 
Included in the business environment are the institutions of the host country. Recently, 
Akhtaruzzaman et al. (2018) concluded that institutional variables such as property rights, 
expropriation risk, governance and corruption play a significant role in determining the cost of 
 
6 The Lucas Paradox comes from the neo-classical growth model which assumes the same technology across all countries. The 
model assumes that capital should flow from countries endowed with more capital to those with less due to the law of diminishing 
returns leading to a convergence of returns in the long run. In reality, however, this is not the case, hence the Lucas Paradox 
(Lucas 1990). 
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doing business in a particular country. In turn, this negatively affects the expected return on 
investment by the investing firm, hence capital inflows. It is thus imperative to understand the 
role of the SSA host countries’ institutions in attracting or repelling capital flows; in this case, 
FDI.  
 
Due to the low savings levels within the economy and the high financing gap created partly 
due to this, it is crucial that SSA countries formulate and implement reforms in a bid to attract 
FDI; although, there is still debate regarding the impact of FDI on host countries’ economies. 
There is a combination of insufficient domestic savings and lack of access to borrowing funds 
from abroad in emerging economies (OECD, 2002). This has led to the conclusion that 
developing countries are trapped in low growth paths, mainly because of the lack of financial 
resources. It is in this regard that FDI inflows are expected to aid economic growth in the host 
countries by providing capital, foreign currency and skills development (OECD, 2002).  
 
Several papers (Slesman, Baharumshah & Wohar, 2015; Jensen, 2003) have claimed that 
FDI may lead to economic growth. Given the low growth rates and the financing gap in SSA, 
FDI can then be both the source of capital and economic growth. However, this needs to be 
empirically examined in the African context, more specifically, at a regional economic level, 
such as the SADC region (SADC, 2012). A careful examination of the reasons why the 
continent has been lagging in terms of attracting FDI is still necessary, and the question is: 
Why has SADC been less successful at attracting FDI despite numerous policy reforms?  
 
Research on FDI over the years has tried to explain decisions relating to location, timing and 
the mode of entry of FDI. History shows that researchers mainly relied on economic 
perspectives in trying to explain FDI decisions (Francis, Zheng & Mukherji, 2009). It should, 
however, be appreciated that in making FDI decisions, firms face several challenges and 
uncertainties that go beyond the known traditional economic factors, such as the availability 
of markets, infrastructure and labour. In recent years, researchers have begun to acknowledge 
and examine the role of institutions in determining the flow of FDI to the host countries (Francis 
et al., 2009).  
 
Yet very few researchers have examined the total institutional environment. Investigating the 
diverse institutional pressures on FDI decisions will shed more light on institutions’ role in 
determining FDI inflows to the host countries for the SADC region. Moreover, foreign direct 
investors respond differently to the various sources of institutional pressure (Francis et al., 
2009). Francis et al. (2009) further argue that institutional factors are more crucial in 
determining the mode of entry of FDI compared to other modes of market entry, signifying the 
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importance and role of institutions in determining FDI decisions. It is in this regard that the 
host country’s institutions are an important determinant of FDI flows (Egan, 2015).  
 
It is widely believed that host countries aiming to attract FDI inflows embark on deliberate 
reform of their institutions (Bevan, Estrin & Meyer, 2004). Nowadays, physical and natural 
endowments are no longer the only factors that can attract FDI; instead, countries’ institutions 
can be regarded as created assets that can be used to attract FDI to the host countries (Bevan 
et al., 2004).  
 
The focus on FDI has slowly moved away from the traditional locational advantages towards 
creative location advantages. These creative location advantages include knowledge-based 
assets and well-functioning institutions (Ali & MacDonald, 2010). This signifies the importance 
of institutions in determining FDI inflows. However, there is no consensus among researchers 
on which institutional variables matter in trying to attract FDI. For example, Addison and 
Heshmati (2003) claim that democracy is a significant institutional variable in attracting FDI 
into host countries; Ali and MacDonald (2010) state that property rights are the most significant 
variable in explaining FDI inflows; and Asiedu (2002) claims that political risk is not significant 
in explaining FDI flows for SSA.  
 
Numerous studies have also shown that MNCs’ foreign investment strategies consider the 
quality of institutions in making investment decisions, especially the mode of entry choice 
(Bevan et al., 2004). However, the relationship between the role of institutions and the impact 
of these institutions on FDI is still under-researched and vastly misunderstood. Established 
indicators, for example, the doing business indicators, need further re-examination in an 
African context. This will deal with the heterogeneity of economic regions and avoid the one-
size-fits-all set of institutional indices.  
 
Researchers generally agree on the role of FDI in the development process, although its 
impact depends heavily on the host country’s initial conditions, such as the development of 
the financial sector and the level of human capital development. However, Africa is still 
attracting low levels of FDI. As a result, many African countries are promoting policy reforms 
such as political and institutional reforms in a bid to attract more of the right kind of FDI inflows 
(Cleeve, 2012). A case in point is Swaziland, which drafted a strategy paper published in 2014 
aimed at strengthening governance and institutional capacity (Country Watch, 2017). In 2005, 
Mauritius instituted reforms that include the liberalisation of trade and investment, lifting of 
price controls, and the reduction of taxes (Country Watch, 2017). Recently, South Africa and 
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Zimbabwe have gone on an investment promotion drive with the aim of attracting FDI into their 
countries.  
 
3.3 DEVELOPING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
There are various theories which have been developed in a bid to explain capital flows across 
the globe. Some of the main theories are discussed in the next sub-section.  
 
3.3.1 Theoretical framework 
 
Several theoretical frameworks have been proposed to explain the determinants of foreign 
capital flows. These theories include the Lucas paradox (Lucas, 1990) and the Fernández-
Aris and Montiel Model (1996). This study adopts the Lucas paradox, which is briefly 
discussed in the following sub-section. 
 
3.3.2 The Lucas paradox 
 
According to the standard Neoclassical Theory, capital should ideally flow from developed to 
developing countries. This is assuming that the countries produce the same goods, use similar 
technology, and there are constant returns to scale in the use of labour and capital as factors 
of production. Another critical assumption is that there should be perfect capital mobility in 
which all investments flow from developed countries to developing countries, and this would 
continue until all returns to all investments are equal in all the countries. The expected 
relationship between output and the factors of production, labour (L) and capital (K) in the 
Cobb-Douglass production function, is represented in equation 3.1. 
 
Yt = AtF (KtLt) = AtKtαLt1-α                   (3.1) 
 
Where: Fk (.) > 0, FL (.) > 0; Fkk (.) < 0, FLL (.) < 0               (3.2) 
 
Y is the production output, and A is the total factor productivity (TFP), which reflects the level 
of technology, in this case, the stock of human capital (Lucas, 1990). Since all countries share 
the same technology and there is perfect competition, it is implied that there should be a 
convergence of the returns to capital. Furthermore, due to the law of diminishing returns, 
capital is expected to flow from highly endowed countries to those that are less endowed in 





’(kjt)                   (3.3) 
 
f (.) represents the net of the depreciation production function in per capita terms, while k 
represents per capita capital, and r is the implied return. In practice, the predicted relationship 
in equation 3.2 does not hold. Less capital flows to capital-scarce countries, and there is no 
convergence in terms of interest rates. This is what is called the ‘Lucas paradox’. 
 
Lucas (1990) argued that this is mainly due to capital market imperfections and economic 
fundamentals across countries. These economic fundamentals also imply differences in the 
countries’ technological factors (At); hence, there will be no equality between any two 
countries. If the assumption of common technology is relaxed and country i is more advanced 
than country j, Lucas (1990) argued that Ait would have higher returns compared to Ajt. This 
explains why country i will attract more capital than country j. Considering the differences in 
the level of technology between the countries, the return to capital can therefore be illustrated 
as follows: 
 
Aitf’ (kit) > Ajtf’ (kjt)                             (3.4) 
 
Lucas (1990) specifies that Ait and Ajt are a representation of other technological factors such 
as institutions as well as the macro-economic conditions, among others. Therefore, capital will 
flow to countries with higher returns, generated by technological factors (including institutions). 
It is in this framework that the role of institutions can be examined in determining FDI flows 
into the SADC region. The theoretical and empirical literature regarding this role raises an 
important policy question, namely how does the role of institutions and transaction costs 
impact on investment and economic growth?  
 
3.4 A SELECTIVE THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE ROLE OF 
INSTITUTIONS IN DETERMINING FDI INFLOWS 
 
Since 1960 there have been several contributions to the literature on the role of institutions 
and transaction costs and how they impact on investment and economic growth. These 
include studies by North (1981, 1991); Knack and Keefer (1995); Hall and Jones (1999); 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); and Rodrik (2000). Korutaro and Biekpe (2013) 
argue that institutions and property rights influence the size of investment as well as the 
efficiency at which inputs are allocated. Generally, the studies agree that institutions play a 
significant role in understanding cross-country differences in terms of economic performance 
and FDI flows. However, there is still some uncertainty on the channels through which 
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institutions influence economic performance. Investors are expected to invest in countries 
governed by clear rules of law, and well-functioning institutions such as an effective regulatory 
framework to deal with issues of information asymmetry, and hence, uncertainty in economic 
exchanges. According to Silajdzic and Mehic (2012), underdeveloped institutions increase the 
cost of establishing firms, which is in line with the argument of Lucas (1990). However, there 
is no agreement on which institutions are important and why. This makes it necessary to 
empirically examine the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows into the SADC region.  
 
Countries have different institutional setups, but it is the FDI’s motive which partially 
determines the institutional variables which are essential in decisions to invest offshore. A 
market-seeking MNC will prioritise the size of the population, GDP and other market size 
indicators, while a resource-seeking MNCs will be more concerned about the availability of 
strategic natural resources such as gold, diamonds and crude oil. This may make the MNCs 
unconcerned about the negative institutional variables such as corruption and military 
involvement in politics. These conditions enable the MNC to achieve its objective of resource 
seeking. 
  
Institutions are defined as the ‘rules of the game’ regarding economic performance. This is 
further explained by North (1991:477), who said that “institutions are humanly designed 
constraints that structure economic, political and social interaction”. The World Bank (2005) 
defined ‘institutions’ as a set of formal and informal rules that govern the actions of individuals 
and organisations, including the interaction of participants in the development process. Formal 
institutions include constitutions and laws, while informal institutions include conventions and 
customs. Formal or informal, institutions are created to reduce uncertainty which comes about 
because of human interactions. Institutions establish and set rules on what individuals can 
and should not do in different scenarios. This therefore means that institutions provide 
economic agents with a predictable framework for interaction.  
 
The role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty through the establishment of a structure for 
human interaction and thus, a framework for economic interaction. However, this does not 
necessarily lead to efficiency. North (1991) argued that institutions impact on economic 
performance due to their effect on production and the cost of exchange. Institutions combined 
with technology can determine the transactions and transformation costs that make up total 
costs (Korutaro, 2010). This means profitability and the reason for engaging in economic 
activities are determined by institutions, hence the influence of institutions on FDI flows.  
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3.4.1  The institutional environment 
 
There are valuable grounds to believe that a good institutional environment, where there is 
efficiency, low levels of corruption, property rights and mechanisms for contract enforcement, 
should attract more FDI inflows into the host country (Ali & MacDonald, 2010). If, for example, 
property rights are poorly protected and contracts are not being enforced, there will be a high-
risk premium which will increase transaction costs and discourage FDI inflows into the host 
country. In a formal system, institutions are required to enforce agreements and reduce 
uncertainties, in the process promoting FDI into the host country.  
 
The investors entering a foreign country should also understand the institutional conditions 
they will encounter in the host country (Ferreira, 2016). An example is Intel’s decision to locate 
to Costa Rica instead of Mexico in 1996. The two countries have the same level of GDP per 
capita in US dollars, and similar levels of adult literacy, yet Mexico had more engineers and 
technically trained graduates compared to Costa Rica. This was supposed to be essential for 
Intel’s decision making. Instead, Costa Rica’s political stability and lower corruption levels 
were crucial in Intel’s final decision to locate to the country rather than Mexico (Alfaro et al., 
2008). This example demonstrates good institutions attracting FDI.  
 
The preceding paragraph further explains that to attract FDI, a robust institutional framework, 
dedicated to assisting investors, is required (Singh, Viviane, Assey & Egesa, 2012). This 
means a strong institutional framework is an essential pillar to attract FDI inflows into the host 
country. It is further argued that the institutional characteristics of the host country play a 
significant role in attracting FDI (Ferreira, 2016). This is more important for LDCs that are still 
experiencing high levels of corruption and dominance of informal institutions over formal 
institutions (Ferreira, 2016).  
 
It was Coase (1992) who first questioned the idea of costless transactions by arguing that 
there are costs that can be incurred during business transactions and negotiations; for 
example, the drawing up of the contracts. These business costs were assumed to be the 
critical determinants of whether a transaction would happen or not. Businesspeople, therefore, 
consider transaction costs when making decisions about what to produce and where to 
produce, thereby determining the direction and flow of capital, in this case, FDI. The 
transaction cost theory states that “arbitrary changes in taxation and other economic 




Furthermore, Coase (1992) concluded that if the cost of making an exchange exceeds the 
expected gains from that exchange, then the exchange will not happen and the expected 
greater production due to specialisation will not be achieved. This view is also supported by 
Seyoum (2009), who claims that transaction costs, such as the costs of adhering to 
government regulations and dealing with corrupt officials and an unpredictable judiciary 
system, could be a significant determinant of investment flows.  
 
The same sentiments are also shared by Bevan et al. (2004), who argue that institutions have 
an impact on firms’ capacity to interact with each other. In the process, it affects the relative 
transaction and coordination costs of production and innovation. This can be interpreted to 
mean that weak institutions increase the need for search and negotiation, as well as the costs 
of contract enforcement. Ultimately, this will lead to high transaction costs7 in setting up a new 
business and discourage FDI in the host country.  
 
Seyoum (2009) states that countries with strong institutions are characterised by independent 
judiciary systems, efficient and effective legal systems, well-protected property rights as well 
as neutral government officials who do not favour well-connected firms and individuals. It is 
assumed that the protection of property rights can boost foreign investment inflows. It can then 
be argued that in many developing countries, the lack of independent judiciary, secure 
property rights, and the rule of law create obstacles for private investment. However, even if 
institutions influence transaction costs that, in turn, determine internalisation decisions, it can 
be argued that economies can function in the face of weak contracting institutions without 
serious consequences (Seyoum, 2009). 
 
3.4.2  Institutional quality 
 
Many indicators have been suggested as a measure of institutional quality. These include 
democracy, political stability/instability, corruption, the burden of regulation, operational risk 
and bureaucracy. If we are to follow the argument of North (1990) that property rights security 
is the most critical institutional variable, then most of these indicators are not directly linked to 
property rights security.  
 
Political instability can be linked to lower property rights security, mainly based on the 
assumption that political leaders facing a loss of power are more incentivised to expropriate 
 
7 Transactions costs are cost as a result of the economic exchange. They include the cost of measuring or determining the value 
of what is being exchanged as well as the costs of protecting property rights, policing and ensuring contract enforcement (Coase 
1992). 
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property rights. However, numerous examples show that even stable political regimes have 
systematically expropriated property rights, while at the same time successfully squashing any 
coups or revolutions against them.  
 
Regarding the use of democracy as an indicator of institutional quality, there is an assumption 
that democratic regimes offer more property rights protection compared to autocratic regimes. 
This is not a fact, as there are numerous examples of good autocratic and bad democratic 
regimes, and the expectation on property rights security runs against the a priori expectations.  
 
Ferreira (2016) argued that the quality of institutions in the host country is a key determinant 
of FDI flows because quality institutions are crucial for macro-economic stability and improve 
the business environment for private players. Quality institutions also reduce additional costs 
to FDI and offer stability and predictability to investors, including guarantees that there will not 
be any policy changes and property rights will be secured (Ferreira, 2016).  
 
Many researchers, such as Lucas (1990), Akhtaruzzaman et al. (2018), Alfaro et al. (2008) 
and Papaioannou (2008) have concluded that the quality of institutions is the reason why 
capital does not flow from developed countries to developing countries. Silajdzic and Mehic 
(2012) further argue that the quality of institutions affects economic transactions in the sense 
that they minimise the costs of exchange, while protecting and ensuring the enforceability of 
the legitimate rights of the parties involved. The quality of institutions also impacts on the type 
of ownership related to FDI. According to Silajdzic and Mehic (2012), the quality of institutions 
impacts on MNCs’ investment strategies, and poor quality institutions are usually associated 
with network-based modes of entry.  
 
It is further argued that contract enforcement and property rights protection can assure efficient 
economic exchange. Similar sentiments are shared by Wernick, Haar and Sharma (2014), 
who found that countries with more impartial and transparent legal systems and better property 
rights attracted more investment flows from the USA. However, a study of the USA alone 
cannot be used to reach conclusions on what determines investment flows into Africa. It is in 
this regard that conclusions from empirical work are far from uniform. This argument is 
supported by Tun, Saini and Law (2012), who state that countries with better institutional 
quality are expected to attract more investments due to improved productivity prospects, a 
reduced cost of doing business, and reduced uncertainty. 
 
Furthermore, according to Zouhaier (2012), a sound institutional environment is positively 
correlated with a good investment climate that, in turn, promotes or encourages both domestic 
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and foreign economic agents to invest. The opposite is true for inferior quality institutions as 
they can increase uncertainty, unpredictability, instability, corruption and transaction costs 
(Zouhaier, 2012). Seyoum (2009) agrees and claims that countries with weak institutions are 
most likely to find it difficult to attract inward investment flows unless they are endowed with 
scarce natural resources and offered large markets. Similarly, from a study of 60 countries, 
Wernick et al. (2014) concluded that weak respect for the rule of law and high levels of 
corruption negatively correlate with private investment flows. Generally, an investor is 
concerned about corruption because it raises the costs of operation and increases uncertainty 
about the economic environment in which the MNC will be operating (Habib & Zurawicki, 
2001). Yet well-developed political and legal institutions can eradicate corruption and 
bureaucracy. This will create a conducive environment that will enable operational efficiency 
for the MNC in a foreign country.  
 
The above sentiments are shared by Ferreira (2016), who further argues that corruption 
reduces the host country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. This is mainly because 
corruption increases the dangers and risks of operating in such a country. Corruption leads to 
lower investor confidence and, in the process, discourages future foreign investments.  
 
However, in 1964 Nathaniel Leff claimed that embracing corruption could help in dealing with 
government inefficiencies. This view was refuted by Brookins (2007), who argued that 
corruption does not improve government efficiency. Cleeve (2012) claims that corruption and 
political risk are significant constraints on FDI inflows to SSA, and Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
argue that corruption has a negative and significant impact on FDI flows.  
 
Reducing corruption leads to improved quality of institutions, which will indirectly promote good 
governance and FDI inflows into the host country (Busse & Hefeker, 2007). Nevertheless, 
there are still disagreements on the impact of corruption on investment decisions. Cross-
country empirical literature has not tested the empirical relationship between corruption and 
government efficiency, hence, its influence on attracting or repelling inward investment. These 
different views clearly show that there is still a gap to decisively conclude on the impact of 
corruption regarding inward investment flows, especially for the SADC countries. 
 
It is further argued that the expectation of higher profits in a foreign or host country is key to 
the investment decision by MNCs (Campos & Kinoshita, 2002). According to Jensen (2008), 
because of the long-term commitment associated with FDI and the expectation by the MNCs 
of positive and stable returns, a stable and consistent positive economic and political institution 
is a necessity. This is because a firm will most likely choose a country that offers high returns 
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and lower production costs as a result of good institutions. Good working economic institutions 
will deal with issues of information asymmetry, and an improvement in profitability and product 
quality. This will also determine where MNCs will decide to undertake FDI.  
 
3.4.3  Locational advantages 
 
In international business, institutions are vital in providing locational advantages as they 
represent huge immobile factors (Bevan et al., 2004). Foreign direct investors need these 
immobile assets to efficiently utilise their core competencies and improve their firm-specific 
advantages (Ali & MacDonald, 2010). Thus, the political, legal and administrative systems of 
the host country have a significant role in determining its attractiveness to foreign direct 
investors.  
 
This view is supported by Egan (2015), who argues that host countries have to deliberately 
establish and promote investment-promoting agencies and efficient institutions in a bid to 
attract FDI inflows. A case in point is Brazil, where the country has put together several policies 
to incentivise MNCs. The policy has worked and seen Brazil’s FDI profile positively changing 
over the years (Egan, 2015). Similarly, a study by Singh et al. (2012) on the role of institutions 
in Rwanda found that institutional reforms have succeeded in starting to attract FDI inflows 
into the country. These reforms should ideally address the issue of property rights, contract 
enforcement and the establishment of an independent legal system.  
 
North (1991) argued that property rights are the key institutional determinant of investment. 
This is supported by Ali and MacDonald (2010) who, in their study of 69 countries, found that 
property rights are the most important institutional variable in determining FDI inflow into the 
host country compared to other variables such as democracy, corruption, political instability 
and social tension.  
 
Once property rights are secured and enforced, the other institutional variables will no longer 
be significant in determining the flow of FDI. Ferreira (2016) similarly agrees that a country 
with effective protection of property rights is bound to improve its attractiveness to FDI. An 
environment that is associated with a weak legal system, violation of property rights and too 
much government interference is associated with low levels of FDI as it is a major deterrent to 
FDI inflows into that country (Ferreira, 2016). It is a priori expectation that a country with 
democratic institutions can provide a conducive environment for property rights, contract 
enforcement and a sound, independent legal system.  
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3.4.4  Democratic, autocratic and repressive regimes 
 
Cao (2009) emphasises the role of democratic institutions in investment flows. However, like 
many researchers, he argues that democratic institutions have adverse impacts on the inflows 
of foreign investment. Cao (2009) further claims that portfolio investors are more concerned 
with institutional variables such as a guarantee of property rights. Jensen (2008) argues that 
democratic regimes reduce the risk to foreign investors, thereby promoting the flow of FDI into 
the host country.  
 
Moreover, according to Asiedu and Lien (2011), there could be a positive relationship between 
democracy and FDI flows, mainly because democracy would make the government 
accountable to its citizens. In turn, this lowers the risk of government interference in MNCs’ 
business space, reduces the risk of policy reversal, and strengthens the protection of property 
rights. Likewise, it is Jensen’s (2003) view that the constraints put on political leaders under 
democratic governments lead to higher levels of political stability and more favourable 
conditions and policies for foreign investors. Furthermore, foreign investors view democratic 
governments as more credible, hence they attract more FDI inflows into the host country 
(Ferreira, 2016).  
 
However, Robert, Shannon and Blanton (2012) argue that autocratic and repressive regimes 
attract more FDI mainly because they will ensure low wages and low production costs for the 
foreign firm. These sentiments are shared by Asiedu and Lien (2011), who also state that 
MNCs might prefer to invest in autocratic regimes mainly because these governments are not 
accountable to their electorates and therefore may be better able to provide protection from 
labour unions and other packages. Furthermore, under autocratic governments, it is easier for 
MNCs to exploit their dominant positions in the host country (Asiedu & Lien, 2011) since they 
will be enjoying the protection of corrupt host government officials. This is highly debatable 
and should be examined in the context of the motive for establishing FDI in a particular host 
country. 
 
A market-seeking FDI will not find an autocratic government more appealing, while a resource-
seeking FDI will be inclined to the autocratic government regime (Asiedu & Lien, 2011). An 
example is SADC countries such as Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, which have 
autocratic leaders but are endowed with strategic natural resources, hence FDI still flows into 
their economies. However, it can be argued that the predatory nature of autocratic regimes 
cannot be trusted to ensure property rights protection. This will then discourage the inflow of 
FDI into the host countries.  
57 
 
An autocratic regime is usually associated with stringent regulatory requirements. There are 
various forms of government regulation, and these include employment laws for hiring and 
firing of employees, ensuring creditors’ rights, protection of foreign and domestic investors, as 
well as the enforcement of contracts. Numerous studies have shown that regulation is an 
important determinant of investment. Generally, regulatory reforms that can significantly lower 
entry barriers encourage investment. This argument is supported by Dawson (2006), who 
concludes that countries with less overall regulation have higher rates of private investment. 
It can further be argued that excessive regulation is the result of inefficient institutions; this 
has led to many recent studies focusing on different aspects of regulation and their impact on 
investment and economic growth in the long run. It is thus imperative that to benefit from 
foreign investment flows, a country needs to have appropriate host government regulations 
and quality institutions in place.  
 
3.4.5  Political stability 
 
Another institutional variable which is important in determining FDI inflows is political stability. 
Political instability is a big challenge in SSA with serious negative implications on FDI (Ferreira, 
2016). Many countries in the SADC region have experienced political instability and these 
include Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho and recently South Africa. Political instability may 
affect economic activities and FDI. If there are changes in politicians, there may be changes 
in policies, potentially impacting foreign direct investors and existing contracts (Ferreira, 
2016). It is argued that a country with a democratic and stable political environment attracts 
more FDI, mainly because the assets of the MNCs will be protected and shielded from 
dictators. According to Jensen (2008), political and economic stability and transparent legal 
regulations regarding MNCs play a significant role in attracting FDI.  
 
Any changes in the government’s policy and political institutions can significantly impact on 
the investment behaviour of foreign direct investors (Busse & Hefeker, 2007). This is because 
there is a risk premium in any investment project, and the location decision of a foreign firm is 
also based on the host country’s political risk. Busse and Hefeker (2007) also argue that there 
is a negative relationship between institutional uncertainty and private investment. It is 
therefore crucial that developing countries strive towards a risk-free political and economic 
environment. 
 
Once foreign investors invest in a foreign country, the process of disinvestment becomes 
costly, depending on the sunk costs. Host governments may agree to terms and provide 
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guarantees to foreign direct investors before they put down their investment. Once the 
investment is in the host country, there is a possibility and the risk that conditions may change.  
Zimbabwe is an example where initial investment decisions were changed or amended. The 
country effected stringent exchange control regulations that included limitations on 
disinvestment and the amount that could be repatriated after declaring a dividend. Such 
foreign investors therefore face serious political risk, and this could be a major factor in 
determining investment decisions in a foreign country like Zimbabwe. It follows that political 
regimes that lower political risks will tend to attract more FDI (Jensen, 2003).  
 
3.5 A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
The last 20 to 25 years have witnessed an overflow of FDI in developing countries. The factors 
that attract FDI vary according to the region and timeframe. This sub-section will give a 
snapshot of the empirical findings regarding the role of institutions in attracting or repelling 
FDI.  
 
3.5.1  Property rights 
 
By using their panel of 69 countries, Ali and MacDonald (2010) concluded that institutions play 
a significant role in attracting or repelling FDI, especially the aspects linked to property rights. 
For instance, the weak judiciary system in Turkey makes contract enforcement and the 
protection of property rights difficult (Dumludag, 2009). This means foreign investors will 
become hesitant to invest under such conditions. Investors with a high rate of innovation, such 
as those in information technology, pharmaceuticals, automobiles or products that require 
patents and trademarks regard intellectual property rights as an important variable before 
making an investment decision in a particular host country. Furthermore, property rights and 
contract enforcement are important institutional variables for foreign investors, given the 
difficulty of disinvesting once a commitment has been made (Moon, 2015).  
 
3.5.2  Democratic accountability 
 
For their study of the role of institutions in attracting FDI for transition economies, Bevan et al. 
(2004) concluded that there is a positive correlation between FDI and the quality of institutions. 
This means the better the institutions in the host country, the more FDI the host country 




The study by Busse (2004), on democratic regimes’ impact on FDI for developing countries 
between 1969 and 1972 found that FDI is significantly higher in democratic countries. 
However, when the study was extended to cover the period 1992 to 2001, the relationship 
was not significant and did not hold. This therefore shows that the level of FDI inflows is also 
affected by the period under study, proving that as dynamics change over time, so does FDI 
inflows.  
 
Similarly, a study by Addison and Heshmati (2003), using the Vanhanen democracy data set 
of 72 countries, concluded that there is a positive correlation between democracy and the flow 
of FDI. Similarly, Busse and Hefeker (2007) claim that MNCs tend to locate to countries where 
there is democracy mainly because it is argued that democracy leads to property rights 
protection, in the process increasing FDI inflows. This same result was found by Li and 
Resnick (2003) for a panel of 53 countries between 1982 and 1995. 
 
Generally, empirical evidence seems to suggest that democratic countries are able to attract 
more FDI compared to autocratic governments because they are viewed as having credible 
institutions that keep to their promises and guarantees (Jensen, 2006; Ahlquist, 2006; Asiedu, 
2006). It must, however, be accepted that some autocratic governments attract more FDI than 
others. The researcher argues that host governments shape the investment climate, although 
there are no guarantees of positive results or increases in FDI inflows, as seen in the case of 
Turkey.  
 
According to Moon (2015), autocrats with long time horizons are able to provide strong 
institutions that can better protect property rights. Autocratic governments with long terms can 
develop and establish credible institutions because they will be motivated by the long-term 
benefits of foreign investments (Moon, 2015). This means these governments can attract more 
FDI than other autocratic governments with shorter terms. We should therefore consider 
variances within different autocratic regimes. It should also be acknowledged that countries 
with strong institutions are not necessarily democratic; autocratic governments can also 
establish credible domestic institutions that protect property rights to attract more FDI (Moon, 
2015).  
 
The above is supported by Li and Resnick (2003), who argue that it is not always obvious that 
democratic countries have advantages over autocratic governments in attracting FDI inflows. 
One of the reasons put forward is that because there is deemed to be accountability in a 
democratic state, elected officials will try to promote competition in their constituencies through 
any means possible; in the process, they block any monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies 
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usually associated with MNCs. The study by Li and Resnick (2003) concluded that democracy 
has mixed effects on FDI flows. However, democratic governments have credibility in terms 
of keeping their initial commitments and therefore provide reliable protection of property rights 
which, in turn, attracts more FDI inflows into the host country (Moon, 2015).  
Given the different arguments about the impact of diverse types of regimes on FDI flows, it 
can be argued that what matters to foreign direct investors may not be the regime type but 
certain institutional variables of the host country. Consequently, as long as the host country 
can provide institutional assurances and credibility, the issue of whether a country is 
democratic or autocratic will not be significant in investment decision making. But this is not to 
disregard the quality of institutions.  
 
A study of developing countries by Ahlquist (2006) concluded that foreign investors are more 
concerned about political institutions than the economic policies of the host country. Ahlquist 
(2006) found that countries with more stable and democratic governments tend to attract more 
FDI. The findings mean that as developing countries implement policy reform, priority should 
be given to the establishment of credible institutions if the goal is to attract FDI.  
 
Natural resources in the host country can affect the relationship between FDI and democracy 
(Asiedu & Lien, 2011:100). These authors analysed the impact of democracy on FDI for 112 
resource-exporting and non-resource exporting developing countries, and concluded that 
democracy was only positively correlated with non-resource exporting countries. Asiedu and 
Lien (2011) found that when operating in non-resource-exporting countries, foreign direct 
investors would prefer democratic governments. However, autocratic governments are 
preferred when foreign direct investors operate in resource-exporting countries. This could 
mean that institutions do not always matter in attracting FDI if a developing country is endowed 
with an exportable strategic resource. Angola, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo are good examples where FDI continues to flow regardless of the political instability.  
 
3.5.3  Institutional quality 
 
Generally, empirical evidence in the literature of FDI determinants – especially for developing 
countries – suggests that the quality of institutions in the host country plays a significant role 
in attracting or repelling FDI (for example Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Wei, 2000; Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2002). In their study (for the period 1981 to 2005), Ali and MacDonald (2010) found 
that the quality of institutions was crucial in determining FDI inflows. This is supported by 
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Asiedu (2006), whose findings for 22 SSA countries showed that a good investment profile is 
positively correlated with FDI inflows while political instability and corruption repel FDI inflows.8  
 
This can be interpreted to suggest that countries can attract and improve the levels of FDI 
inflows by establishing sound institutions. For instance, the improvement in FDI policy was 
found to be positively correlated to the levels of FDI inflows in Africa (Asiedu, 2006). Similarly, 
Asiedu and Freeman (2009), covering 81 countries for the period 1996 to 1998, found that 
corruption has a negative and significant impact on FDI inflows in transition economies. Yet 
this is not always the case. For example, for a study of Turkey, Dumludag (2009) concluded 
that despite several efforts by government to improve the institutional system and establish 
FDI promoting agencies, the levels of FDI inflow into the country never significantly changed 
to mirror the government efforts. This is mainly because the investors see the legislative 
reforms as unreliable, and the adopted laws are not implemented (Dumludag, 2009). The 
findings emphasise the need to understand the role of institutions in determining FDI flows.  
 
Asiedu (2006) determined that a decline in the level of corruption is associated with an 
increase in FDI inflows for African countries. Furthermore, on the factors that determine FDI 
inflows into Africa, Asiedu (2006) found that corruption was the highest obstacle to FDI inflows 
into Africa. Similarly, for a sample of 45 host countries, Wei (2000) determined that as 
corruption increases in a host country, the level of FDI inflow decreases; therefore, there is a 
negative correlation between the level of corruption and FDI inflows. The negative impact of 
corruption on FDI flows has also been established in Turkey, where a survey of investors 
confirmed that corruption in the country was a major deterrent to FDI (Dumludag, 2009). This 
was mainly because corruption brings about uncertainty in the business environment. 
Corruption also impacts on the rule of law and may create a situation where other 
organisations are treated differently and, in the process, promote unfair competition. 
 
These findings were not the same for Latin American and the Caribbean, or SSA countries. In 
contrast, for a study of 73 developing countries for the period 1995 to 1999, Egger, Eggert and 
Winner (2009) found a positive correlation between corruption and FDI inflows. Yet Cleeve 
(2012) found that corruption was not significant in explaining the flow of FDI into SSA. There 
was thus no clear relationship between corruption and FDI inflows as the study produced 
mixed results.  
 
 
8 The effect of corruption on FDI inflows is not always negative. This is because when a country is endowed with strategic natural 
resources FDI still flows into that country as the resources outweigh the risks of corruption.  
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The study by Cleeve (2012) reported that some of the most corrupt countries, as measured 
by the corruption perception index, attracted vast amounts of FDI compared to the less corrupt 
countries. For example, Sudan and Nigeria received a larger share of FDI inflows during the 
period of study, compared to South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana, which were deemed to 
be less corrupt according to the corruption perception index. This could be because a country 
like Nigeria is well endowed in strategic natural resources such as oil, which will make 
investors overlook the other negative institutional variables.  
 
Furthermore, Dutta and Roy (2011) researched FDI inflows to 97 countries for a period 
covering 20 years. They found that the flow of FDI is greatly influenced by the level of 
government stability, socio-economic conditions, the level of democracy, military in politics, 
religion in politics, law and order, as well as the level of red tape. This, however, differs from 
the findings of Campos and Kinoshita (2002), who for 25 transition countries found that not all 
the variables, but only the level of red tape, as well as law and order, impact on the level and 
flow of FDI.  
 
In a study of 34 investors from the OECD countries, Daude and Stein (2007) concluded that 
only government stability significantly impacts on the level of FDI inflows for 151 countries. 
For a study of American FDI outflows into 44 countries, Biswas (2002) found that government 
stability was significant in the decision of the American-based firms to invest in those countries. 
These results are supported by Dumludag (2009), who concluded that political and macro-
economic instability was the most significant factor hindering higher FDI inflows into Turkey. 
This is because political stability is a means through which investors can measure the security 
of their investments before committing to the host country. If the investors are not sure or are 
in doubt, they will be discouraged to invest or will adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude. This highlights 
the role of political instability in determining FDI inflows.  
 
The role of political risk and instability in determining FDI flows is still being debated. According 
to Asiedu (2002), the impact of political risk in determining FDI inflows into SSA was mixed 
and unclear. This could be because different researchers use different variables to estimate 
political risk. Cleeve (2012) argues that many SSA countries could not attract a larger share 
of FDI inflow mainly because of the continent’s hostile investment environment, which 
increases both economic and political risk. Some of the reasons cited by Cleeve (2012) include 
small fragmented markets, corruption, political instability and the effect on FDI inflows on the 
existence of strategic natural resources in the host country.  
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A country with vast mineral deposits is claimed to often have positive effects which may 
outweigh the impact of institutional factors. A case in point is Nigeria, Angola and Zimbabwe, 
where there is political instability, but the high returns from the extractive industries seem to 
compensate for the negative factors such as physical distance, institutional quality and political 
instability in attracting FDI inflows (Cleeve, 2012). Ali and MacDonald’s (2010) study also 
reflected that institutions do not matter in determining FDI flows in the primary sector but the 
institutional quality matters for FDI in the manufacturing and services sectors.  
 
However, the composition of FDI flows has been shifting away from resource-based countries 
towards industrial and services-oriented economies. This can be interpreted to mean that 
natural resource endowments are no longer important in attracting FDI inflows into the host 
country, leaving one to consider other factors such as the credibility and stability of host 
country institutions. This is supported by Asiedu (2006), who argued that countries that do not 
have strategic natural resources or big markets can still attract FDI inflows by implementing 
reforms that improve their institutions. The problem with Asiedu’s study is that it used a very 
small sample and the findings cannot be generalised to other countries. Moreover, it is difficult 
to test and accept Asiedu’s (2006) hypothesis without getting data regarding FDI flows at a 
sectorial level.  
 
The above arguments clearly highlight the fact that the role and impact of institutions in 
determining FDI flows are mixed. This means that comprehensive indicators for institutions 
need to be used to comprehensively determine the role of institutions in FDI flows. The next 
section presents the methodology that was used in this study to model the role of institutions 
in determining FDI flows into the SADC region.  
 
3.6 METHODOLOGY  
3.6.1 The model, data and variable definitions 
 
This section discusses the model used to examine the role of institutions in determining FDI 
flows into the SADC region. The section also gives a brief description of the data used and 
the a priori expectations. The justification for the use of the selected model is also provided. 
 
3.6.2 Data and model description 
 
The study used the panel data modelling approach to identify the factors that determine FDI 
inflows into the SADC region. Thus, the study sought to examine the role of institutions on FDI 
inflows into the SADC region. The study applied a panel modelling approach for all the SADC 
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countries using annual secondary data from 1996 to 2016. The data were sourced from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), World Bank (Development Indicators) and 
UNCTAD. Furthermore, political risk indices for Swaziland, Mauritius and Seychelles, which 
are not part of ICRG data, were calculated for the first time in this study covering the 12 
subcomponents of political risk. The base model estimated was of the form: 
 




FDIit is the dependent variable measuring the inflow of FDI into country i in time t. The variable 
is the log of net FDI inflows expressed as a percentage of GDP. This is done to consider the 
effect of the country size. The data for this variable are taken from the UNCTAD FDI (2016) 
database.  
 
α is a constant term that may capture the effects of other unspecified factors, thus it is a 
common fixed-effect term.  
 
Instit is the target explanatory variable. It is proxied by 12 different measures of institutional 
and political factors. This is important so that the study does not make the same error as 
previous studies by using only one or some of the institutional variables, thus making the 
indicator robust. The variable is constructed from the ICRG, which is published by the PRS 
group. The PRS has provided information on 12 subcategories of political risk indicators in 
assessing the institutional quality of 140 countries. As from 1988, African countries have 
formed part of the analysis. These institutional indices are subjective indicators. However, they 
are reliable and credible because there is a strong incentive for the firm producing the 
information to make it accurate to the best of its ability, to sell to foreign investors. Secondly, 
over the years, foreign investors have successfully been using these indicators to evaluate 
the institutional quality of host countries before making investment decisions. Lastly, the data 
from ICRG have been used widely in economic research as a proxy for institutions.  
 
All the variables are ranked from 0 to 6, where a low score implies weak institutions. It must, 
however, be appreciated that the PRS group ranks these variables differently; some are 
ranked from 0 to 4, 0 to 6, and others are ranked from 0 to 12. As an example, a score of 4 
may mean very low risk for bureaucratic quality (it is ranked from 0 to 4), but a score of 4 for 
socio-economic conditions, which is ranked from 0 to 12, indicates a high risk. This means 
there is a need to adjust the original ranking to be able to make comparisons across the 
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various risk categories. The following are the selected institutional variables for this study and 
are defined in line with the PRS group: 
 
 
i. Democratic Accountability – covers aspects such as government accountability to its 
citizens, civil liberties as well as political rights.  
ii. Law and Order – measures the strength of the legal system in implementing law and 
order.  
iii. Military Involvement in Politics – indicates a breakdown of the democratic system in a 
country and might lead to a higher risk to investors.  
iv. Religious Tensions – indicates the marginalisation of certain religious groups in society.  
v. Ethnic Tensions – refers to divisions which exist in society due to differences in race, 
nationality and language 
vi. Corruption – ranks countries according to their level of corruption as measured by 
Transparency International.  
vii. Investment Promotion – issues under this variable include exchange control regulations, 
contract viability, repatriation of profits, payment delays, among other additional 
investment risks which are not covered elsewhere.  
viii. Socio-Economic Conditions – measures unemployment, poverty and inequality 
conditions. These conditions can constrain and destabilise governments.  
ix. Government Stability – consists of government unity, legislative strength and popular 
support. Thus, it measures the ability of government to undertake its business by 
carrying out its programmes and staying in office.  
x. Bureaucratic quality – measures institutional strength, quality and durability. 
xi. External Conflict – includes all forms of violent and nonviolent pressure, for example, 
war, cross-border conflict, as well as foreign diplomatic pressures.  
xii. Internal Conflicts – measures domestic disturbances, for example, civil war, terrorism 
and civil disorder.  
 
The study adopted the procedure developed by Cleeve (2012) in adjusting the institutional 
variable scores. The use of 𝑥 and 𝛾 is not based on any scientific reasoning. They are 
symbols chosen to show how a case of dealing with 6 (𝑥) as a score and 12 (𝛾) as a 
score. It can be any letter or symbol. Furthermore, the PRS ranks the institutional 
variables scoring differently. The variables are ranked from 0 to 4, whilst others are 
ranked from 0 to 6 and from 0 to 12. The average of these different rankings is seven 
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(7). This is then used in the established formula to standardise the institutional scoring. 
All the rankings were adjusted to have a maximum score of 6 in order to have 
consistency in estimation and interpretation. For variables with scores from 0 to 4, the 




(𝑥 + 1) − 1                     (3.2) 
 




(𝛾 + 1) − 1                     (3.3) 
 
Apart from Cleeve (2012), previous studies, such as Busse and Heffeker (2007), Asiedu 
(2006) and Ali and MacDonald (2010) assumed a uniform scoring across the indicators. This 
may compromise the credibility of their results.  
 
CVit is a vector of other factors that explain the inflow of FDI into the SADC region. These 
controlling variables are drawn from the surveyed empirical literature. However, this was a 
challenge because the empirical literature seems to suggest many variables can be potential 
determinants of FDI inflows. Nevertheless, the study chose variables that have been used 
extensively in the reviewed empirical literature. The traditional and policy variables were 
sourced from the World Bank (2016) under the World Development Index (WDI) database. 
Based on the mainstream literature on FDI, the chosen controlling variables are: 
 
LGDPPC, – this the log of GDP per capita, which is used to measure or capture the impact of 
the market size of the host country in attracting FDI inflows.  
 
Infrastructure Development – in this study, the number of telephone lines per 1 000 people is 
the proxy for this variable (Tele). 
 
Tariff – this is the policy variable that measures the openness of the country to trade and 
investment. It is measured by the mean of the tariff rate to capture the effect of trade policy on 
FDI flows. 
 
Inflation (Infl) – this is a proxy for macro-economic and fiscal stability. 
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LTax – this is a measure of the marginal corporate income tax rate. It is used to measure the 
expected impact of the corporate tax rate on FDI flows.  
 
 
3.6.3 A priori expectations 
 
In undertaking research, it is standard procedure that a priori expectations are provided. It is 
important in comparing the findings of the study with the expected results, and providing valid 
economic reasons if the research findings are not in line with a priori expectations. These a 
priori expectations are informed by existing economic literature on the role of institutions in 
determining FDI inflows. The following is expected in terms of the relationship between FDI 
and the variables under study: 
 
i. Instit: it is expected that an improvement in any of the institutional variables would lead 
to an increase in the flow of FDI into the SADC countries. 
ii. It is expected that LGDPPC was positively correlated with FDI inflows into the SADC 
region. This is mainly because a large market means a bigger demand for the products 
the FDI firm will be producing in the host country. 
iii. Tariff: it is expected that a low level of tariff and an open economy would attract more 
FDI. The more open the economy is, the higher the probability of FDI flowing to those 
host countries. It is therefore expected that an open economy will encourage the inflow 
of FDI. 
iv. Tele is expected to be positively correlated to FDI inflows. This is because satisfactory 
infrastructure makes it easy for FDI firms to conduct business by improving the efficiency 
of investment, hence attracting more FDI inflows in the process. This is more so for 
efficiency-seeking FDI firms. Studies have shown that a weak infrastructure is the 
biggest constraint to FDI inflows in SSA.  
v. Inflation (Infl): macro-economic stability, especially price stability, is one of the key 
factors necessary to stimulate economic growth and FDI flows. If there is no macro-
economic stability, the risk of doing business for the investing foreign firm increases. It 
is therefore expected that lower inflation should be interpreted to mean a good 
investment climate, hence more FDI inflows could be expected. Thus, it is an a priori 
expectation that the lower the inflation rate, the higher the FDI inflows in that particular 
host country. 
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vi. LTax: it is expected that there was a negative correlation between corporate tax rates 
and FDI flows. A higher corporate tax rate is expected to be associated with lower FDI 
inflows into a particular host country.  
 
All the variables used in the study are transformed into logarithms. After considering all the 
discussed variables, the model estimated to determine the role of institutions on FDI inflows 
into the SADC countries was as follows: 
 
LFDIit= αi+βInstit+δ1LGDPPCit+δ2LGDPit +δ3LTeleit+δ4LTariff+δ5LInflit+δ6LTax+εit..(2) 
 
 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the model estimated to determine 
whether institutions matter in determining the flow of FDI into the SADC region.  
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables, 1996-2016 
 
Source: Derived from author’s own calculations 
 
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 3.1 clearly indicate the high level of diversity with 
regard to the SADC countries. The high degree of heterogeneity within the SADC countries is 
further confirmed by the variances of the maximum and minimum values. Thus, the quality of 
institutions as well as key variables, such as GDP, FDI and Inflation within the SADC countries 
greatly vary. The average FDI to GDP ratio for the SADC countries is 1.4 percent, while the 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Definitions
FDI 250  1.268631  1.114218 -2.981883  4.202729 Foreign Direct Investment
GDP 250  1.528680  0.685764 -1.384002  3.290092 Gross Domestic Product
GDP PC 250  1.528680  0.685764 -1.384002  3.290092 Per Capita Income
INFL 250  2.118359  0.896157 -1.742969  5.783816 Inflation Rate
TARIFF 250  1.711295  1.042448 -0.693147  3.663818 Level of Tariff
TAX 250  3.546180  0.416673  2.451555  4.493104 Corporate Tax
TELE 250  0.512833  1.751969 -5.096165  3.450097 Telephones per 1000
BURQUAL 250  0.810329  0.522947 -0.916291  1.667707 Bureaucratic Quality
CORRUPT 250  0.848892  0.585970 -0.916291  1.667707 Corruption
DEMACC 250  1.498763  0.265885  0.693147  1.791759 Democratic Accountability
ETHTEN 250  1.417685  0.219837  0.851410  1.791759 Ethnic Tensions
EXCON 250  1.612781  0.291672  0.143101  2.251292 External Conflict
GOVSTAB 250  1.295963  0.452608 -2.564949  1.697731 Government Stability
INCON 250  1.445683  0.286981 -1.360977  1.791759 Internal Conflict
INVPRO 250  1.219397  0.531071 -2.564949  1.745850 Investment Promotion
LAWORD 250  1.257733  0.517404 -2.564949  1.697731 Law and Order
MILPOL 250  1.206975  0.484055  0.000000  1.791759 Military in Politics
RELTEN 250  0.622462  0.916959 -2.564949  1.609438 Religious Tension
SOCIO_ECON 250  0.323025  0.823120 -2.564949  1.647178 Socio-economic Conditions
INST_AVER 250  4.122705  0.192033  3.564827  4.392905 Annual Institutional Average
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maximum is four percent. This is too small a percentage, given the massive financing gap in 
the region. GDP per capita, which measures the market size, shows that on average SADC 
residents received USD1.528 per person with a severe variation across countries. The highest 
GDP per capita is USD3.290. In terms of infrastructure, on average there are 0.51 telephone 
lines per 1000 people, and a maximum of 3.45 per 1 000 people in the SADC region. Table 
3.2 summarises the correlation of FDI with the independent variables. The section fouses on 
the correlation of FDI and the independent variables in line with the focus of the study.  
 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables in the Model 
LFDI LGDP LGDP_PC LINFL LTARIFF LTAX LTELE LINST_AVER
LFDI 1
LGDP 0.2412475 1 1
LGDP_PC 0.2412475 1 1
LINFL 0.0107999 0.0769502 0.0769502 1
LTARIFF 0.0543478 0.1334669 0.1334669 0.140282 1
LTAX 0.1625206 0.0655259 0.0655259 0.2093233 -0.065281 1
LTELE -0.190796 -0.231629 -0.231629 -0.282771 -0.359667 -0.141122 1
LINST_AVER -0.1376 -0.061642 -0.061642 -0.254543 -0.41636 -0.009367 0.5539731 1  
Source: Derived from author’s own calculations 
 
Table 3.2 shows that FDI has a positive correlation with economic growth, measured by the 
GDP and the market size according to the GDP per capita (GDP_PC). This is in line with the 
a priori expectations. Surprisingly, FDI is also positively correlated with inflation, the tariff rate 
and the tax rate against a negative correlation expectation. This could be because investment 
increases productivity, leading to higher incomes and increased expenditure and inflation. 
There is also a negative correlation between FDI and the average institutional variable and 
the level of infrastructure development as proxied by the number of telephone lines per 1 000 
people. This could be another source of model error, which then requires further analysis.  
 
It should, however, be appreciated that correlation does not mean causation. There is a need 
to undertake a rigorous empirical examination of the role of institutions in determining FDI 
inflows, and the next sub-section runs the necessary regression equations to examine the 
influence of institutions on FDI flows.  
 
3.7 THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
To empirically examine the role of institutions in determining FDI flows into the SADC region, 
the model is estimated using the panel data analysis approach. The advantages of panel data 
are that it allows for the control of variables which one cannot observe or measure. Examples 
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include cultural factors as well as differences in business practices across countries. 
Furthermore, panel data enable the examination of variables that change over time but not 
across entities (i.e. national policies, government regulations, and international agreements, 
among other variables). Therefore, issues of individual heterogeneity are accounted for under 
panel data. 
The study first applied both the random effect and the fixed-effect model approaches in 
analysing the variables. The use of both models takes account of the fixed and random 
individual differences in the observations in a time series cross-section data set. However, the 
application of the Hausman (1978) test suggested the use of the fixed-effects model as it was 
more suitable compared to the random-effects model. The fixed-effects model allows the 
examination of the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables within 
a particular country. Each country has its own characteristics that may or may not influence 
the independent variables. Furthermore, the fixed-effects model removes the effect of time-
invariant characteristics. This enabled the study to assess the net effect of the independent 
variables on FDI. The results of the Hausman tests are summarised in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Hausman Tests 
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
LGDP 4.10166 0.841977 0.366391 0.000
LGDP_PC -3.1957 0.207689 0.592846 0.000
LBURQUAL -0.9947 1.109003 0.174297 0.000
LCORRUPT 0.57253 -1.996747 0.171298 0.000
LDEMACC 0.55276 -0.911846 0.16986 0.000
LETHTEN 1.19468 2.398209 0.066304 0.000
LEXCON -0.3635 1.478562 0.147007 0.000
LGOVSTAB 0.0934 0.398583 0.023683 0.047
LINCON -0.369 -1.258484 0.035189 0.000
LINVPRO 0.03341 0.378368 0.038439 0.079
LLAWORD 0.175 -0.053927 0.051577 0.314
LMILPOL -0.306 -1.25421 0.091475 0.002
LRELTEN 0.10265 0.02545 0.009603 0.431  
Source: Derived from author’s own calculations 
 
Three equations were then estimated using the fixed-effects model. The first was a base 
model with all the institutional variables summed up as the annual average is estimated 
together with the control variables. The second equation further decomposed the institutional 
variables into 12 subcomponents; for example, law and order, government stability, internal 
conflict, etc. The third regression equation estimated FDI inflows against only the institutional 
variables without the control variables. The model results are presented in Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4: Fixed-Effects Generalised Least Squares (GLS) Regressions 1996-2016 







































Observations 310 283 288
R- Squared 0.80 0.83 0.61
** denotes significance at 5%   
Source: Derived from author’s own calculations 
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The numbers in parenthesis represent the static test values. The R squared, which measures 
how good the model is at explaining the changes of the dependent variable (FDI) due to its 
regressors, is 80 percent (base model), 83 percent (equation 2) and 61 percent (equation 3) 
for the three estimated models, respectively. This means the estimated models can reliably 
estimate how institutions influence the flow of FDI into the SADC region ceteris paribus. 
However, in a panel data system, the R squared can be misleading. Table 3.5 summarises 
the relative contribution of each variable to FDI flows.  
 
Table 3.5: Relative Contribution of the Explanatory Variables in Determining FDI 
Flows 
 
Source: Derived from author’s own calculations 
 
GDP contributes more to FDI flow into the SADC region, thus an increase in GDP by one 
percent will lead to a positive increase of FDI flows into the SADC region by 4.348, and the 
variable is statistically significant in explaining FDI flows into the region. However, the impact 
of GDP per capita on FDI flows into the region is negative and the results are statistically 
significant. This is in line with the study’s  arguments which suggest that FDI into the SADC 
region is resource based and not necessarily market seeking. Institutions also play a 
significant and positive role in determining FDI flows into the SADC region and the relationship 
is statistically significant. An improvement in institutions by one percent is associated with a 
1.6 change in FDI inflows into the SADC region.  
 
The results show that infrastructure, as proxied by the number of telephone lines per 1 000 
people, is not significant in determining FDI inflows into the SADC region. The contribution of 
the inflation rate to FDI flows into the SADC region is statically significant. However, the tariff 
rate is not a statistically significant variable to explain the flow of FDI into the SADC region.  
 
3.8 TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES (2SLS) 
 
The estimated equations in Section 3.4.1 only considered heterogeneity and did not deal with 
the potential problems of endogeneity. For example, GDP can also be determined by FDI, and 
an increase in FDI can lead to an increase in GDP and vice versa. This leads to dual causality, 
which then creates an endogeneity problem. Furthermore, some of the proxies used, such as 
telephone lines per 1 000 people, can be another source of problems leading to measurement 
Variable GDP INFL LGDP_PC LTARIFF LTAX LTELE LINST_AVER
Coefficient 4.348 -0.091 -3.935 -0.115 0.548 0.083 1.584
P- Value  0.000 0.057 0.000 0.179 0.040 0.535 0.011
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errors. The model can run into the challenge of omitted variables. To deal with these 
challenges, the study applied the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. First, there was 
a need to test for the existence of endogeneity between FDI and economic growth. This is 
briefly discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
3.8.1 Test for Endogeneity  
 
To check whether there is endogeneity between FDI and economic growth, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman Test was applied in this study. The hypothesis of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test is 
expressed as follows: 
 
Null : 𝐻: 𝛽 =  0 There is no endogeneity. 
Alt : 𝐻: 𝛽 ≠ 0  There is endogeneity. 
 
The results showed that there is a problem of endogeneity, and this was confirmed by the 
Wald Tests of the coefficient diagnostics. The results are presented in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6: Endogeneity Test 
 
Test Statistic Value DF Probability
t-statistic 3.6688428 233 0.000301
F-statistic 13.460407 (1.233) 0.00301
Chi-square 13.460407 1 0.000243
Normalised Restriction (= 0) Value Std Err
C (2) 3.378095450.920752
Restrictions are linear in coefficients
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Null Hypothesis: C(2) = 0
 
 
Source: Derived from author’s own calculations 
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From Table 3.6, it can be confirmed that there is endogeneity between FDI and economic 
growth. This is confirmed by the probability value of 0.0003, which means we reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no endogeneity.  
First, a model with all the institutional variables was run to determine institutions’ influence on 
FDI flows into the SADC region using the 2SLS methodology. However, the results were not 
making economic sense compared to a priori expectations and established economic 
relationships in literature. This meant there was a need to estimate the role of each institutional 
variable, together with the established macro-economic variables, while controlling for the rest 
of the institutional variables. Eleven models were estimated, and the results are shown in 
Table 3.7. 
 
3.8.2 Economic growth and FDI inflows 
 
Results of the estimated models in Table 3.3 indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between economic growth (GDP) and the inflow of FDI for the SADC countries for all the 
estimated models. This confirms the results of the base model estimated using the fixed-
effects model (Table 3.3). The base model shows that FDI inflows for SADC countries are 
positively correlated to the GDP. An increase in GDP leads to an increase in the flow of FDI 
for the SADC countries. This is in line with the a priori expectations and the findings of other 
researchers such as Ali and MacDonald (2010), whose study concluded that the impact of 
GDP growth on FDI is positive and significant. However, the results are only significant for 
model 2, where the institutional variable ‘democratic accountability’ is introduced. This 
highlights the possibility of the interlinkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth for 
the SADC countries. Furthermore, the results demonstrate the significance of democratic 
accountability in determining FDI inflows for the SADC countries.  
 
3.8.3 Institutions and FDI inflows 
 
The base model under the fixed effect also confirms that institutions play a vital role in 
determining FDI inflows for SADC countries. The study found that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between FDI flows and institutions. Therefore, the better the institutions 
in a particular country in SADC, the more FDI flows into that country. This is supported by the 
findings of Alfaro et al. (2008), Papaioannou (2008) and Akhtaruzzaman et al. (2018), who 
resolved that the quality of institutions is a key determinant of FDI flows into a particular 
country. Similarly, for a study of 40 SSA countries, Cleeve (2012) concluded that the quality 
of institutions plays a significant role in determining FDI inflows. For the study of Rwanda, 
Singh et al. (2012) also determined that institutions play an essential role in determining FDI 
75 
inflows. Moreover, the results are in line with the findings of Bevan et al. (2004) for a study of 
transition economies, who concluded that FDI is positively correlated to the quality of formal 
institutions.  
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Table 3.7: Results of the 2SLS Estimated Models 
 
Source: Derived from author’s own calculation
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
LGDP 0.023 0.187 0.102 0.022 0.055 0.051 0.025 0.062 0.031 0.042 0.036
(0.675) (0.00)** (0.091) (0.696) (0.369) (0.395) (0.672) (0.294) (0.558) (0.453) (0.520)
LGDP_PC 0.153 0.163 0.242 0.293 0.236 0.213 0.248 0.251 0.192 0.242 0.395
(0.245) (0.242) (0.069) (0.031)** (0.084) (0.130) (0.067) (0.063) (0.131) (0.071) (0.005)**
LINFL -0.119 -0.163 -0.156 -0.150 -0.152 -0.348 -0.151 -0.150 -0.106 -0.350 -0.139
(0.019)** (0.001)** (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.033) (0.000) (0.008)
LINVPRO 0.214 0.195 0.176 0.908 0.107 0.075 0.098 0.160 0.246 -0.104 0.194
(0.104) (0.125) (0.190) (0.18) (0.23) (0.671) (0.465) (0.243) (0.054) (0.560) (0.150)
LTARIFF -0.320 -0.247 -0.310 -0.216 -0.313 -0.282 -0.286 -0.306 -0.270 -0.293 -0.212
(0.000)** (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.025)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.010)**
LTAX 1.582 0.977 1.146 1.109 1.099 1.223 1.150 1.151 1.481 1.297 1.179
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.014)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
LTELE -0.032 -0.256 -0.295 -0.341 -0.342 -0.424 -0.345 -0.328 0.097 -0.508 -0.367























Observations 310 289 310 310 309 305 310 310 310 305 310
R- Squared 0.42 0.46 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.40
** denotes significance at 5%  
Estimated Models
77 
3.8.4 GDP per capita and FDI inflows 
 
The results of the fixed-effect model show that there is a negative relationship between FDI 
inflows and the GDP per capita, both in the base model and the second model, which included 
institutional variables in addition to the control variables. The relationship is also statistically 
significant. The results are not in line with a priori expectations and the market size and output 
theory. This could mean that MNCs invest in the SADC region for cheap natural and human 
resources and they are not necessarily market seeking. In this regard, the products of the 
MNCs are exported to other foreign markets. An example is the MNCs of a Chinese shoe 
factory in Ethiopia, where almost all of the output is exported. This factory is owned by the 
Dongguan Huajian Group, and since its establishment in Ethiopia in 2012, it has employed 
over 4 000 people, of which more than 90 percent are local hires. Every year, about 2.4 million 
pairs of shoes, including brands like Naturalizer, Nine West and Guess, labelled “Made in 
Ethiopia”, are shipped to the US market, bringing profits to the Chinese company and US$20 
million foreign exchange earnings to Ethiopia. 
 
However, the results of the 2SLS (Table 3.7) confirm that the market size in the host country 
has an effect on attracting FDI inflows for the SADC region across all the estimated models. 
There is a positive relationship between FDI inflows and the market size as proxied by the 
GDP per capita (GDP_PC). The results are statistically significant under models 4 and 11, 
where there is law and order as well as government stability. Comparably, in a study of 40 
SSA countries, Cleeve (2012) reached similar conclusions.  
 
3.8.5 Inflation rate and FDI inflows 
 
As expected, there is a significant negative relationship between the inflation rate of a 
particular country in SADC and the inflow of FDI into countries across all the estimated models, 
including the fixed-effect base model. This is the same observed relationship in equation 2, 
after decomposing the institutional variables into the 12 subcomponents, in line with a priori 
expectations and reviewed literature. An environment with high inflation makes it difficult for 
firms to plan and maximise their profits, which is their main objective. It therefore makes 
economic sense that an increase in inflation leads to a decrease in the flow of FDI into the 
SADC region. For example, in February 2016, Zambia recorded an inflation rate of 22.9 
percent, making planning difficult and eroding the real and expected profits for the foreign 
direct investor. This led to Zambia experiencing disinvestment of 69 percent by 2018 
(UNCTAD, 2019).  
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3.8.6 Investment promotion and FDI inflows 
 
The results show that deliberate efforts to promote investment in a host country lead to an 
increase in FDI inflows into the SADC region. This is in line with the a priori expectations and 
the findings of Dumludag’s (2009) study of Turkey, and Egan’s (2015) study of Brazil. The 
deliberate efforts of these countries to promote FDI yielded positive results.  
 
Investment promotion is positively related to FDI flows for the SADC region, and the 
relationship is statistically significant for the estimated model 9. Therefore, SADC countries 
should establish independent investment promotion agencies to attract FDI inflows into their 
economies. Singh et al. (2012), as well as Egan (2015), concluded that investment promotion 
efforts lead to more FDI inflows for the host countries Rwanda and Brazil, respectively. 
However, these countries are not within the SADC region, meaning there may be other factors 
such as physical infrastructure and geographical location which determine the flow of FDI, 
hence the same result should not be expected for the SADC countries.  
 
In 2005, Mauritius instituted reforms which included the liberalisation of trade and investment, 
lifting of price controls and the reduction of taxes. The Mauritius Export Development and 
Investment Authority was established in 1984 to assist investors and promote exports. These 
reforms led to higher FDI inflows into the country from an average of USD51 million during the 
1990s to an average of USD398 during the early 2000s (UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
Similarly, in 1990, the United Republic of Tanzania legislated the National Investment 
Promotion and Protection Act, which led to the establishment of an Investment Centre 
(Country Watch, 2016). The investment centre plays a role in promoting and supporting foreign 
investment into the country. This led to the United Republic of Tanzania experiencing an 
increase in FDI inflows from USD135 million during the 1990s to USD756 million during the 
early 2000s (UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
In 2006, Zambia established a Development Agency which allows foreign investors to invest 
in any activity open to the private sector. This was a key move to promote FDI inflows, and 
between the early 2000s and 2010, the country experienced an increase in FDI inflows of 389 
percent (from USD139 million to USD681 on average).  
 
For a study on the determinants of FDI into developing countries, Asiedu (2002) concluded 
that these determinants are not uniform across Africa and that policies that have been proven 
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to work in other economic regions do not necessarily work in Africa. Therefore, Africa, as a 
region, is different and FDI policies should be formulated in the right context.  
 
3.8.7 Corporate tax and FDI flows 
 
Contrary to expectations, there is a positive relationship between FDI flows and the level of 
corporate tax in the host country for the SADC region, and the results are statistically 
significant. This could mean that the MNCs that invest and operate in the SADC region are 
usually in the mining and oil industrial sectors; for example, diamonds in Botswana and 
Zimbabwe, gold and platinum in South Africa, and oil in Angola (Country Watch, 2017). The 
availability of such strategic natural resources causes MNCs to overlook other variables such 
as a high corporate tax. This could be due to the high profit margins which the MNCs still 
realise regardless of the high corporate tax. Furthermore, in line with the resource seeking 
motive, the high corporate tax will not be a hinderance to MNCs.  
 
3.8.8 Bureaucracy and FDI inflows 
 
An increase in the level of bureaucracy leads to a decrease in the flow of FDI into the SADC 
region; this is in line with the a priori expectations. Bureaucracy leads to inefficiencies which 
are a cost to the firm that erodes the expected profits. Naturally, MNCs will be hesitant to 
invest in such a business environment. Likewise, in a study of 40 SSA countries, Cleeve 
(2012) found that bureaucracy leads to a decrease in the flow of FDI. To partially deal with the 
constraint of bureaucracy, host countries should ensure that regulatory frameworks are not a 
burden to investors. Dumludag (2009) agrees, and based on a study of Turkey, claims the 
regulatory framework is an important determinant of FDI inflows. 
 
Mauritius established a board of investment in 2001 to reduce bureaucracy. It takes only two 
weeks to get approval for an offshore or Freeport license, since there is a Mauritius Offshore 
and Business Activities Authority as well as the Mauritius Free Port Authority (Country Watch, 
2016). These authorities do not require cabinet approval to make decisions. Thus, between 
2001 and 2010, FDI inflows into the country increased from an average of USD51 million to 
an average of USD163 million, which is a 219 percent increase (UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
3.8.9 Democracy and FDI inflows 
 
The results indicate that an increase in democracy leads to an increase in the inflow of FDI for 
the SADC countries. In a study of the interlinkages between democracy, FDI and natural 
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resources, Asiedu and Lien (2011) came to the same conclusion. An increase in democracy 
makes political leaders accountable to their citizens, hence one would assume that issues of 
contract enforcement, corruption and property rights would be respected. MNCs would 
therefore find it easy to invest in such a business environment, thereby increasing the inflow 
of FDI into the host country. These sentiments are shared by Jensen (2008), who concluded 
that democratic governments promote FDI inflows into the host country, as they are perceived 
to present less of a risk to MNCs investors. Jensen (2003) found that a switch from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic regime increased FDI inflows by 60 percent for 114 
countries.  
 
However, the relationship between democracy and FDI inflow is not statistically significant. In 
the SADC region, the type of regime, whether democratic or autocratic, does not really matter 
in determining and influencing the flow of FDI into the region. These findings are in line with 
those of Asiedu and Lien (2011), whose study determined that democracy only promotes FDI 
if the value of the share of minerals and oil in total exports is less than a certain critical value. 
From the examined 122 countries they reviewed, 90 countries showed a positive relationship 
between FDI and democracy, while 22 countries showed that an increase in democracy 
reduced FDI inflows into the host country. One possible explanation is that the availability of 
natural resources overshadows the negative institutional factors. Again, Zimbabwe (diamond, 
gold and platinum), Angola (oil) and Zambia (copper) are classic examples where democratic 
accountability does not matter in terms of attracting or repelling FDI flows because they are 
endowed with strategic natural resources. 
 
3.8.10 Law and order and FDI inflows 
 
The results indicate that an improvement in law and order leads to an increase in the inflow of 
FDI for the SADC countries. This is again in line with the a priori expectations and other 
researchers such as Cleeve (2012), whose study concluded that a country with law and order 
tends to attract more FDI inflows. Similarly, according to Busse and Hefeker (2007), ensuring 
basic rights and promoting the rule of law are significant in attracting FDI inflows. 
 
Although the influence of law and order is in line with expectations and theory by exhibiting a 
negative relationship with FDI flows, it is not statistically significant. This could be because 
many African countries in the SADC are endowed with strategic natural resources which make 
investors overlook the lack of law and order and other institutional variables; endowment in 
natural resources is therefore a key factor in determining FDI inflows. Researchers, such as 
Asiedu (2006), Campos (2004) and Ferreira (2016), came to the same conclusion. However, 
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because the relationship is not significant, the results become inconclusive, which means that 
law and order cannot explain the flow of FDI into the SADC region.  
3.8.11 Military in politics and FDI inflows 
 
The involvement of the military in politics is associated with a decrease in the inflow of FDI for 
the SADC countries. The results show that if the military gets involved in politics, it leads to a 
decrease of FDI inflows into the SADC region, and the relationship is statistically significant. 
The finding is in line with expectations, as the involvement of the military in politics means 
there is a high risk of political change, and the new government can change existing 
agreements and arrangements with MNCs. The results are supported by Cleeve’s (2012) 
findings, which showed that once the military gets involved in politics, it acts as a deterrent for 
FDI inflows into that particular country. 
 
Madagascar is a perfect example of the effect of military involvement in politics on FDI inflows. 
The country was a French Colony and gained its independence in 1960. In 1972 there was a 
coup which meant military power in the country. A new constitution was adopted in 1975 and 
the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. In 1993, there was an end 
to the one-party state, causing an increase in FDI inflows into the country. However, in 2009, 
the then-president was forced to resign in military style and the opposition took over. The 
power struggle turned violent and left more than 100 people dead (Country Watch, 2016). This 
led to a de-acceleration of the FDI increase into the country, from a previous average increase 
of 1 586 percent (USD25 million to USD489 million) between 1990 and 2010, to a mere 
increase of 3.7 percent (USD489 million to USD507 million) between 2010 and 2018 
(UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
3.8.12 Socio-economic conditions and FDI inflows 
 
The socio-economic conditions of the host country are positively related to the inflow of FDI 
into the SADC countries, and the results are statistically significant. This means that an 
improvement in the host country’s socio-economic conditions will lead to an increase in the 
inflow of FDI into that particular country. Conversely, a deterioration of the socio-economic 
conditions will lead to a decrease in FDI inflows. One example of a country which experienced 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions and disinvestment, is Namibia. 
 
In 2001, there was pressure to fast-track the land redistribution process in Namibia and the 
president at that time, Sam Munjoma, made the pronouncement that if the ‘willing buyer willing 
seller’ Land Reform Act was not working, there might be a need to relook at the policy. In the 
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2000s, there was a perception that the Namibian government was incompetent and corrupt; 
for example, when Namib Air was in dire financial distress with an estimated debt of half a 
billion Namibian dollars. This was followed by a strike by the National Union of Mine Workers 
in 2001 against the mismanagement of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Country Watch, 
2016). These socio-economic conditions led to a decrease in the rate of FDI inflows into the 
country. Namibia’s FDI inflows increased by only 47 percent during this period compared to a 
340 percent increase between the 1990s and the early 2000s (UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
3.8.13 Corruption and FDI inflows 
 
As shown by the work of Asiedu (2006), corruption is a major constraint to the inflow of FDI to 
the SADC countries. The results show that an increase in corruption will lead to a decrease in 
the inflow of FDI into the SADC countries, and the results are statistically significant and in 
line with the a priori expectations. SADC countries should therefore address their leadership 
and governance issues with the aim of stamping out corruption. A case in point is in South 
Africa, where the government has been on an anti-corruption drive by establishing various 
commissions of enquiry, especially for State Owned Companies (SOCs). Similarly, Zimbabwe 
has established an anti-corruption unit to deal with the rampant corruption in that country, in 
the hope that it will improve the image of the country, business confidence and, in the process, 
lead to an increase in the inflow of FDI. Botswana similarly benefited in terms of FDI inflows 
as a result of a low level of corruption.  
 
In 2003, Botswana topped the list of African countries in terms of governance by the World 
Economic Forum (Country Watch, 2016). This index includes variables such as the rule of law, 
corruption and contract enforcement. In 2015, Botswana was ranked as showing the best 
credit risk in Africa. These developments led to the country receiving an increasing share of 
FDI inflows. During the 1990s, FDI inflows to Botswana were on average only USD25 million, 
but this increased to USD360 million by 2010 (UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
3.8.14 Government stability and FDI inflows 
 
Government stability is an important institutional variable in determining the flow of FDI into 
the SADC countries; a stable government is associated with an increase in the inflow of FDI 
for the SADC countries. Moreover, this is supported by the findings of Ahlquist (2006) who 
concluded, in a study of FDI into developing countries, that countries which are more politically 
stable tend to attract more FDI inflows. Busse and Hefeker (2007) also reported that 
government stability determined FDI inflows in a study of 87 developing countries. 
83 
 
For instance, Madagascar’s government is not stable. The country has a score of 4 out of 10 
with regard to the political risk index as well as political stability (Country Watch, 2016). As 
already discussed, this has significantly affected the flow of FDI into the country. On the 
contrary, the United Republic of Tanzania got its independence in 1964 and the constitution 
allowed for a one-party state. From independence until the 1980s the country was a one-party 
state with a socialist model of economic development. In 1994, the country made some 
political and economic reforms as well as multi-party elections and thus ended the one-party 
rule. In 2000, the country conducted peaceful elections which were contested by 13 political 
parties (Country Watch, 2016). These developments saw FDI inflows into the country 
increasing on average from USD135 million during the 1990s, USD756 million during the early 
2000s to USD1 375 million currently (UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
3.8.15 Tariff rate and FDI inflows 
 
The results confirm that there is a negative correlation between the tariff rate and the flow of 
FDI into SADC countries. This is similar to the results of the fixed-effect base model as well 
as the findings of Jude and Levieuge (2017). This makes economic sense as high tariffs make 
the import of raw materials expensive if the MNC is manufacturing products that require 
imports from outside the foreign country where it will be operating. Even in resource-seeking 
FDI, for example in the mining sector, there is still a need to import heavy-duty equipment into 
the SADC countries, hence a high tariff will add up to the total costs of imports.  
 
However, the impact of the tariff is not statistically significant in the fixed-effect base model. 
Yet in the second equation, after disintegrating the institutional variables, the tariff rate 
becomes significant; thus, tariffs play an important role in determining FDI flows into the SADC 
region when combined with the elements of institutional variables. This further amplifies the 
importance of institutions in determining the flow of FDI into the SADC region.  
 
3.8.16 Internal and external conflict and FDI inflows 
 
Internal and external conflicts negatively impact the inflow of FDI into the SADC countries and 
the results are significant. This is in line with the findings of Busse and Hefeker (2007), who 
claim that FDI inflows are determined by government stability, and the absence of internal 
conflicts and ethnic tensions. A country can determine its domestic politics and conflicts but 
will have no direct control over the affairs of its neighbours. Thus, the results indicate that, 
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within the SADC region, external conflicts lead to a decrease in the inflow of FDI. This is the 
so-called spatial contagion effect or the neighbourhood effect (Jude & Levieuge, 2017).  
3.8.17 Ethnic tensions and FDI inflows 
 
Ethnic tension refers to divisions which exist in society due to differences in race, nationality 
and language (Cleeve, 2012). Ethnic tensions are positively correlated to the flow of FDI into 
the SADC region and the relationship is significant under the fixed-effect model. However, 
using the 2SLS, the relationship is negative and in line with the a priori expectations, although 
it is not statistically significant. According to Busse and Hefeker (2007), ethnic tensions 
determine the flow of FDI. This may be because certain ethnic groups will protect the MNCs 
operating in their country as they will benefit from the presence of such foreign investors. Thus, 
if the ethnic group in power favours and protects the MNC, FDI will flow into that particular 
host country and, more specifically, in a particular geographical region within the host country. 
This is mainly true for resource-seeking FDI, for example, the mining of strategic mineral 
resources such as diamonds and gold. 
 
Mauritius have good institutional structures which in 1999 dealt with rising ethnic 
confrontations (Country Watch, 2016). The country has a reputation of stability and racial 
harmony among its mixed population of Asians, Europeans and Africans. As a result, FDI 
inflows into the country have been increasing from an average of USD51 million in the 1990s, 
USD163 million during the early 2000s to USD398 million currently (UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
3.9 ROBUSTNESS TEST 
 
To check the results established using the 2SLS methodology, this study re-estimated the 11 
models in Table 3.7, using the dynamic GMM technique. The dynamic GMM technique makes 
it possible to observe the interaction of the variables and allows for feedback effect. It also 
takes heterogeneity into account, as well as deal with possible challenges of endogeneity. 
Results of the GMM technique are in line with the output of the 2SLS in terms of the sign of 
the coefficient and significance. For example, GDP is positively associated with FDI, thus an 
increase in GDP leads to an increase in FDI flows into the SADC region. There is negative 
relationship between inflation and FDI inflows meaning an increase in inflation lead to a 
decrease in FDI inflows into the SADC region. The results also confirm the negative impact of 
corruption on FDI inflows for the SADC region. The results are significant at all levels of 
significance and highlighted in Table 3.8. This means the estimated models through the 2SLS 
can be used to understand institutions’ influence on FDI flows into the SADC region.  
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Table 3.8: Estimated GMM Models Results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
LGDP 0.023 0.187 0.055 0.051104 0.051 0.031 0.102 0.036 0.025 0.062 0.022
(0.6751) ***(0.0049) (0.3694) (0.3949) (0.3949) (0.5577) *(0.0908) (0.5204) (0.6716) (0.2938) (0.6957)
LGDP_PC 0.153 0.163 0.236 0.213452 0.213 0.192 0.242 0.395 0.248 0.251 0.293
(0.2457) (0.2421) *(0.0839) (0.1302) (0.1302) (0.1306) *(0.0692) ***(0.0050) *(0.0668) *(0.0629) **(0.0310)
LINFL -0.119 -0.163 -0.151900 -0.348309 -0.348 -0.106 -0.156 -0.139 -0.151 -0.150 -0.150
***(0.0198) ***(0.0011) ***(0.0048) ***(0.0000) ***(0.0000) **(0.0327) ***(0.0028) ***(0.0078) ***(0.0044) ***(0.0043) ***(0.0044)
LINVPRO 0.214 0.195 0.107 0.074941 0.075 0.246 0.176 0.194 0.098 0.160 0.908
(0.104) (0.1248) (0.4262) (0.671) (0.671) **(0.0544) (0.1899) (0.15) (0.4652) (0.2431) **(0.025)
LTARIFF -0.320 -0.247 -0.313234 -0.282116 -0.282 -0.270 -0.310 -0.212 -0.286 -0.306 -0.216
***(0.0000) ***(0.0014) ***(0.0002) ***(0.000) ***(0.0004) ***(0.0003) ***(0.0001) ***(0.0102) ***(0.0004) ***(0.0001) ***(0.0136)
LTAX 1.582 0.977 1.099 1.223090 1.223 1.481 1.146 1.179 1.150 1.151 1.109
***(0.0000) ***(0.0014) ***(0.0004) ***(0.000) ***(0.0000) ***(0.0000) ***(0.0000) ***(0.0000) ***(0.0000) ***(0.0000) ***(0.0000)
LTELE -0.032 -0.256 -0.342 -0.423534 -0.424 0.097 -0.295 -0.367 -0.328 -0.341






















Observations 310 289 310 310 309 305 310 310 310 305 310
R- Squared 0.42 0.46 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.40
*** denotes significance at 1% , ** at 5% and *at 10% 
Estimated Models
 
Source: Author’s own calculations using Eviews
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3.10 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The policy implications from the study clearly indicate that the growth rate of the host country is 
important in attracting FDI inflows into the SADC region. This means SADC countries need to 
promote growth-enhancing policies and initiatives to attract FDI. However, the impact of the size 
of the market in the host SADC countries is still ambiguous in attracting or repelling FDI flows. 
Therefore, the majority of the MNCs that invest in the SADC region are not necessarily market-
seeking but resource-seeking. Governments in the SADC region should thus implement terms 
and conditions that will ensure FDI comes with the intended and desired benefits, not only 
depleting or removing the host countries’ resources.  
 
The role of institutions in determining FDI flows cannot be overemphasised. All the SADC 
countries should ideally work together and formulate common policies that support and promote 
good institutions, for example, low levels of corruption, promoting peace and stability in the region, 
reducing the involvement of the military in politics, promoting the rule of law, etc. This is important 
to avoid the negative neighbourhood effect, which might affect the rest of the SADC countries 
attempting to improve on governance and other institutional variables.  
 
SADC governments should set up independent investment promotion agencies in their 
economies to promote FDI and, in the process, deal with the funding gap problem. This is because 
the empirical results show that there is a positive and significant correlation between investment 




The study examined the role of institutions in determining the flow of FDI using three panel data 
techniques, namely the fixed-effects model, 2SLS and the GMM technique. The study made use 
of all 12 institutional indicators and calculated institutional indices for countries like Mauritius, 
Swaziland and Seychelles for the first time in the academic literature. 
 
From the literature review and results of the econometric models developed in the study, it is 
evident that institutions play a significant role in attracting or repelling FDI. Institutions play a 
central role in determining FDI inflows into SADC countries, and there is a positive correlation 
between FDI and economic growth. The study thus found a positive and significant relationship 
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between FDI flows and institutions; the better the institutions in a particular country in SADC, the 
more FDI flows into that country.  
 
Investment promotion is positively related to FDI flows for the SADC region, and the relationship 
is statistically significant. Thus, the results show that deliberate efforts to promote investment in 
a host country lead to an increase in FDI inflows into the SADC region.  
 
In the SADC region, the type of regime, whether democratic or autocratic, does not really matter 
in determining and influencing the flow of FDI into the region. For example, the modelling results 
confirm that democratic accountability does not always impact on the flow of FDI into the SADC 
region.  
 
Furthermore, government stability is a significant institutional variable in determining the flow of 
FDI into the SADC countries. The results show that a stable government is associated with an 
increase in the inflow of FDI for the SADC countries. The determinants of FDI are not uniform 
across Africa, and policies that have been proven to work in other economic regions do not 
necessarily work in SADC. 
 
Corruption is a major constraint to the inflow of FDI to the SADC countries. The theoretical and 
empirical literature confirm that there is a correlation between corruption and the flow of FDI. Even 
though the findings for the impact of corruption on FDI are mixed for other studies, this study 
found a significant negative correlation between corruption and FDI inflow in a particular host 
country. Thus, SADC countries should put measures in place to deal with corruption.  
 
The study further showed that the level of good governance, property rights, business regulation 
and political stability impact on the flow of FDI. However, for resource-exporting developing 
countries, institutional variables are not always significant in determining the flow of FDI. Lastly, 
the availability of strategic natural resources such as diamonds, gold and oil in host countries can 










This chapter examines the relationship among institutions, FDI and economic growth and 
estimates the effects of FDI and institutions on the economic growth of SADC countries for the 
period covering 1996-2016. Institutional quality also determines the absorptive capacity of the 
host country and, in the process, the effect of FDI on economic growth. Previous studies, such as 
those by Carkovic and Levine (2005) and Alfaro (2003), ignored the role of institutions in host 
countries in determining the impact of FDI on economic growth. How FDI influences economic 
growth via institutions is a fundamental academic question with significant policy implications. 
This will provide the basis for appropriate policies to attract FDI and reform certain institutional 
variables with the aim of improving the FDI-growth nexus in the SADC region.  
 
This study applied the dynamic panel GMM technique to deal with the endogeneity problem. 
Moreover, the three-way linkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth for all the SADC 
countries were examined. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, no empirical studies have 
focused on the examination of the three-way linkages among institutions, FDI and economic 
growth using a dynamic panel GMM-equation model, applying the growth model framework. The 
model makes it possible to examine how institutions, FDI and economic growth are interrelated 
and the respective impacts thereof. This means that the methodology applied in this study goes 
beyond previous studies that analysed only the impact or effect of FDI on economic growth or 
vice versa; for example, Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) and Durham (2004). Thus, the 
methodology allows us to examine the indirect effects of FDI for the SADC countries in terms of 
economic growth, or the other way around. 
 
There are perceived economic benefits from the inflow of FDI and thus both developed and 
developing countries implement policies that encourage the inflow of FDI, such as the removal of 
capital barriers and the reduction of regulatory burden. A primary reason for this is FDI being 
regarded as a solution to boost economic growth (Jude & Levieuge, 2017). Generally, economists 
such as Malikane and Chitambara (2017), Iamsiraroj and Ulubasoglu (2015), Li and Liu (2004), 
Baltabaev (2014), and Batten and Vo (2009) agree that FDI inflows can lead to an increase in 
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economic growth. However, over the years, there have been numerous theoretical and empirical 
arguments regarding the impact of FDI on the host country’s economy.  
 
Several variables and methodologies to determine the effect of FDI on economic growth all 
yielded different results. These arguments make it quite difficult for policymakers to determine 
whether advocating for FDI inflows into their countries will be an appropriate policy decision. 
Busse and Groizard (2008) argued that FDI might provide new capital into the host country’s 
economy.9 In addition, De Mello (1999) concluded that FDI is expected to drive long-run economic 
growth through technological upgrading and knowledge spillovers. The fact that these respectable 
researchers are not writing with certainty shows that the effect of FDI on the host country’s 
economy is not a given. As countries aim to increase FDI inflows, they should concentrate not 
only on the quantity or volume of FDI inflows; thought should also be given to the quality of FDI 
inflows into the host country and the quality of institutions. Greenfield FDI is preferred to brownfield 
FDI. Furthermore, FDI in the primary sector of the economy is regarded as poor quality FDI 
compared to the secondary sector of the economy.  
 
Researchers, such as Sen et al. (2012), concluded that there is a significant relationship between 
FDI and economic growth in the case of Brazil, Argentina, Turkey and Thailand for the period 
1980 to 2011. However, the study was not explicit in the direction of Causility. This raises the 
question of the direction of causality between FDI and economic growth, hence the need to 
understand the relationship within the African context, specifically for SADC countries. In the study 
of SADC countries, Mahembe and Odhiambo (2014) concluded that there is a unidirectional 
causal flow from economic growth to FDI, and not the other way round. Herzer, Klasen and 
Lehmann (2008) acknowledged that a range of factors could determine the effect of FDI on 
economic growth, including the type of FDI,10 institutions and the country contexts. Moreover, the 
effect of FDI on economic growth can be both negative and positive (Zilinske, 2010).  
 
The study contends that the conflicting results on the interlinkages between institutions, FDI and 
economic growth could be due to inconsistency in the estimation methods. Due to the possibility 
of bi-directional causality between FDI and economic growth, the association is most likely to be 
dynamic. This could mean that there is a possibility of endogeneity and simultaneity that was 
 
9 The key word here being “may” 
10 Greenfield FDI has more positive externalities than mergers and acquisition 
90 
missed by previous studies. Most studies concentrated on examining the role of institutions in 
attracting FDI inflows, and very few studies examined how institutions can aid the effect of FDI on 
the host country’s economy. As a contribution to the academic debate, this study created an 
additional interactive variable which seeks to examine how the interaction of FDI and institutions 
can impact on the host country’s economic growth.  
 
Although research has been done on the impact of FDI on economic growth, especially for 
developed countries and other developing countries, little has been written to examine the impact 
of the interlinkages among FDI, institutions and economic growth for the SADC region. This study 
therefore analysed the impact of FDI on economic growth for all the SADC countries, and for a 
sub-sample of countries not endowed with strategic natural resources. The following section 
provides the background and then discusses the theoretical framework adopted in this study, 
followed by a discussion of a model of institutions, FDI and economic growth. A comprehensive 
literature review then follows, before the discussion of the methodology, results of the estimated 




The rate of growth of FDI has exceeded the growth rate of world production and the growth rate 
of international trade over the last 20 years (Herzer et al., 2008). Due to the integration of the 
global economy, international capital transfers are now featuring prominently in the global 
economy, and FDI is one of the most significant components of these international transfers 
(Iamsiraroj & Ulubasoglu, 2015). It is in this regard that most countries, especially developing 
countries, have been actively aiming to increase the inflow of FDI into their economies (Herzer et 
al., 2008). SADC countries over the years have been actively implementing policies aimed at 
attracting FDI into the region (Mahembe & Odhiambo, 2014), mainly because they expect long-
term economic growth from the additional resources brought by foreign investors.  
 
However, these so-called additional resources are not stable as the host countries will not have 
control over their movements, even though they can try to influence them. FDI is more resilient 
and stable in times of economic crisis than other forms of investment, such as portfolio investment 
(Zilinske, 2010). The investing firm usually brings capital investments, which makes it difficult to 
disinvest; for example, countries such as Zimbabwe have stringent disinvestment procedures and 
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requirements, in the process making FDI a stable form of investment once it is in the host country’s 
economy.  
 
Since FDI is a non-debt flow compared to other sources of external capital, such as portfolio 
investment and loans,11 it can be argued that it is the most constructive form of capital. Moreover, 
FDI inflows are more stable, and sudden withdrawals are highly unlikely compared to other forms 
of external capital. Adhikary (2011), who argued that FDI is a reliable source of capital for 
developing countries mainly due to its irreversible long-term nature of commitment, shares the 
same view.  
 
FDI is an important source of growth for developing countries, especially those with a low savings 
rate and financing gap (Sengupta & Ntembe, 2015). FDI has also increased its role as a source 
of capital for emerging countries, particularly SSA countries (Adeleke, 2014). Furthermore, FDI 
has become the largest source of capital for developing countries, where the savings rate is 
relatively low (Adams, 2009). This view is supported by Wijeweera, Villano and Dollory (2010), 
who claim that increased foreign capital is essential in reducing the savings gap. Because most 
SSA countries do not have access to international capital markets, they have to rely on FDI and 
loans from multilateral organisations as a source of capital (Adeleke, 2014). It can be interpreted 
to mean that FDI has become an essential source of capital for development finance.12 Jude and 
Levieuge (2017) argue that FDI could act as a substitute for local investment for developing 
countries since they have liquidity challenges. It is in this regard that FDI is widely viewed as a 
key factor in promoting economic growth, especially in developing countries (Keho, 2015); the 
OECD’s 2002 report (OECD, 2002) shares this view. 
 
According to the 2019 World Investment Report, FDI flows to developing countries remained 
stable and slightly increased by two percent. The share of global FDI by developing countries 
increased by 54 percent for the year 2018 (UNCTAD, 2019). The main reason for the increase 
was due to a decline in the share of FDI flows by developed countries. In 2018, FDI inflows to 
Africa increased by 11 percent, despite declines in many of the larger recipient countries 
(UNCTAD, 2019). This increase is predominantly due to resource-seeking inflows, some 
diversified investments, and a recovery in South Africa after some years of low-level inflows 
 
11 It is worse for short-term credits as this type of finance supports growth by eliminating risks (Zilinske, 2010). 
12 This is supported by the FDI inflow statistics from UNCTAD (2017). 
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(UNCTAD, 2019). The increase in FDI inflows into developing countries shows that FDI plays a 
significant and integrating role for developing countries. However, the role of FDI in aiding 
economic growth for the host country is not apparent, and is discussed in the next sub-section.  
 
4.2.1 The role of FDI in economic growth 
 
FDI plays an essential role in integrating developing economies into the world economy (Keho, 
2015). In a study of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS) countries, Gupta and Singh (2016) 
argued that FDI has been instrumental in promoting global integration. It is mainly for this reason 
that developing countries give special attention to foreign capital (Forte & Moura, 2013). 
Governments of developing countries thus encourage the inflow of FDI (Jude & Levieuge, 2017). 
In a bid to attract FDI, developing countries have introduced tax and non-tax incentives for foreign 
investors (Malikane & Chitambara, 2017). Batten and Vo (2009) state that FDI could create an 
international network that makes it more efficient for the movement of domestic goods across 
borders; this will reduce the cost of doing business and improve the competitiveness of domestic 
firms.  
 
According to Parezanin, Jednak and Kragulj (2016), FDI could be a good alternative source of 
capital for developing countries that will facilitate accelerated growth and cover the capital gap. 
De Mello (1997), Jude and Levieuge (2017), Adams (2009) and Saini, Baharumshah and Law 
(2010) share these sentiments by arguing that FDI is a composite bundle consisting of capital 
stock, advanced technology and technological expertise. Thus, FDI can play a dual role in capital 
accumulation as well as increasing investment productivity, in the process aiding economic 
growth. This is supported by the OECD (2002), who claimed that FDI inflows impact positively on 
the host country’s economic growth through an increase in factor productivity.  
 
FDI not only boosts capital formation but improves the quality of capital (Pegkas, 2015). The same 
sentiments are shared by Abubakar and Bala (2016), who claim that investment provides the 
platform for capital formation, which, in turn, is channelled into the efficient production of goods 
and services, hence, economic growth. FDI inflows play a significant role in covering the rising 
investment requirement to boost economic growth at a much higher pace and create macro-
economic stability in the process (Abubakar & Bala, 2016).  
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FDI complements domestic savings and investments, leads to the creation of employment, 
encourages technology transfer, and in the process raises the country’s economic performance 
(Karim & Abu, 2016). FDI can supplement the host country’s domestic capital and thereby 
stimulate economic growth (Iamsiraroj & Ulubasoglu, 2015). Furthermore, higher growth rates 
attract FDI and are regarded as a signal that firms can maximise their profits by doing business 
in that economy. Beugelsdijk, Smeets and Zwinkels (2008), Suliman and Elian (2014), Parezanin 
et al. (2016) and Su and Liu (2016) similarly agree that FDI has a positive and significant impact 
on economic growth for developing countries.  
 
It is in this regard that policymakers in most countries, SADC included, are creating incentives 
and implementing reforms in a bid to attract FDI inflows (Beugelsdijk et al., 2008). Aurangzeb and 
Stengos (2014), who argued that developing countries should encourage the inflow of FDI to 
promote economic growth, support the view that FDI brings additional capital and technology. 
This will then be transferred to the local firms, creating linkages that boost economic growth.  
 
The role of FDI in aiding economic growth has been and remains a topic under debate and interest 
among economists and policymakers (Abubakar & Bala, 2016). Omri and Kahouli (2014), 
Beugelsdijk et al. (2008) and Baltabaev (2014), also acknowledged that the nexus between FDI 
and economic growth is still a subject of academic research. Available empirical evidence is not 
conclusive about the impact of FDI on economic growth, and this inconclusive debate has 
continued to inspire academic interest. Thus, FDI can have a positive or negative impact on 
economic growth or none at all, depending on the variables applied in the model. 
 
According to Karim and Abu (2016), there are still controversies regarding the exact relationships 
and the direction of causality among domestic investment, economic growth and FDI. However, 
Sunde (2017), referring to a study conducted in South Africa, concluded that there is a 
unidirectional causality running from FDI to economic growth. Thus, there seem to be 
disagreements and conflicting views regarding the connection between FDI and economic growth 
(Karim & Abu, 2016), a position also acknowledged by Saini et al. (2010).  
 
For example, Forte and Moura (2013) argued that the effect of technology could be negative or 
positive. Their findings are supported by Baltabaev (2014), who concluded that FDI could have a 
positive or negative effect on the host country’s economic growth and affect productivity 
negatively. It follows that the impact of FDI on the host country’s economic growth is unclear. This 
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means there is no guarantee that, through the transfer of technology, the effect of FDI on 
economic growth will be positive. For example, MNCs can be negative towards the host country’s 
R&D with the aim of retaining technological advantages over the local firms. In fact, Baltabaev 
(2014) determined that an increase in the number of foreign firms in the same industry decreases 
the productivity of domestic firms and overall economic growth.13  
 
A study on Malaysia by Abubakar and Bala (2016) found that there was a positive correlation 
between FDI and economic growth in the long run, while domestic investment was found to be 
negatively correlated with economic growth. The study also found that FDI crowds in domestic 
investment. However, in India, a time series analysis found unidirectional causality from economic 
growth to FDI and from FDI to domestic investment (Abubakar & Bala, 2016). Studies of Vietnam 
showed a causal relationship between FDI and growth (Karim & Abu, 2016). The same finding 
applied for the studies conducted in the USA (2009), Malaysia (2008), Nigeria (2010), Chile (2008) 
and Thailand (2008) (Karim & Abu, 2016). These conflicting results show that the impact of FDI 
on economic growth is still a subject of academic debate, and depends very much on the country 
of study. Thus, results in one country cannot be treated as homogenous across all countries. 
Therefore, the impact of FDI on economic growth for the SADC countries needs to be empirically 
examined.  
 
A study by Okudua (2009) on the nexus between FDI and economic growth concluded that there 
is a unidirectional causality running from FDI to economic growth for the case of Nigeria. However, 
there is the possibility of bi-directional causality between FDI and economic growth. For example, 
a study by Iamsiraroj and Ulubasoglu (2015) of 124 countries for the period 1971 to 2010 reported 
that FDI is positively correlated with economic growth and vice versa. Zilinske (2010) and Yalta 
(2013) also claim that there is a great deal of empirical evidence that causality between FDI and 
economic growth is bi-directional. Therefore, understanding the direction of causality has 
significant macro-economic policy implications. For example, if the FDI-led theory of economic 
growth holds, then SADC countries should encourage FDI inflows.  
 
If causality is running from economic growth to FDI, SADC countries should prioritise domestic 
investment rather than offering incentives such as tax breaks to attract FDI inflows. Thus, 
 
13 This therefore casts doubt on the expected positive spillover effect of FDI in general due to the negatively externalities which the 
host country might experience. 
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domestic investment is also key to enhancing economic growth. In fact, Silajdzic and Mehic (2016) 
argued that the impact of FDI on the host country’s economic growth highly depends on the 
complementarity as well as the substitution effect between FDI and domestic investment. 
However, the impact of FDI on domestic investments is determined by the structural changes that 
will occur because of the presence of the MNC. The expected increased imports to the host 
country can worsen the host country’s balance of payments position. Some researchers even 
claim that FDI may cause harm instead of being a driver of economic growth (Karim & Abu, 2016; 
Omri & Kahouli, 2014), because of the host country’s reluctance to save, resulting in a negative 
influence on economic growth. 
 
Herzer et al. (2008) similarly challenged the perception that FDI has a positive impact on 
economic growth in developing countries. For 28 developing countries, Herzer et al. (2008) found 
neither a long nor a short-term impact of FDI on economic growth. This view is shared by Yalta 
(2013) who, in a study of China, concluded that there was no statistical relationship between FDI 
and economic growth. Thus, questions still exist regarding the impact of FDI on economic growth 
and the necessary conditions and channels for FDI to significantly influence the host countries’ 
economic growth. The following section discusses the channels through which FDI could affect 
economic growth.  
 
4.2.2 Channels through which FDI Affects Economic Growth 
 
FDI influences the host country’s economic growth through different channels, including the 
market structure, the degree and level of competition, employment effects and knowledge 
spillovers (Beugelsdijk et al., 2008). FDI inflows can significantly contribute to economic growth 
through various channels, including an increase in productivity through the provision of new 
investment, improved and updated technologies, and transferring managerial skills to the host 
country’s labour force (Pegkas, 2015). MNCs are also expected to provide market access to local 
firms through their marketing networks (Adhikary, 2011). Consequently, the TFP is expected to 
increase, allowing economic agents to undertake investment that is more productive.  
 
A complementary relationship is expected to exist between FDI and economic growth (Williams, 
2017). Productivity in the host country occurs through worker training provided by MNCs 
(Jayaraman, Choong & Fatt Ng, 2017). In addition, domestic firms can improve productivity by 
emulating foreign firms. The MNC theory states that MNCs bringing new technology have a 
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technological advantage compared to the local firms that will outweigh the cost of doing business 
in a foreign market. In this case, foreign firms will be the catalysts for economic growth. Table 4.1 
highlights the various channels through which FDI can affect the host country’s economic growth. 
 
Table 4.1: Channels through which FDI affects the host country’s economic growth 
How FDI affects the Host Country's Economic Growth Positive Negative
Transfer of new Technology and know how x x
Human Capital Formation x x
Integration into the global economy x x
Increased competition in the host country x x
Local firm development and restructuring x
Expected Impact
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on OECD (2002) 
 
Elkomy, Ingham and Read (2016) support the notion that although FDI plays a significant role in 
the economic growth of host countries, very little is understood about the mechanisms through 
which that happens. Table 4.1 clearly shows that the channels through which FDI affects the host 
country’s economic growth are ambiguous and can have a positive impact, a negative impact, or 
both, on the host country’s economic growth. 
 
FDI can increase economic growth in two ways. First, through increases in total investment by 
attracting higher levels of domestic investment. This is particularly more pronounced on greenfield 
FDI since it will be an addition to the country’s capital stock. Zilinske (2010), who also concluded 
that greenfield FDI yields more positive effects on economic growth than mergers and 
acquisitions, supports this view. In the process, it is expected that the increase in capital stock 
will lead to an increase in economic growth.  
 
The impact of FDI on economic growth largely depends on whether the spillover effects to 
domestic firms are associated with an increase in returns to capital and domestic production as 
well as the increase in the value-added content of FDI-related output (De Mello, 1997). This can 
be interpreted to mean that not all international capital inflows enhance economic growth; for 
instance, short-term capital inflows will not lead to sustainable economic growth in the developing 
countries (Williams, 2017). This is because almost all the macro-economic indicators in these 
countries are negative and require a significant outlay of capital inflow and a longer-term horizon. 
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Thus, for SADC countries, short-term capital should be crowded out by long-term capital inflow. 
However, the impact of FDI on the host country’s economy is still a subject of discussion.  
 
According to the neoclassical growth model, capital accumulation is limited due to the law of 
diminishing returns to capital. Therefore, the impact of FDI on economic growth can be limited 
and depends on the type of FDI. Beugelsdijk et al. (2008) argued that the impact of FDI on the 
host country’s economic growth prospects is largely influenced by the nature of the FDI. For 
example, it is argued that FDI that aims for long-term returns can promote economic growth and 
development in the host country through technological transfer (Jayaraman et al., 2017). The 
impact will depend on the host country’s absorptive capacity, which is based on the quality of its 
human capital.  
 
One can contend that the impact of FDI on economic growth is transitory; therefore, FDI ultimately 
does not influence the economic growth of the host country. It is said that technological progress, 
population growth and the labour force exogenously determine growth (Ahmed, 2010). Omri and 
Kahouli (2014) mention that FDI only influences economic growth positively if permanent 
technological shocks exist. Moreover, the mechanisms through which FDI impacts on economic 
growth can be direct or indirect. Direct effects refer to the net contribution to capital stock that the 
FDI makes to the host country by increasing its savings and investments, as well as the expansion 
of the goods and services available to its citizens. Furthermore, the direct effect is through new 
production technologies. Broadly, FDI is considered a direct source of new foreign technology 
transfer and productivity growth. Aurangzeb and Stengos (2014) claimed that FDI should be the 
main channel through which developing countries, such as those under SADC, get access to new 
and advanced technologies and, in the process, enhance economic growth. 
 
The second way in which FDI can increase economic growth is through interaction with the host 
nation’s human capital. Human capital contributes to economic growth by facilitating technology 
spillovers that are associated with FDI (Su & Liu, 2016). However, there should be sufficient levels 
of human capital stock in the host country. Thus, the study contends that the stock of human 
capital in the host country determines the absorptive capacity of the hosting country, hence the 
impact of FDI on economic growth. This point is supported by Borensztein et al. (1998) who, for 
their study of 69 developing countries, concluded that the economic growth effect from FDI in host 
countries with low levels of human capital is negative and vice versa.  
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People employed by the MNCs will be exposed to new technology and skills that can be 
transferred to the rest of the population, thereby improving productivity and economic growth. This 
occurs through knowledge transfer and innovation to the host country, mainly because it is 
assumed foreign companies are technologically superior. Aurangzeb and Stengos (2014) 
contended that there is a gap in terms of ideas between developed and developing countries. 
This gap is a critical factor in determining the effect of FDI on the economic growth of the host 
countries (Sengupta & Ntembe, 2015). Borensztein et al. (1998) similarly argued that the growth 
rates in developing countries could partly be explained by the differences in the level of technology 
and the catch-up process.  
 
The larger the gap between a country with technology and the host country without technology, 
the more significant the expected impact of FDI on the host country through technological diffusion 
(Baltabaev, 2014). Technologically inferior domestic firms will thus benefit through the catching-
up effect. The impact of FDI on economic growth is inversely related to the technological gap 
between the leaders and the followers in technology (De Mello, 1999). Therefore, FDI can make 
it easy for developing countries, such as the SADC countries, to acquire new technology from the 
MNCs.  
 
MNCs, through FDI, play a key role in transferring technology and increasing the level of 
productivity in the host country. This is made possible through the interactions of the domestic 
firms with the MNCs, either through competition or cooperation. Competition among domestic 
firms to supply the MNCs can lead to the adoption of new technologies without the assistance of 
MNCs. Suliman and Elian (2014) similarly concluded that FDI influences economic growth 
through the transfer of advanced technology, improved productivity and efficiency, and knowledge 
diffusion to the host countries.  
 
4.2.3 Effect of initial host country conditions on the impact of FDI on economic growth 
 
Stemming from the above discussion and to further complicate the debate surrounding the impact 
of FDI on economic growth, researchers such as Ahmed (2010), and Hermes and Lensink (2003) 
argued that the impact of FDI on economic growth strongly depends on the host country’s initial 
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conditions and absorptive capacity14. As physical capital, FDI has no permanent effect on 
economic growth because eventually, the economies of the host countries will converge to a 
steady state. However, as a source and carrier of advanced technology, FDI affects the speed of 
this convergence to the steady state and promotes economic growth (Su & Liu, 2016). The impact 
of FDI on its own can thus be zero, but when it interacts with other host-country variables (Ahmed, 
2010) such as institutions, human capital, financial sector development, and trade, its effect and 
impact can be positive and significant (Iamsiraroj & Ulubasoglu, 2015); the effect and impact is 
only limited by the existing local conditions in the host country (Malikane & Chitambara, 2017).  
 
These initial host country conditions include the level of development of the financial markets, the 
level of human capital development, and the quality of institutions, among other variables 
(Stancheva-Gigov, 2016). Other host-country factors, such as the trade system, the degree of 
openness, and macro-economic factors (such as the country’s savings), also determine how FDI 
influences the economic growth of the host country (Suliman & Elian, 2014). A clear distinction 
should thus be made between countries with sufficient domestic savings that can be used in 
financing the required amount of capital, and those without (OECD, 2002).  
 
In a study of transition economies, Silajdzic and Mehic (2016) found that FDI has a positive impact 
on the host country’s economic growth, but the impact is highly dependent on the absorptive 
capacity of the host country. Thus, a host country must reach a minimum level of economic 
development threshold for FDI to have a positive and significant impact on its economic growth 
(Ahmed, 2010). Saini et al. (2010) support this view and propose that the impact of FDI on 
economic growth is influenced by the level of economic freedom in the host country. Thus, 
countries that promote greater freedom of economic activities can benefit more from the presence 
of MNCs. Another variable which is part of the initial host-country conditions is the level of 
education of the host country’s citizens.  
 
4.2.3.1 The influence of the level of education 
 
The level of educational attainment in a host country is part of the initial host-country conditions. 
Busse and Groizard (2008) found that countries require a minimum level of educational attainment 
to benefit from the positive technological spillover effect of FDI. Batten and Vo (2009) concluded 
 
14 Absorptive capacity includes factors such as human capital, the level of financial development, and the level of economic 
development, among other factors. 
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that the level of education, financial sector development, and the quality of institutions were critical 
factors in determining the impact of FDI on the host country’s economic growth. SADC countries 
should therefore not expect high economic growth as a result of FDI inflows without equally 
increasing the level of education of the economically active population. This, however, cannot be 
generalised. For example, a study by Elkomy et al. (2016) on transitioning and developing 
countries found no strong evidence that a critical threshold level of human capital in the host 
country is a necessary condition for the impact of FDI on economic growth to be significant.  
 
Another example is that of Malaysia. In 1971, the Malaysian government decided to develop 
human capital stock by investing in the education sector (Shakar & Aslam, 2013). Similar to the 
findings of Elkomy et al. (2016), the increase in human capital did not significantly impact on the 
country’s economic growth. The issue of heterogeneity should thus be considered because the 
macro and socio-economic conditions of SADC countries are different from those of transition 
economies, hence the findings of Elkomy et al. (2016) might not necessarily be applicable to the 
SADC countries.  
 
Borensztein et al’s. (1998) findings proposed that FDI is an important vehicle for technological 
transfer, which can lead to economic growth in the host country. However, the impact of this 
technology transfer is highly dependent on a minimum threshold of human capital in the host 
country. In fact, Wijeweera et al. (2010) concluded that for FDI to have a positive impact on 
economic growth, the host country should have a highly skilled labour force. This notion is 
supported by Batten and Vo (2009), who argue that the effect of FDI is stronger for countries with 
higher levels of education. Given the low levels of education in SSA, this could partially explain 
why the impact of FDI for SADC countries has not been that significant.  
 
4.2.3.2 The Influence of the level of Human Capital 
 
The pre-existing quality of human capital is fundamental in determining the effect of FDI on the 
economic growth of the host countries. Human capital formation not only acts as an input to the 
production process but enhances the absorptive capacity of the host country (Sengupta & 
Ntembe, 2016). For a host country to be able to produce quality products, the existing workforce 
must be highly skilled and able to use the new technology in order for FDI to positively influence 
economic growth (Stancheva-Gigov, 2016).  
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Baltabaev (2014) concluded that there was no significant direct effect between FDI and the 
economic growth of the host country, although it was positive. Rather, the effect of FDI on 
economic growth is positive and significant when it interacts with human capital. Many SADC 
countries have low levels of human capital,15 which could therefore significantly reduce the impact 
of FDI on economic growth in this region, unless the SADC governments upskill and reskill their 
citizens. 
 
However, while the availability of human capital is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for FDI 
to have a significant impact on the host country’s economic growth. Other factors, such as existing 
market conditions, need to be taken into account.  
 
4.2.3.3 The influence of existing market conditions 
 
Omri and Kahouli (2014) supported the above arguments, and further claimed that in addition to 
a host country having adequate human capital, the economy of the host country should be stable 
and have liberalised markets. Furthermore, if the degree of market integration is not sufficient, 
technology transfer may not occur (Zilinske, 2010). If the pre-existing economic conditions in the 
host country are distorted, FDI can be a negative externality, for example, in resource allocation 
(Aurangzeb & Stengos, 2014). This will, in turn, restrict the economic growth of the host country 
rather than promote it. It is therefore the host country’s responsibility to create the necessary 
conditions that enable the economy to leverage FDI inflows. In doing so, sequencing is important 
in implementing the chosen economic policies as such host governments should first deal with 
the regulatory framework before engaging in the required policies to attract FDI. Moreover, the 
trade regime of the host country is another important element which needs to be considered when 
discussing the impact of FDI on economic growth.  
 
4.2.3.4 Influence of the host country’s trade regime 
 
The impact of FDI on economic growth depends on the trade regime of the host country. The 
impact is positive for countries that promote an outward-oriented trade regime and negative for 
countries that promote inward trade regimes (Ahmed, 2010). The level of human capital also 
 
15 In fact, Gui-Diby (2014) argued that Africa did not benefit from the spill-over effect of FDI mainly due to the lack of adequate human 
capital. However, his empirical results showed that human capital is not a significant factor in explaining the impact of FDI on economic 
growth in Africa. The only logical explanation is that MNCs coming to Africa concentrate more on the primary sectors, which generally 
do not require a high degree of human capital in terms of skills. 
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determines the extent of FDI’s impact on economic growth. The World Bank confirmed this as far 
back as 2001.  
 
According to the export-led growth hypothesis, exports are one of the main determinants of 
economic growth (Keho, 2015), to which FDI can contribute. Thus, MNCs produce commodities 
destined for export markets and, in the process, promote domestic economic growth. Szkorupova 
(2014) argued that for the case of Slovakia, FDI resulted in an increase in the export performance 
of the country and its economic growth. Similarly, Gui-Diby (2014) and De Mello (1997) concluded 
that the effect of FDI on economic growth is higher for countries that promote exports than 
countries that have import substitution policies. In a study of 12 SSA countries, Keho (2015) 
concluded that countries with more trade openness grew faster than closed countries. These 
findings tally well with the assertion presented earlier, that FDI does not automatically lead to 
economic growth; its effect depends on the initial conditions of the host country.  
 
FDI makes it possible for developing countries to specialise and enjoy the benefits of economies 
of scale, at the same time contributing to export earnings, creating employment and more income, 
skills transfer, and the adoption of international best practice by the host country (Jayaraman et 
al., 2017). In the researcher’s view, this is because exports can increase economic growth in a 
small, open economy.  
 
Baltabaev (2014) agreed that a small country could benefit from FDI through spillover effects. 
Moreover, Edwards et al. (2016) argued that FDI does not influence economic growth when a 
country has an import substitution policy. If FDI is to be effective in host countries, SADC countries 
should thus reduce barriers to trade and promote exports. And in all this, the role of the financial 
sector of the host country needs to be considered.  
 
4.2.3.5 Influence of financial sector development 
 
According to Hermes and Lensink (2003), the host country’s financial sector development is a 
necessary pre-condition for FDI to have a positive and significant impact on its economic growth. 
However, there is a minimum threshold of financial sector development that the host country 
should achieve for FDI to have a positive impact on the host country’s economy (Jayaraman et 
al., 2017). A developed financial sector improves the allocative efficiency of financial resources 
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over investment projects. It further mobilises savings, increasing the volume available to finance 
additional investment.  
 
Reviewed empirical literature on the FDI and growth nexus (Alfaro, 2003) seems to suggest that 
FDI is not performing as expected, mainly because of the lack of adequate financial capital in 
developing countries. Suliman and Elian (2014) state that financial sector development is a 
necessary pre-condition for FDI to have an impact on the host country’s economic growth. 
Sengupta and Ntembe (2015) claim that only countries with well-developed financial sectors 
benefit from FDI inflows. Thus, domestic capital and the development of the domestic financial 
sector play a significant role in aiding FDI’s impact on economic growth. However, a lack of 
adequate capital is the biggest constraint to economic development and growth in SSA, hence 
FDI can cover the financing gap if proper reforms are implemented.  
 
Herzer et al. (2008) concluded that there was no link between financial sector development and 
FDI inflows for 28 developing countries. This can be interpreted to mean that the host country’s 
financial sector development was not a significant factor in determining FDI effect on economic 
growth for developing countries. The result is supported by Yalta (2013), who concluded that the 
level of financial sector development had no bearing on how FDI affected economic growth for 
China. However, caution should be exercised, and cognisance taken of the fact that the dynamics 
of China and other Asian countries are different from those of SADC countries.  
 
It should be re-emphasised that businesses want to reduce transaction costs and risks. A well-
developed financial sector screens and monitors investment projects, thereby reducing the cost 
of information acquisition. It enables MNCs to borrow domestically to extend their innovative 
activities in the host country. FDI and financial markets are deemed complementary in enhancing 
technological diffusion, thereby increasing economic growth. In a study of India, Jayaraman et al. 
(2017) determined that FDI impacts economic growth through financial sector development, thus 
supporting the issue of complementarity between FDI and financial sector development. 
 
Contrary to perceptions, MNCs do not always bring capital to the host countries and hence 
compete with local firms in the domestic capital markets. This can crowd out domestic firms from 
participating in the capital market. For example, FDI, which comes in the form of mergers and 
acquisitions, does not necessarily lead to an increase in the capital stock of host countries. Cross-
border transactions can just be a transfer of existing assets from the domestic holders to the new 
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foreign owners, and the proceeds of the sale can be on consumption rather than capital 
investment (Herzer et al., 2008).  
 
These sentiments are shared by Jayaraman et al. (2017) and OECD (2002), who argued that 
local financial resources are used by MNCs to finance investments. Similarly, Adams (2009) found 
in a study of SSA that FDI has a negative effect on domestic investment, resulting in the crowding-
out effect. Crowding out local firms can also be due to MNCs bringing in superior technology, 
advanced marketing networks, better managerial skills, and larger capital outlays (Adhikary, 
2011). MNCs can be parasitic and retard the development of domestic industries, as they often 
tend to focus on boosting exports only (Okodoa, 2009). Wijeweera et al. (2010) thus argued that 
MNCs could push domestic firms to undertake less profitable ventures, incurring productivity 
losses that ultimately crowd them out.  
 
In some instances, MNCs can have advantages over domestic firms; in such cases, FDI can have 
negative implications for economic growth. For example, the increased outflow of revenue in the 
form of dividends can lead to serious capital flight from the host country. Also, through 
competition, MNCs can reduce the productivity of domestic firms, since MNCs can have lower 
marginal costs compared to the domestic firms due to firm-specific advantages.16 These move 
demand away from the domestic firms and force them to reduce production levels, thereby 
incurring a higher average costs curve (Herzer et al., 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, FDI resulting in the crowding out of domestic firms is not necessarily a problem for 
the host country. Instead, it can be what the host country requires to remove inefficient firms and 
foster competition. In the end, the domestic economy will become efficient and compete in world 
markets. Thus, one can conclude that the crowding out of domestic firms will only be an overall 
loss to the host country’s economy if the firms being crowded out have the potential to be efficient.  
 
4.2.3.6 The influence of the economic sector 
 
The economic sector into which the FDI falls plays an essential role in determining its impact on 
the host country’s economic growth, and not every type of FDI positively influences economic 
growth. A study conducted on China by Su and Liu (2016) concluded that the FDI-human capital 
 
16 The impact of FDI can be negative for the domestic firms if foreign firms over-leverage, which will result in crowding out of the 
domestic firms.  
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complementary effect is more significant if the FDI is technology driven, rather than labour driven. 
The extent to which FDI influences economic growth also depends on the economic sector of the 
host country.  
 
Thus, the impact of FDI on economic growth varies across economic sectors, with a significant 
positive impact expected in the manufacturing sector and a negative impact in the primary sector 
(Ahmed, 2010). Primary resource extraction activities are common in SADC countries, for 
example, gold in South Africa, diamonds in Botswana, platinum in Zimbabwe and oil in Angola. 
These primary activities generate limited spillover effects for technological transfer. In fact, one of 
the reasons why studies on the impact of FDI on economic growth yielded different results could 
be due to the application of total factor FDI instead of FDI per sector. This raises the question of 
whether SADC countries should take deliberate actions to discourage primary FDI. However, 
considering this does not end the debate on the impact of FDI on economic growth. 
  
To date, there is no single theory that can claim to adequately cover the interdependencies that 
exist among institutions, FDI and economic growth. Growth theories greatly emphasise how 
important savings and investments are in determining long-term economic growth (Solow, 1970; 
Romer, 1990; Lucas, 1990). Other growth models suggest that insufficient domestic savings will 
not hurt investment and economic growth since an economy has access to foreign savings to 
cover the savings-investment gap (Karim & Abu, 2016). This brings up the need to attract FDI, 
and the role of institutions in performing this function needs to be carefully examined.  
 
4.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL BY 
ROMER (1990) 
 
Stemming from the neoclassical and endogenous growth models, there are contrasting views in 
the theoretical literature on the effects of FDI on economic growth. The neoclassical growth model 
postulates that long-run economic growth can only come about because of technological 
progress, the labour force or a combination of both factors. These factors are considered 
exogenous. However, due to diminishing returns to capital inputs, economies will eventually 
converge to their steady state; thereby, FDI will only affect economic growth in the short-run, thus 
leaving the long-run growth rate unchanged (De Mello, 1997).  
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This shortcoming of the neoclassical model led to the development of the endogenous growth 
model that has been accepted by many researchers – including Iamsiraroj and Ulubasoglu (2015) 
and De Mello (1997) – in explaining the effect of FDI on economic growth, emphasising the role 
of technology. Paul Romer, Robert Lucas and Robert Barro first developed the endogenous 
growth theory in the 1980s. FDI is deemed to promote economic growth by augmenting domestic 
capital accumulation, in the process facilitating technological transfer to the local firms (Edwards, 
Romero & Sajadi, 2016).  
 
Technological diffusion could play a key role in promoting economic growth. Unlike the traditional 
growth theories where the technological effect is treated as residual and unexplained, recent 
literature on economic growth emphasises the existing domestic technology compared to that of 
the rest of the world. The endogenous growth model requires that long-run growth be determined 
within the model rather than by exogenous factors alone.  
 
De Mello (1997) boldly declares that the only channel for growth to happen through FDI is through 
permanent technological shocks to the host country’s economic system. Due to the availability of 
FDI, aggregate production in the host country will increase because of the combination of labour 
and physical capital (De Mello, 1999). The endogenous growth model states that the long-term 
growth of the economy is achieved through the accumulation of knowledge. Thus, FDI can provide 
mechanisms of knowledge accumulation and become the engine of growth in the host country’s 
economy.  
 
4.3.1 Endogenous Growth Model Variables 
 
The endogenous growth model also emphasises the accumulation of human capital and R&D. If 
FDI can increase productivity, generate positive externalities and spillover effects, it can be 
argued that it stimulates economic growth endogenously. There are two types of endogenous 
growth models, namely: 
 
i. Endogenous growth models of AK nature – these emphasise the role of production factors 
in determining growth. These models focus on the accumulation of knowledge through on-
the-job training. 
ii. Endogenous growth models in which technological change is based on the level of 
investments as well as R&D. 
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The study adopted the endogenous growth model with R&D as developed by Romer (1990). 
Technical progress is endoginised in the model by firms seeking to maximise profit through 
innovation introducing research on new ideas. The model has two components, which are: 
 
i. The production function equation 
ii. All equations that show how the inputs evolve over time 
 
The aggregate production function is as follows: 
 
Y ꞊ Kα (ALϒ) 1-α           (4.1) 
 
Where α is a constant parameter 0<α<1 
Production factors: K – Capital; Lϒ – Labour, A – Knowledge 
 
The labour and capital factors experience constant returns to scale, while technology has 
increasing returns to scale that will result from the non-rival use of ideas. The equation of labour 
and capital accumulation is similar to the Solow model and represented as follows: 
 
K ꞊ skY- δK           (4.2) 
 
Where: skY is the income savings rate 
 δK is the rate of capital depreciation 
 
The equation for technological progress evolution: 
 
A =rLA            (4.3) 
 
Where: A is the number of ideas invented every moment and it depends on: 
 
LA - the number of people putting time aside for research 
r - The rate of new ideas achievement 
 
It is through the endogenous growth model that there has been much interest in the transmission 
mechanism of FDI to economic growth (Omri & Kahouli, 2014). In the model, growth is sustained 
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if the number of innovations created in each period continues to increase. It is also assumed that 
firms operate in a competitive environment with the aim of maximising profit, and the engine for 
growth is innovation. It is then expected that FDI will have a positive effect on economic growth 
by providing technology to the host country and encouraging local production, as well as the 
diffusion of new knowledge and innovation (Mehic, Silajdzic & Hodovic, 2016). 
 
4.4 INSTITUTIONS, FDI AND ECONOMIC GROWTH INTERLINKAGES 
 
Stemming from the preceding section that established the endogenous growth model, the study 
applied a simple model adopted from Rodrik (2000) to show and examine the interlinkages of FDI, 
institutions and economic growth. The model allows for interactions, as well as feedback, with 
other variables (including institutions) to demonstrate the complex nature of the subject. This 
model, however, simplifies the relationship and allows us to examine the impact of FDI on 
economic growth, the impact of institutions on economic growth, and the impact of the interaction 
of FDI and institutions on economic growth.  
 
In the model, there are deep and proximate determinants of economic growth. Deep determinants 
include the integration into the world economy, institutions and geographical location. Proximate 
determinants are factors such as the accumulation of human capital, level of productivity and 
technological improvements. The model allows feedback effects whereby economic growth is not 
only affected by the said factors but can also affect the mentioned factors. This framework makes 
it possible to answer questions on how institutions, FDI and economic growth interact. For the 
purposes of this study, the model assisted in examining the role of FDI in economic growth – 
directly and indirectly – through interaction with institutions. Figure 4.1 shows the modified version 
of Rodrik’s (2000) model. 
 
The first panel of Figure 4.1 shows the proximate determinants of economic growth. In this case, 
economic growth is determined by the accumulation of physical and human capital17 as well 
productivity and technological progress. This is the traditional way of understanding the factors 
that determine economic growth. However, it does not include other significant factors such as 
the role of institutions in determining FDI flows and economic growth. Including these factors can 
assist in understanding the factors that affect capital accumulation, productivity and technological 
 
17 This can also be referred to capital deepening. 
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progress. Above all, it can assist in understanding why capital moves in certain directions. The 
assumption is that there will be technological diffusion from the advanced countries to the inferior 
countries in terms of technology. This then expected to lead to an increase in capital accumulation 
as well as productivity and ultimately economic growth. However, the direction of causality 
between economic growth, capital accumulation and productivity is bidirectional. Thus, economic 
growth can lead to capital accumulation and productivity or vice versa. The second panel of the 
figure allows the interaction of institutions and FDI.18 This interaction demonstarates that the 
direction of causality between institutions and FDI is bi-directional. However, it is through the 
interaction of institutions and FDI which will lead to overall economic growth. Based on the above 
discussions, this chapter therefore applies the endogenous growth theory and the institutional 











Figure 4.1: Institutions, FDI and Economic Growth Interlinkages 
Source: Adopted from Rodrik (2000) 
 
4.4.1 Reviewed Literature on Institutions, FDI and Economic Growth 
 
It should be emphasised that the relationship between FDI and economic growth differs 
depending on the host country’s institutions, hence the need to understand the role of institutions 
in aiding economic growth (Mehic et al., 2016). The effect of FDI on economic growth varies 
across countries partially due to the heterogeneity of institutions. Therefore the orthodox 
assumption of a homogenous marginal return to FDI may be misleading. If heterogeneity exists, 
 
18 In this developed model, institutions and FDI are the deeper determinants of economic growth. 
Economic Growth  









The relationship is bi-directional 
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host country policies, which are supposed to promote the effect of FDI on economic growth, 
should not be homogenous across countries. This notion is supported by McCloud and 
Kumbhakar (2012), who argued that institutional qualities19 are the main reason why different 
countries have different absorptive capabilities, hence a heterogeneous FDI-growth relationship.  
A country with poor institutions is most likely to experience economic challenges such as low 
levels of investment, low productivity growth and slow output growth (Jude & Levieuge, 2017). 
For example, firms are willing to be continuously innovative if they expect to profit from 
innovations. However, intellectual property rights (IPRs) should protect these innovations. Thus, 
a host country whose economic growth depends on innovations is likely to be boosted by the 
existence of IPRs. On the other hand, quality institutions will most likely ensure that there is factor 
allocation efficiency, investment in higher return activities, a reduction in business uncertainty, 
and a well-coordinated economic system (Jude & Levieuge, 2017). This will promote economic 
growth.  
 
In a study on FDI, democracy and economic growth for eight Southern African countries, Malikane 
and Chitambara (2017) concluded that democratic institutions are a strong driver of economic 
growth. Thus, the impact of FDI on the host country’s economic growth depends significantly on 
the country’s level of democracy. This could mean that countries with strong democratic 
institutions absorb the positive spillover effects of FDI compared to countries with weak 
democratic institutions. However, the role of democracy in the FDI-growth nexus is still a subject 
of debate. Furthermore, Malikane and Chitambara (2017) used only one institutional indicator to 
determine the interlinkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth, and this study 
employed all 12 institutional indicators.  
 
According to Jude and Levieuge (2017), institutional quality determines the effect of FDI on 
economic growth for developing countries. It is my argument that, just like there is a need to have 
a minimum level of human capital for the impact of FDI to be maximised, there is also a need to 
have a minimum threshold level of institutional quality in the host country. Therefore, a minimum 
institutional quality is required to trigger a growth-enhancing effect. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
channels through which institutional quality can aid FDI in promoting economic growth. 
 
 
19 The quality of institutions can determine the extent to which the host country can capitalise on the productive spillover effects 
from the foreign firms.  
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From Figure 4.2, the assumption is that FDI influences economic growth through productivity 
spillovers from foreign firms to domestic firms. This could be because of the linkages between 
suppliers and customers, through the demonstration effect and increased competition. It is in this 
regard that the quality of institutions will influence the relationship between domestic and foreign 



















Figure 4.2: Channels of Institutional Quality to Economic Growth 
Source: Author’s own configuration 
 
The quality of institutions also influences capital accumulation. If the institutions are poor, the host 
country is likely to attract low technology and resource-based FDI with limited growth effect. 
Similarly, the demonstration effect is stronger for a country with quality institutions than one with 
poor institutions. Quality institutions can deal with the crowding-out problem by encouraging 
foreign firms to enter new industries, thereby reducing competition with domestic firms. As the 
new foreign firms enter the new markets, there will be a multiplier effect. For example, demand 
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A study by Adhikary (2011) on Asian countries, concluded that a combination of FDI and good 
institutional variables such as the rule of law, property rights, political stability and absence of 
violence lead to economic growth. Furthermore, fundamental institutional variables such as 
political stability, civil rights, property rights and socio-economic variables play an important role 
in determining the effect of FDI on the economic growth of host countries (Ntwembe & Sengupta, 
2016). Elkomy et al. (2016) share these sentiments, and argue that the level of institutional 
development and the quality of policy-making in the host country determines the magnitude of the 
impact of FDI on economic growth. It should be acknowledged that these institutional variables 
aid the effect of FDI on economic growth at different rates. Therefore, priority should be given to 
those institutional variables that can have an incremental effect on economic growth.  
 
The FDI-growth nexus is highly sensitive to country-specific factors, which include the kind of 
institutions in those countries (De Mello, 1999). For FDI to have a significant impact on the host 
country’s economic growth, host governments must first ensure that their institutions are 
functioning well (Busse & Groizard, 2008). For example, host countries with more regulations will 
be less able to benefit from the presence of MNCs in their economies compared to less regulated 
economies. Technology and knowledge transfer to the host country heavily depends on the kind 
of existing institutions in that host country (De Mello, 1999), which is further evidence that initial 
conditions in the host country determine the impact of FDI on economic growth.  
 
Williams (2017) argued that political instability affects FDI inflows and growth differently. Saini et 
al. (2010) indirectly supported this notion by arguing that host countries with better property rights 
should ideally benefit more from FDI inflows compared to those with poor property rights. 
Therefore, when we consider the host country’s initial conditions, the institutional variables should 
take centre stage in how FDI influences economic growth. Institutions such as commercial banks 
and credit agencies play a significant role in ensuring that savings are not spent on consumption 
but rather fund investment expenditure, leading to economic growth (Jayaraman, 2017). The 
effect of FDI on the host economy is thus enhanced when there is institutional stability (Edwards 
et al., 2016).  
 
Furthermore, in host countries with higher levels of institutional capabilities, as measured by the 
degree of property rights protection, the effect of FDI is stronger (Stancheva-Gigov, 2016). These 
were similar to the findings of a study of 32 developed and developing countries. Panel data 
results indicated that FDI has a positive impact on economic growth if the host country has 
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relatively high human capital and high-quality institutions (Mehic et al., 2016). However, other 
studies such as that by De Mello (1999) found weak evidence that FDI leads to economic growth 
and that the quality of institutions for the host country matters (Mehic et al., 2016). 
 
Elkomy et al. (2016) pointed out that a more democratic political system is likely to amplify the 
positive effect of FDI on the host country’s economic growth. This is because there is a high 
chance of the redistribution of the income and gains from FDI towards further investments in 
human capital development, thereby promoting economic growth. Furthermore, democratic 
political systems are most likely to promote international trade and integration into the global 
economy. Therefore, these countries can attract internationally competitive export-oriented FDI 
and promote economic growth. The opposite is expected to be true for countries with autocratic 
political systems. These countries are expected to have poor policies and closed economies. 
These conditions, in turn, attract FDI that is less technologically advanced, resulting in limited 
spillover effects.  
 
Another institutional variable that is important in aiding the effect of FDI on the host country’s 
economic growth is corruption. A country that is less corrupt compared to its peers is likely to 
experience an increase in economic growth due to FDI inflows (Wijeweera et al., 2010). This, 
however, is not a straightforward relationship. Existing literature is inconclusive on the effect of 
corruption on FDI inflows and economic growth. Corruption can act as additional tax to foreign 
firms, heightening insecurity and uncertainty for would-be foreign direct investors. It is in this 
regard that the effect of corruption on the host country’s economic growth is indirect.  
 
An additional institutional variable which can determine the impact of FDI on economic growth is 
governance. A study by Adeleke (2014), on the FDI-growth nexus in Africa, indicated that most 
African countries have weak governance structures and this inhibits growth. Thus, the assumption 
is that a good governance structure attracts more FDI and hence, growth. This is further evidence 




20 This is still a subject of debate and the available empirical literature is still inconclusive. Thus, there are many examples which 
show that FDI will always lead to economic growth  in the host country. 
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4.5 METHODOLOGY 
4.5.1 The model, data and variable definitions 
 
This section discusses the empirical model used to establish the role of institutions and FDI in 
determining economic growth for the SADC region. The research design, population, sample and 
data, as well as model specification and estimation technique, are also discussed. In addition, the 
section gives a brief description of the data used and the a priori expectations. Further to this, the 
section develops an argument for the support of the model as a significant tool in the development 
of policies that would help address international economic policy. 
4.5.2 Research design 
 
The study applied quantitative data techniques. Thus, specifically, the study estimated a dynamic 
panel data model for the period 1996 to 2016. Given the interactions among FDI, institutions and 
economic growth for all the SADC countries, the development of a panel model that allows these 
interactions to happen is justified. Furthermore, panel data models capture the heterogeneity of 
institutions across countries, which is imperative for an empirical examination of the impact of FDI 
and institutions on the economic growth of host countries. In the developed model, the impact of 
FDI on economic growth is decomposed into the direct impact and the indirect impact that should 
work via institutions. Thus, the model assists in understanding how institutions aid the effect of 
FDI on the economic growth of the host country. The quality of institutions determines how FDI 
affects the host country’s economic growth. High-quality institutional variables, such as the rule 
of law, military not being involved in politics, and the existence of property rights, among other 
institutional variables, are expected to positively affect the impact of FDI on the host country’s 
economic growth. Likewise, poor-quality institutional variables, such as high levels of corruption, 
bureaucracy, and military involvement in politics, are expected to be associated with low levels of 
economic growth in the host countries.  
 
Endogeneity is a problem which requires attention in examining the relationship among 
institutions, FDI and economic growth. The potential endogenous relationship between FDI and 
economic growth may lead to an over-estimation of the impact of FDI on economic growth. Since 
FDI can be correlated with the country-specific error term, it could lead to a wrong and biased 
estimation of the coefficients. It can be argued that the more income a country has, the better the 
institutions are compared to those of a developing country. Thus, economic growth could be as a 
result of an improvement in the quality of institutions.  
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4.5.3 Population, sample and data 
 
This is a regional-based study that empirically examined the roles of institutions and FDI in 
promoting economic growth for all the SADC countries using secondary data for the period 1996 
to 2016. All the data were taken from the World Development Indicators, PRS, country-specific 
reserve banks, and statistical agencies/departments.  
 
Furthermore, the study divided the SADC countries into two samples: one with all the countries, 
which is the full sample, and the other sample where countries endowed with strategic natural 
resources were removed from the full sample. Using this process l was able to estimate how the 
interrelationship among institutions, FDI and economic growth could vary according to the 
different environments in terms of the existence of strategic natural resources.21 This allowed me 
to remove outliers from the sample and examine whether there were any dynamic changes. 
Outliers refer to countries that are endowed with strategic natural resources which may make 
foreign direct investors overlook negative institutional variables such as corruption, military 
involvement in politics, and bureaucracy, among others. Thus, foreign direct investors will invest 
in these countries regardless of the negative institutional variables. Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo are two examples of countries endowed with strategic natural resources, but 
poor quality institutional variables; yet they still receive large FDI inflows.  
 
The removed countries in the sub-sample are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Natural Resource-Endowed Countries 
Country Available Natural Resource (s)
Angola Oil and minerals
Democratic Republic of Congo Minerals
Republic of South Africa Minerals
Mozambique Gas and Minerals
Zambia Minerals
 
Source: Author’s own configuration 
 
 
21 This encompasses oil, natural gas, coal, forestry and other minerals. 
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4.5.4 Definition of variables, proxies and a priori expectations 
 
Table 4.3 shows the institutional variables, definitions and expected sign of the coefficient. 
 
Table 4.3: Definition of Variables, Proxies and a Priori Expectations 
Variable Proxies and Definitions Proxies by 
Expected Sign of 
Coefficient 
Economic Growth 
The current growth rate of the 





Economic Growth of 
Previous Period 
The previous period growth rate 
of the gross domestic product. 
Liu (2016) Positive 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 







All the country’s institutions, i.e. 
government and private. It is 
proxied by 12 different 








The interaction of FDI and all 
the institutional indictors. This is 
to capture the interactive effect 
between FDI and institutions on 
economic growth. This further 
shows the conditional role of 









depending on the 
quality of 
institutions 
GDP per Capita 
The initial level of GDP per 
capita. This is necessary to take 









Variable Proxies and Definitions Proxies by 
Expected Sign of 
Coefficient 
Population  
Population annual growth rate to 







The growth rate of domestic 
investment. Measured by the 
gross capital formation as a 








This is the policy variable that 
measures the openness of the 
country to trade and investment. 
It is measured by the mean of 
the tariff rate to capture the 







Annual inflation rate. This is a 







4.5.5 Model specification 
 
The study followed the endogenous growth model. Since literature on the relationship between 
FDI and economic growth is inconclusive, even after including control variables such as the initial 
GDP, domestic investments, degree of openness and human capital, the study applied panel data 
techniques and treated endogeneity with caution. Furthermore, most studies conducted on the 
subject did not have enough data, hence there are constraints in the use of relevant and 
appropriate estimation methods. In this regard, the study examined the impact of FDI on economic 
growth for SADC countries based on the endogenous growth theory.  
 
The panel model estimation is as follows: 
 
y𝑖𝑡 = β1y𝑖𝑡−1 + β2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡+β4 (FDI*𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽
𝑁
𝐽=0 jXit-1+ εit………..(4.1) 
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y𝑖𝑡 is the change in GDP (economic growth). 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼it is the FDI for country i at time t for i =1….., N and t =1……,T and it is expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. 
y𝑖𝑡−1 is the first lag of y𝑖𝑡 and β1 is the coefficient of the lag of economic growth.  
 
β3 is the coefficient of the institutional variables.  
 
All the data for the institutional variables were sourced from the PRS.  
 
The average of the 12 sub-indicators of political risk is used as an aggregate measure of 
institutional quality. Furthermore, the 12 subcomponents of institutional variables are sequentially 
included in the regressions. This therefore means that l estimated 30 different regression 
equations. β4 captures the interactive effect between FDI and institutional variables. Furthermore, 
FDI and the various institutional variables are included in the model to enable the capturing of the 
interactive effect between FDI and institutions. εit is the random error term, which breaks down 
into 𝜇it + 𝜈it. 𝜇i represents the time-invariant country-specific effect, while 𝜈𝑖𝑡 represents the 
remainder of the disturbance in the estimated regressions. 
 
The set of control variables is captured by Xit-1. Existing literature has widely used these control 
variables, which include: 
 
• Economic growth for the previous period 
• Initial level of GDP per capita to take care of the effects of convergence 
• The population annual growth rate 
• Domestic investment 
• Trade openness  
• The annual inflation rate 
 
4.5.6 Estimation technique 
 
Existing empirical literature used various techniques, for instance, instrument variables such as 
the 2SLS, to deal with the potential endogeneity bias. However, the concern over the 2SLS 
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estimator is that it is not efficient when heteroscedasticity is present. Jude and Leviuege (2017) 
proved that nonlinear modelling, such as the use of the Panel Smooth Transition Regression 
Model could assist in mitigating the challenge of endogeneity and reverse causality problems. 
This study applied the GMM estimator.  
 
The GMM technique makes it possible to treat economic growth as a dynamic process, thus 
accounting explicitly for the possibility that the current growth rate can be influenced by the 
previous growth. Furthermore, the use of GMM techniques makes it possible to deal with the 
potential problem of endogeneity and the autocorrelation of the independent variables. GMM 
techniques also remove the country-specific effects and therefore affect the element of 
heterogeneity. The GMM makes it possible to have a clear understanding of the short-run 
(dynamic) effect within the model, and to exploit the group variations in the data. Consequently, 
a dynamic relationship is structured in the model to include the dependent lagged variable (See 
equation 4.1). 
 
The study therefore estimated the dynamic GMM with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard 
errors, and the 2SLS instrument weighting matrix orthogonal deviations. The orthogonal 
deviations are used to maximise the sample size because there are gaps in the panel data. The 
study estimated a total of 30 models. First, the base model with the traditional known factors in 
economic literature that affect economic growth is estimated. Institutional indicators are then 
added to the base model, one at a time, so that their effect on economic growth can be quantified. 
  
4.5.7 Empirical results and discussion 
 
This sub-section presents and examines the results of the empirical analysis. First, there is a 
presentation of the descriptive statistics to understand the data on which the research is based. 
A correlation matrix is then discussed to aid the empirical specification. Thereafter, the empirical 
analysis on institutions, FDI and economic growth is presented for the full sample and the sub-
sample, which excludes countries endowed with natural resources. Descriptive statistics results 
are presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics 


































































































































Mean 2.513 2.745 4.257 4.116 5.396 5.679 4.5 2671 3.853 4.183 1.40 60.584 3.450 3.615 3.520 2.520 1.715 9.037 37 5.781 
Median 2.558 2.500 4.500 4.340 5.192 3.572 4.6 1018 3.869 4.385 7.404 62.667 3.353 3.577 3.500 2.119 1.266 8.150 35 1.901 
Maximum 5.300 5.300 6.000 6.000 9.500 66.869 26.8 15687 5.462 6.000 2.310 80.875 5.731 5.462 6.000 5.000 5.192 39.010 89 31.50 
Minimum 0.400 0.400 0.000 1.131 1.154 -2.943 -17.7 102 0.077 0.256 -9.616 27.333 0.077 0.077 0.000 -0.192 -0.192 0.500 11 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.929 1.269 1.518 0.863 1.573 7.287 4.7 3206 1.064 0.939 1.830 12.069 1.163 1.198 1.366 1.686 1.339 7.430 15 8.515 
Skewness -0.476 0.208 -1.387 -0.434 0.739 3.646 -0.3 1 -0.830 -0.627 12.430 -0.477 -0.777 -0.922 
-
0.225 
0.115 1.090 1.465 0.9 1.810 
Kurtosis 3.033 2.404 4.679 2.787 4.600 22.875 8.6 5 3.632 3.910 15.600 2.355 4.187 3.944 2.299 1.523 3.416 5.230 4 5.015 
                     
Jarque-Bera 11.911 6.929 138.061 10.502 62.257 5882.608 419.5 258 41.419 31.499 313375 17.378 50.164 56.287 9.108 29.332 64.671 177.921 54 225.3 
Probability 0.003 0.031 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                     
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 
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The average economic growth rate for all the SADC countries is 4.5 percent, and the average 
initial GDP per capita is USD2 700. The GDP and GDP per capita figures show that the average 
income per capita in SADC is relatively high compared to SSA. These could mean a potential 
market for the foreign direct investor. Maximum GDP recorded is 26.8, while the minimum is 
negative 17.7. This shows the heterogeneity which exist in the SADC region and that there is an 
outlier in terms of GDP figures.  
 
FDI as a percentage of GDP averaged 5.7 percent over the period 1996 to 2016. Thus, the 
researcher infers that FDI has been an important source of development finance for SADC 
countries. The maximum number for FDI is 66.7, which is significantly different from the median, 
minimum, mean and standard deviation. This demonstrates that there is an outlier in the data, 
thereby confirming heterogeneity22 which exists within the SADC region.  
 
The institutional average, which proxies the quality of institutions in the SADC region, is 60.5 
percent; the maximum being 80.8 percent and the minimum 27 percent. These results can be 
interpreted to mean that institutions, as a whole, are not poor in SADC countries.  
 
The average government stability in the SADC region is 3.8 out of a maximum of six. The median 
is 3.9, which indicates the scoring for most of the SADC countries. The most stable government 
in the SADC region has a scoring of 5.5 out of six. The data also indicate that in terms of 
government stability, there are no indicated outliers within the SADC countries.  
 
Internal conflict recorded a maximum score of six and a minimum of 0.07 for all SADC countries. 
The average score in terms of internal conflict is 4.2 out of six, with a median of 4.4. This mirrors 
the general government stability that exists in the SADC region. Furthermore, the data show that 
there are few incidents of internal conflicts in the SADC region.  
 
Moreover, investment promotion averages 3.5 out of six for the SADC region. The maximum 
score for investment promotion is 5.7 out of six, with a minimum of 0.77. This shows that not all 
SADC countries are taking deliberate efforts to promote foreign investment inflows. The pairwise 
correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.5. 
 
 
22 SADC countries experienced political independence and hence institutional transformation at different periods. Furthermore, the 
countries are at different stages of economic development (Country Watch 2017).  
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Economic growth is negatively correlated with most of the institutional variables, for example, 
bureaucratic quality, corruption, democratic accountability and external conflict. Although there is 
a positive correlation between economic growth and the institutional average, descriptive statistics 
analysis seems to suggest that there are generally good institutions in SADC countries.  
 
However, the correlation between economic growth and the interaction term of FDI and 
institutions is positive, proving the theory that FDIs’ impact on economic growth depends on initial 
host-country conditions such as the quality of institutions. For example, Saini et al. (2010), in a 
study of 85 developed and developing countries, concluded that FDI on its own does not have an 
impact on economic growth. Instead, the impact of FDI on economic growth depends on the host 
country’s initial conditions, such as the quality of institutions. Also, as mentioned earlier, Jude and 
Leviuege (2017) concluded that FDI alone has no significant impact on economic growth.  
 
In line with the a priori expectations supported by the findings of Stancheva-Gigov (2016), there 
is a positive correlation between economic growth and FDI. There is also a positive correlation 
between economic growth and the initial level of GDP per capita and the rate of population growth. 
However, there is a negative correlation between trade openness and economic growth. This is 
not in line with a priori expectations. It should, however, be appreciated that correlation does not 
mean causation. Therefore, rigorous empirical examination of the interlinkages among 
institutions, FDI and economic growth is required, which is therefore the focus of the next sub-
section.  
 
4.5.8 An analysis of the regression results 
 
Under this sub-section, the empirical results from cross-section regressions are discussed. A total 
of 30 models were estimated for the full sample and the sub-sample, taking cognisance of natural 
resource endowments for particular SADC countries. In both the full sample and the sub-sample, 
the first model examines the control variables, and the subsequent models introduce the various 
institutional variables into the estimated models.  
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Table 4.5: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 




NT LETHTEN LEXCON LFDI LFDI_INST
LGDP_GRO










LDEMACC 0.121 0.178 1.000
LDOMESTIC_INVESTMENT 0.737 0.811 0.056 1.000
LETHTEN 0.338 0.385 0.611 0.360 1.000
LEXCON 0.309 0.384 0.437 0.353 0.587 1.000
LFDI -0.087 -0.182 -0.155 -0.087 0.077 0.073 1.000
LFDI_INST -0.016 -0.104 -0.100 -0.010 0.172 0.153 0.993 1.000
LGDP_GROWTH_RATE -0.003 -0.114 -0.055 -0.042 0.075 -0.046 0.741 0.734 1.000
LGDP_PC 0.573 0.628 -0.150 0.863 0.315 0.374 0.223 0.287 0.198 1.000
LGOVSTAB -0.047 -0.002 0.185 -0.015 0.384 0.523 0.216 0.265 0.260 0.072 1.000
LINCON 0.300 0.296 0.370 0.319 0.745 0.532 0.081 0.165 0.106 0.335 0.290 1.000
LINST_AVER 0.578 0.631 0.438 0.632 0.803 0.682 0.057 0.176 0.027 0.563 0.435 0.716 1.000
LINVPRO 0.236 0.236 0.175 0.268 0.311 0.267 0.157 0.227 0.065 0.286 0.112 0.386 0.600 1.000
LLAWORD 0.244 0.289 0.202 0.333 0.261 0.244 0.058 0.122 -0.099 0.301 0.003 0.228 0.545 0.930 1.000
LMILPOL -0.009 0.021 0.432 0.029 0.546 0.467 0.028 0.085 0.198 0.071 0.703 0.404 0.473 0.157 -0.004 1.000
LPOP_GROWTH_RATE -0.357 -0.497 0.025 -0.666 -0.029 0.016 0.246 0.215 0.148 -0.547 0.210 -0.034 -0.231 -0.114 -0.232 0.169 1.000
LRELTEN 0.540 0.552 -0.156 0.609 0.199 0.205 0.033 0.103 -0.148 0.566 -0.080 0.243 0.586 0.594 0.655 -0.228 -0.380 1.000
LSOCIO_ECON 0.579 0.655 0.238 0.674 0.530 0.497 -0.030 0.068 -0.136 0.592 0.121 0.440 0.817 0.630 0.674 0.147 -0.389 0.838 1.000
LTRADE_OPENNESS -0.301 -0.266 -0.022 -0.312 -0.334 0.000 -0.168 -0.216 -0.229 -0.388 -0.182 -0.315 -0.417 -0.306 -0.185 -0.298 0.212 -0.289 -0.283 1.000
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4.5.9 Full sample with countries endowed with strategic natural resources included 
4.5.9.1 Previous economic growth rate and economic growth 
 
The results of the estimated panel dynamic GMM models are shown in Table 4.6 across all the 
estimated models. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the previous 
year’s economic growth rate (LGDP_Growth_Rate (-1)23) and economic growth of the host 
country. The results are further justification for the use of the dynamic panel GMM estimation 
technique. This is in line with the findings of Alfaro and Johnson (2013), who concluded that FDIs’ 
impact on economic growth depends on initial host-country conditions such as the previous year’s 
economic growth.  
 
4.5.9.2 FDI and economic growth 
 
The effect of FDI on economic growth is both negative and positive across the estimated models. 
Gui-Diby (2014) had similar findings and concluded that FDI has a mixed impact on the host 
country’s economic growth, depending on the period under study. Similarly, Edwards et al. (2016) 
and Zilinske (2010) claim that there are positive and negative effects of FDI on the host country’s 
economic growth.  
 
Another study by Alfaro et al. (2006) failed to confirm that FDI has a positive influence on the host 
country’s economic growth. Instead, the results were mixed and consistently found either no effect 
of FDI on host countries’ firms’ productivity and/or aggregate growth or negative effects. This is 
contrary to popular belief by policymakers that FDI generates positive productivity externalities 
for host countries.  
 
However, the effect of FDI on economic growth varies across countries partially due to the 
heterogeneity of institutions. This view is supported by McCloud and Kumbhakar (2012), who 
agree that institutional qualities are the main reason why different countries have different 





23 The relationship is statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance.  
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Table 4.6: Full Sample Institutions, FDI and Economic Growth 
Source: Author’s own calculations using Eviews 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
LGDP_GROWTH_RATE(-1) 2.15 1.99 1.99 2.09 1.97 2.02 1.81 2.27 1.95 1.92 1.92 1.98 1.72 1.81 1.92
**(0.08) **(0.09) **(0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) **(0.05) (0.15) (0.10) (0.1) **(0.09) (0.10) **(0.06) **(0.05) **(0.07)
LGDP_PC -1.69 -1.48 -1.48 -1.60 -1.54 -1.54 -1.25 -1.89 -1.42 -1.40 -1.41 -1.47 -1.16 -1.25 -1.37
(0.29) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.34) (0.42) (0.32) (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33)
LDOMESTIC_INVESTMENT 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05
(0.63) (0.66) (0.66) (0.65) (0.63) (0.70) **(0.10) (0.71) (0.66) (0.66) (0.68) (0.66) (0.72) **(0.10) (0.64)
LFDI 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.16 -0.19 0.26 -0.27 -0.69 0.20 0.06 0.36 0.20 0.57 -0.27 -0.27
(0.38) (0.34) (0.66) (0.73) (0.77) (0.69) (0.63) (0.53) (0.64) (0.89) (0.52) (0.75) (0.30) (0.63) (0.68)
LTRADE_OPENNESS 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12
(0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.38) (0.44) (0.37) (0.32) (0.34) (0.35) (0.39) (0.41) (0.36) (0.38) (0.32) (0.33)
LPOP_GROWTH_RATE -0.43 -0.39 -0.39 -0.41 -0.46 -0.41 -0.35 -0.53 -0.38 -0.36 -0.36 -0.39 -0.34 -0.35 -0.37
(0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.37) (0.31) (0.26) (0.33) (0.31) (0.34) (0.32) (0.31) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28)
LINST_AVER -0.13
(0.76)
LFDI_INST -0.13 -0.10 0.27 -0.20 0.35 0.79 -0.14 0.00 -0.30 -0.14 -0.51 0.35 0.33

























Observations 276.00 276.00 276.00 276.00 257.00 257.00 276.00 270.00 276.00 276.00 276.00 276.00 276.00 276.00 276.00
R- Squared 58.53 49.67 49.67 54.93 52.37 52.05 38.62 64.30 47.58 46.66 46.04 49.43 36.50 51.00 43.81
** denotes significance at 10%  
GMM Estimated Models full Sample
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4.5.9.3 GDP per capita and economic growth 
 
The results indicate that there is a negative relationship across all the estimated models between 
the initial levels of GDP per capita and economic growth in the SADC host countries. This could 
be interpreted to mean that countries that start from a rich base tend to grow at a slower pace 
than those starting from a poor base. This result is not in line with a priori expectation and the 
market size and output hypothesis. GDP per capita is an indicator of the size of the market and 
hence the expectation is that a higher GDP per capita should promote more FDI inflows, which 
will then translate to economic growth for the host country. However, most of the FDI into the 
SADC countries is resource-based, thus, the motive for FDI into the SADC countries is mainly 
resource extraction and not market seeking (Asiedu & Lien, 2011).  
 
4.5.9.4 Trade openness and economic growth 
 
There is a positive relationship between trade openness and the economic growth of the host 
countries across all estimated models. Therefore, an increase in trade openness leads to an 
increase in the host country’s economic growth. Open trade makes it possible for countries to 
import and export goods and services, in the process promoting economic activities and economic 
growth. These are similar to the findings by Stancheva-Gigov (2016), El-Wassal (2012), and 
Batten and Vo (2009), who all concluded that the effect of FDI on the host countries’ economic 
growth is positive and significant when the countries are open to trade. Furthermore, trade 
openness increases economic growth through efficiency gains. 
 
4.5.9.5 Domestic investment and economic growth 
 
The level of domestic investment is positively associated with the economic growth of the host 
countries across all estimated models. This is in line with a priori expectations. Domestic 
investment adds to foreign capital and economic growth. The findings are supported by the 
conclusion of De Mello (1999), who argued that the extent to which FDI impacts on economic 
growth depends on the degree of complementarity and substitution between FDI and domestic 
investment. Sengupta and Ntembe (2015) also concluded that domestic capital influences 
economic growth in SSA rather than USA FDI. Thus, the SADC region can promote economic 
growth by mobilising domestic resources which will compliment FDI.  
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4.5.9.6 Population growth rate and economic growth 
 
Although the population growth rate should be one of the key drivers of economic growth in 
classical economics, the case is different for SSA and SADC countries, in particular. The 
population growth rate is negatively associated with economic growth across all estimated models 
for the SADC countries. This could be because SSA and SADC countries still lag behind in terms 
of investment in physical capital, hence the increase in population will translate into a decrease 
in the capital-labour ratio. This means a decrease in TFP and a decrease in economic growth.  
 
4.5.9.7 Institutions and economic growth 
 
As expected, the results indicated that there is a negative relationship between institutions and 
economic growth for the SADC countries, because the quality of institutions for this group of 
countries is weak. A country with poor institutions is likely to experience economic challenges 
such as low levels of investment, low productivity growth, and slow output growth. The quality of 
institutions also influences capital accumulation. If the institutions are poor, the host country is 
likely to attract low technology and resource-based FDI with limited growth effect. 
 
This is in line with the findings of Adeleke (2014), who determined that many African countries 
have weak governance structures that are a constraint to economic growth. To further prove that 
the average quality of institutions is poor for SADC countries, the interaction term of FDI and 
institutions yielded a negative relationship with economic growth. Jude and Leviuege (2017) also 
concluded that institutional quality affects the effect of FDI on the host country’s economic growth. 
 
4.5.9.8 Democracy and economic growth 
 
The empirical results showed that there is a negative effect between democratic accountability 
and economic growth for the SADC countries. This is not in line with a priori expectations, as an 
increase in democratic accountability is expected to be associated with an increase in economic 
growth. This point is supported by Malikane and Chitambara (2017), who concluded that countries 
with strong democratic institutions benefit more from the presence of FDI in terms of economic 
growth. However, the results confirm the arguments of Cao (2009), who claimed that democractic 
institutions have a conflicting impact on FDI inflows, and ultimately, the economic growth of the 
host country.  
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4.5.9.9 Investment promotion and economic growth 
 
The coefficient of investment promotion is negative. Thus, an increase in investment promotion 
leads to a decrease in economic growth for the host countries’ economies. The results are, 
however, not statistically significant. This could be because of the poor institutions in SADC 
countries. This point is supported by the findings of Adeleke (2014), who concluded that African 
countries must improve their governance structures if they want to increase economic growth. 
The same sentiments are shared by Batten and Vo (2009), who stated that countries that intend 
to attract more FDI should ensure the institutional variables are improved in order for FDI to have 
a maximum impact on the host countries’ economic growth.  
 
4.5.9.10 Corruption and economic growth 
 
Ideally, corruption should lead to lower investor confidence and, in the process, discourage future 
foreign investments. However, in 1964 Nathaniel Leff claimed that embracing corruption could 
help with government inefficiencies, and an increase in corruption leads to an increase in 
economic growth for the host country. This is not in line with a priori expectations. It should be 
acknowledged that the link between corruption and economic growth is not direct, but through 
FDI inflows into the host country.  
 
One logical explanation for this anomaly could be the existence of strategic natural resources in 
the selected SADC countries, which will mean that MNCs will ignore all the negative institutional 
variables and invest in corrupt countries. The usual effects of FDI on the host country’s economy 
will then kick in, and economic growth will thus be experienced. A country with vast mineral 
deposits is often claimed to have positive effects which may outweigh the impact of institutional 
factors. A case in point is Nigeria, Angola and Zimbabwe, where there is corruption, but the high 
returns from the extractive industries seem to compensate for the negative factors such as 
corruption, institutional quality, and political instability in attracting FDI inflows (Cleeve, 2012).  
 
Some countries which are deemed to be corrupt, for example, Sudan and Nigeria (as measured 
by the corruption index) received a larger share of FDI inflows compared to countries which were 
deemed less corrupt, such as South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana. Ali and MacDonald’s (2010) 
study also concluded that institutions do not matter in determining FDI flows in the primary sector. 
This leads to the discussion in the next sub-section, where countries that are endowed with 
strategic natural resources are removed from the sample.  
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4.5.9.11 Law and order, government stability, religious and ethnic tensions and economic 
growth 
 
Other institutional variables, such as the increase in law and order, government stability and a 
decrease in religious and ethnical tensions all show the right signs in terms of their impact on the 
host country’s economic growth. This is in line with a priori expectations and the findings of other 
studies. A study by Adhikary (2011), on Asian countries, concluded that a combination of FDI and 
good institutional variables, such as the rule of law, property rights, political stability and the 
absence of violence lead to economic growth. De Mello (1999) also found that the FDI-growth 
nexus is highly sensitive to country-specific factors, which include the kind of institutions in those 
countries. 
 
4.5.10 Sub-sample that excludes natural resource-endowed countries 
 
This section presents the results for the sub-sample that excludes countries endowed with 
strategic natural resources. These countries lie above the mean of the indicator of natural 
resource endowment. In terms of control variables, the empirical results are almost the same as 
those of the preceding section, except that under the sub-sample, the results are statistically 
significant. The models’ results are presented in Table 4.7.  
 
4.5.10.1 Previous rate of economic growth, domestic investment, trade openness 
 and economic growth 
 
The previous rate of economic growth, the level of domestic investment, and trade openness all 
positively impacted the host countries’ economic growth. The previous year’s economic growth 
proved to be an especially important determinant of the current economic growth rate by being 
significant at one percent level of significance for all 15 estimated models. This is in line with the 
empirical findings of Alfaro and Johnson (2013), who determined that the effect of FDI on 
economic growth depends on the host country’s initial conditions, including the previous rate of 




Table 4.7: Institutions, FDI and Economic Growth- Sub-sample without Resource-Endowed Countries 
Source: Author’s own calculations using Eviews 
Variables Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30
LGDP_GROWTH_RATE(-1) 1.41 1.29 1.29 1.22 1.04 1.25 1.27 1.28 1.39 1.25 1.06 1.38 1.28 1.25 1.26
*(0.00) *(0.00) *(0.00) *(0.00) *(0.01) *(0.00) *(0.00) * *(0.01) *(0.00) *(0.00) *(0.01) *(0.00) *(0.00) *(0.00)
LGDP_PC -0.76 -0.61 -0.61 -0.50 -0.38 -0.52 -0.52 -0.59 -0.72 -0.59 -0.33 -0.71 -0.59 -0.52 -0.54
(0.21) (0.32) (0.32) (0.38) (0.48) (0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.43) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33)
LDOMESTIC_INVESTMENT 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.43) (0.52) (0.52) (0.58) (0.85) (0.49) (0.60) (0.74) (0.61) (0.50) (0.54) (0.52) (0.55) (0.60) (0.59)
LFDI 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.27 0.68 0.08 -0.25 -0.37 0.16 0.09 0.71 -0.03 0.25 -0.01 -0.02
**(0.05) ***(0.03) (0.45) (0.33) ***(0.03) (0.83) (0.58) (0.45) (0.63) (0.79) *(0.01) (0.96) (0.54) (0.98) (0.96)
LTRADE_OPENNESS 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.46) (0.30) (0.14) (0.16) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.21)
LPOP_GROWTH_RATE -0.24 -0.22 -0.22 -0.19 -0.15 -0.21 -0.25 -0.26 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.26 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
(0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.38) (0.18) (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.31) (0.32) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
LINST_AVER -0.13
(0.66)
LFDI_INST -0.13 -0.18 -0.57 -0.01 0.33 0.47 -0.07 0.02 -0.62 0.11 -0.16 0.09 0.10

























Observations 185.00 185.00 185.00 185.00 166.00 185.00 179.00 179.00 185.00 185.00 185.00 185.00 185.00 185.00 185.00
R- Squared 10.98 9.26 9.26 7.91 6.04 8.10 7.95 8.49 10.60 9.04 5.78 10.79 8.95 8.19 8.38
GMM Estimated Models Sub Sample Without Resource Endowed Countries
** denotes significance at 10%, *** denotes significance at 5 percent and *denotes significance at 1 percent. Numbers in parethensis represents the p-value  
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4.5.10.2 FDI and economic growth 
 
The effect of FDI on the host countries’ economic growth is proven to be both negative and 
positive and significant at five and 10 percent levels of significance, depending on the 
institutional variable with which it interacted. This shows that FDI and institutions on their own, 
without the existence of strategic natural resources, can contribute to economic growth for 
SADC countries. Similarly, Gui-Diby (2014) and Edwards et al’s. (2016) studies reported that 
FDI has a mixed impact on the host country’s economic growth, depending on institutional 
quality.  
 
Significantly, FDI on its own, without institutional variables, can lead to an increase in economic 
growth for the SADC countries. This is contrary to the findings of many researchers such as 
Jude and Leviuge (2017) and Saini et al. (2010), who concluded that, on its own, FDI does not 
have an impact on the host country’s economic growth. Countries with higher levels of FDI 
inflows experience high productivity in the export sector compared to those with low levels of 
FDI. Furthermore, FDI is significant in improving factor productivity and makes it possible for 
domestic firms to be linked with foreign firms, hence it creates linkages that will aid in economic 
growth. FDI is associated with globalisation, and it is this association that has increased the 
spread of technology across borders. Thus, through FDI and globalisation, host countries can 
gain access to foreign knowledge. The increasing use of available foreign knowledge and 
technology boosts the innovation capacity and labour productivity for domestic firms; according 
to Coady et al. (2019), knowledge flows from global technology leaders between 2004 and 
2014 were estimated to have increased labour productivity by 0.7 percent for developing 
countries.  
  
4.5.10.3 FDI/institutions and economic growth 
 
The results show that the interaction of FDI and institutions has both a negative and positive 
effect on the host country’s economic growth. The results are statistically significant at the five 
and 10 percent level of significance. This is in line with the findings of other researchers such 
as Jude and Leviuge (2017), who concluded that institutional quality affects the effect of FDI 
on the host country’s economic growth. Saini et al. (2010) also claim that FDI on its own does 
not have an impact on the host country’s economic growth; instead, institutional quality plays 




4.5.10.4 Democracy and economic growth 
 
Under the full sample, an increase in democratic accountability was negatively associated with 
economic growth. This could have been due to the presence of strategic natural resources 
where dictatorship is favoured by MNCs. However, after removing countries endowed with 
strategic natural resources, an increase in democratic accountability leads to an increase in 
economic growth. The results are in line with the findings of Malikane and Chitambara (2017), 
who concluded that countries with democratic institutions benefit more from the presence of 
FDI. This shows the importance of institutions in amplifying the effect of FDI on economic 
growth without the natural resource bias to impact on MNCs’ decision making. However, it is 
not statistically significant.  
 
4.5.10.5 Corruption and economic growth 
 
Likewise, an increase in corruption is associated with a decrease in economic growth. This 
result is contrary to the findings of the full sample, which included resource-endowed countries, 
indicating the resource bias element where MNCs overlook poor institutional indicators if the 
host country is endowed with strategic natural resources. This is in line with a priori 
expectations and the findings of Wiljeweera et al. (2010), who concluded that corruption has a 
negative impact on economic growth. 
 
4.5.10.6 Military in politics and economic growth 
 
Under the full sample, an increase in military involvement in politics led to an increase in 
economic growth. This is not in line with a priori expectations, perhaps due to the existence of 
strategic natural resources. However, under the sub-sample, which excludes countries with 
strategic natural resources, a military increase in politics is associated with a decrease in 
economic growth. This is in line with a priori expectations, and further highlights the importance 
of good institutions aiding economic growth. 
 
4.5.10.7 Investment promotion and economic growth 
 
The results show a negative effect of investment promotion on economic growth, the same 
finding as that under the full sample. This can be interpreted to mean that other institutional 
indicators are more important compared to the investment promotion institutional indicator. 
This is supported by the findings of Batten and Vo (2009), who concluded that countries that 
intend to attract more FDI inflows should first ensure that the other institutional indicators are 
of good quality. However, the results are not statistically significant, meaning that SADC 
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countries can still take deliberate action to promote investment in their respective economies. 
This view is supported by Egan (2015), who argued that host countries have to deliberately 
establish and promote investment-promoting agencies and efficient institutions in a bid to 
attract FDI inflows. 
 
4.5.10.8 Institutions and economic growth 
 
Overall, the results show that through FDI, institutions can have an indirect role in influencing 
economic growth. Thus, government stability, a reduction in corruption, less military 
involvement in politics, democratic accountability and enhanced regulatory quality and 
governance structures can lead to better economic growth outcomes for SADC countries. The 
results of the estimated models for the sub-sample without resource-endowed countries are 
presented in Table 4.7. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The chapter examined the interrelationships among institutions, FDI and economic growth for 
SADC countries. The study examined how FDI interacts with institutions to promote economic 
growth in various country environments, with the exclusion of countries endowed with strategic 
natural resources. A panel dynamic GMM technique with Windmeijer corrected standard errors 
and orthogonal deviations was used to empirically examine the interrelationship among 
institutions, FDI, and economic growth for SADC countries. 
 
The interrelationship among institutions, FDI, and economic growth differs, depending on 
country characteristics, including initial host-country conditions. The reviewed literature 
highlighted that initial host-country conditions and their absorptive capacities determine FDI’s 
effect on economic growth. There is a need to increase the absorption capacity of the host 
country to ensure FDI’s maximum impact on economic growth. These absorptive capacities 
include human capital, trade openness, institutions, macro-economic stability and the initial 
levels of GDP per capita. There is heterogeneity in terms of absorptive capacities due to the 
differences in the quality of institutions. This therefore means SADC countries require a 
targeted approach to FDI.  
 
The results of the study showed that SADC countries have relatively weak institutions, which, 
in turn, affect FDI’s impact on economic growth. The study clearly showed that the quality of 
institutions determines the effect of FDI on economic growth. As the institutional variables 
improve, so does the impact of FDI on economic growth. This is more evident in the sub-
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sample without resource-endowed countries. For example, there is a negative correlation 
between corruption and economic growth, indicating that a reduction in the level of corruption 
is associated with an increase in economic growth, while an increase in corruption is 
associated with a decrease in economic growth.  
 
Thus, institutions indirectly affect economic growth for the SADC countries through the 
interaction with FDI. However, the institutions’ interactions and FDI effect on economic growth 
is both negative and positive, regardless of whether or not the countries are endowed with 
strategic natural resources. 
 
The results also show that for countries that are not endowed with strategic natural resources, 
FDI and institutions on their own can promote economic growth. Thus, as a policy 
recommendation, SADC governments, especially those without strategic natural resources, 
should aim to implement policies that improve the quality of their institutions and FDI 
promotion. Thus, non-resource FDI has a direct and significant effect on the host country’s 
economy, as it tends to create more jobs. Furthermore, there is a higher level of technology 
transfer and an increased supply of domestic inputs to the MNC as it relies on host countries 
for inputs. 
 
Significantly, the results of the study show that FDI on its own can actually increase the level 
of economic growth for SADC countries. Therefore, SADC countries should implement 
measures that promote FDI inflows as a major determinant of economic growth in the region. 
This could include tax incentives, a reduction in the interest rate, a reduction of red tape and 
the provision of other incentives. However, the undertaking of rigorous investment promotion 
activities in the respective economies should be done simultaneously with an improvement in 
governance structures.  
 
Furthermore, reforms should target improving the socio-economic dimensions, political 
stability, and law and order; reduce corruption; improve the levels of democratic accountability; 
and reduce the involvement of the military in politics. Governments in SADC countries should 
ensure fully developed financial sectors to derive the maximum benefits from FDI inflows. 
Furthermore, SADC countries should put together policies to boost human capital as a way of 
building up their absorptive capacities.  
 
The level of domestic capital investment is of paramount importance in boosting the domestic 
country’s economic growth. Thus, there is a complementary relationship between the host 
country’s economic growth and the level of domestic capital investment. It is therefore vital that 
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as a policy recommendation, SADC countries should increase domestic capital investment to 






































Although there has been several studies which seek to understand the relationship between 
the roles of FDI and institutions, and their implications for economic growth, very little research 
has been conducted focusing on SADC countries. In this study, an attempt was made to fill 
this academic gap by exploring various stages of the interplay between this relationship and 
its implication for the economic growth of SADC countries.  
 
The study has provided an analysis of the evolution and various theories of FDI. It has also 
presented an overview of the theories of FDI and trends of FDI flows into the SADC region. 
Furthermore, the study examined the motivation and mode for FDI. To have an appreciation 
of how institutions influence the flow of FDI, it is crucial to link the theories determining FDI 
with the various theories that emphasise the role of institutions, and ultimately, the impact on 
economic growth.  
 
Over the years, literature on economic growth has demonstrated great interest in 
understanding the determinants of economic growth. Within this body of literature, the role 
played by FDI and institutions in determining economic growth has been a subject of debate 
among researchers. In this regard, there is a large body of literature that has analysed the 
various aspects of FDI and institutions, as well as economic growth. This, however, was done 
separately, with FDI and economic growth on the one hand, and institutions and FDI on the 
other hand.  
 
The studies concluded that integration into the world economy is crucial, and institutions play 
a particularly important role in determining economic growth. This led to the perception that 
trade openness, FDI and institutional reforms are a panacea to countries achieving a 
sustainable growth path. Thus, academic economists, policymakers and development 
practitioners are now advocating for openness to trade, FDI promotion and institutional 
reforms.  
 
However, the interlinkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth have received little 
academic attention in the existing literature. The study thus tried to fill this academic void by 
examining the interlinkages among institutions, FDI and economic growth, which was the main 
objective of the study. Thus, the study presents an analysis of the implications of the 
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interrelationship and complementarity between FDI and institutions, and ultimately shows how 
FDI influences economic growth. First, however, there was a need to understand the role of 
institutions in attracting FDI. The main argument of the study was that the interrelationship and 
complementarity between FDI and institutions need to be considered, for a better 
understanding of how FDI contributes to economic growth.  
 
To achieve the intended objective, the researcher included two empirical chapters in the study 
in addition to the first and second chapters. The first chapter introduced the study and the 
second chapter provided an overview of the theories and trends of FDI flows into the SADC 
region. The first empirical chapter examined the interrelationship between FDI and institutions. 
Specifically, the chapter analysed the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows into the 
SADC countries. The other empirical chapter analysed the interlinkages among institutions, 
FDI and economic growth.  
 
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
 
The main results of the study are summarised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 
The theories reviewed seem to suggest that a firm must have a sustainable comparative 
advantage over the host country’s firms for it to be an MNC. In the same process, the host 
countries respond by actively creating conducive environments for business. However, there 
is no single theory that can explain the reason and motive for international capital movements. 
There is generally inflow and outflow in terms of FDI. Historically, FDI has been flowing from 
developed countries to developing countries. FDI played – and continue to play – a significant 
role in the GDP composition of these countries. In terms of FDI flow and trends into the SADC 
region, the analysis showed that different member countries are experiencing different FDI 
inflows. The results and extent of the inflows differ depending on the period and the variables 
being analysed. Generally, the trend shows that FDI inflows play a significant role in GFCF for 
the SADC countries.  
 
Chapter 3 
Institutions are crucial in determining FDI inflows into SADC countries, and there is a positive 
correlation between FDI and economic growth. The study found that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between FDI flows and institutions. This means the better the 
institutions in a particular country in the SADC region, the more FDI flows into that country.  
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The results also confirm that the market size in the host country has an influence in attracting 
FDI inflows for the SADC countries across all estimated models. Investment promotion is 
positively related to FDI flows for the SADC region, and the relationship is statistically 
significant. Thus, the results show that deliberate efforts to promote investment in a host 
country lead to an increase in FDI inflows into the SADC region.  
 
The results of the chapter also highlighted that in the SADC region, the type of regime, whether 
democratic or autocratic, does not really matter in determining and influencing the flow of FDI 
into the region. However, corruption is a major constraint to the inflow of FDI to the SADC 
countries. Countries which are deemed to have high levels of corruption, for example 
Zimbabwe, received a smaller share of the FDI inflows into the SADC region. Government 
stability is also a significant institutional variable in determining the flow of FDI into the SADC 
countries.  
 
The results illustrate that a stable government is associated with an increase in the inflow of 
FDI for the SADC countries. The determinants of FDI are not uniform across Africa and policies 
that have been proved to work in other economic regions do not necessarily work in SADC. 
 
Chapter 4 
The impact of FDI (on its own) on economic growth is ambiguous until it interacts with other 
host country variables. The researcher found that institutions are weak in SADC countries; 
hence, there is both a positive and a negative relationship between institutions and economic 
growth for the SADC countries. The impact of FDI on economic growth is dependent on the 
quality of institutions; thus, countries with ‘good’ institutions are better able to absorb the 
positive spillovers from FDI.  
 
What is key, however, is that FDI on its own, without institutional indicators, can lead to an 
increase in economic growth for the SADC countries. The effect of FDI on economic growth is 
both negative and positive across the estimated models, indicating heterogeneity in terms of 
the initial host country conditions. Furthermore, the extent to which FDI impacts on economic 
growth depends on the degree of complementarity and substitution between FDI and domestic 
investment.  
 
An increase in corruption leads to an increase in economic growth for the host country. One 
logical explanation for this anomaly could be the existence of strategic natural resources in 
selected SADC countries; MNCs would thus ignore all the negative institutional indicators and 
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invest in corrupt countries. Consequently, the usual impacts of FDI on the host country’s 
economy would take effect and, in the process, economic growth would be experienced. 
 
Under the full sample, an increase in democratic accountability is negatively associated with 
economic growth. Again, this could have been due to the presence of strategic natural 
resources where dictatorship is favoured by MNCs, mainly for corrupt reasons. However, after 
eliminating countries endowed with strategic natural resources, an increase in democratic 
accountability leads to an increase in economic growth.  
 
The results also show that institutions can have a direct role in influencing economic growth. 
Government stability, a reduction in corruption, less involvement of the military in politics, 
democratic accountability and enhanced regulatory quality and governance structures can 
therefore lead to better economic growth outcomes for SADC countries. 
 
5.3 FINAL WORD 
 
Most of the available studies on institutions’ role in determining FDI flows have been limited to 
specific institutional indicators, without examining the impact of all indicators. This study filled 
the gap by examining all 12 institutional indicators and calculating institutional indices for 
countries like Mauritius, Swaziland and Seychelles for the first time in the academic literature. 
Thus, the thesis clarifies why some previous studies could not establish a significant correlation 
between FDI and institutions.  
 
Using few chosen indicators and, in some instances, even a single institutional indicator to 
demonstrate the relationship between institutions and FDI, could be one of the reasons 
previous studies failed to obtain meaningful results. Another critical contribution is that the 
study provides empirical evidence that is used to assess the importance of each institutional 
indicator in determining FDI flows and the subsequent effect on economic growth.  
 
Previous studies ignored the role of host countries’ institutions in determining FDI’s impact on 
economic growth. How FDI influences economic growth via institutions is a fundamental 
academic question with significant policy implications. This study provides the basis for 
appropriate policies to attract FDI and reform certain institutional indicators with the aim of 
improving the FDI-growth nexus in the SADC region. As a further contribution to the academic 
debate, this study has created an additional interactive variable of FDI and institutions.  
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Most existing studies examined only the role of institutions in attracting FDI flows. Very few 
studies examined how institutions could aid the FDI’s effect on the host country’s economy. 
This study contributes to the academic literature by focusing on the examination of the three-
way linkage among institutions, FDI and economic growth, using a dynamic panel GMM-
equation model, and applying the growth model framework.  
 
Furthermore, unlike other studies, this study also analysed the impact of FDI on economic 
growth for a sub-sample of countries not endowed with strategic natural resources. This is 
important for policy-making decisions and a major contribution of study thesis, as it provides a 
clear understanding of the interrelationship and complementarity between institutions and FDI, 
and how that influences economic growth without the element of natural resource bias.  
 
Overall, the major contribution of this study is that it shows that a better understanding of the 
FDI’s contribution to economic growth requires consideration of the interrelationship and the 
complementarity between FDI and institutions. 
 
5.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Over the years, many African countries have been undertaking a wide range of policy changes, 
including political and institutional reforms, in order to facilitate and increase the flow of FDI 
into their countries. Through the structural adjustments and austerity programmes by the IMF 
and the World Bank, issues of trade liberalisation and investment promotion have received 
considerable attention. Likewise, SADC countries should establish independent investment 
promotion agencies to attract FDI inflows into their economies. However, this requires a 
simultaneous improvement in governance structures and other institutional indicators, 
cognisant of the fact that Africa, as a region, is unique and FDI policies should be formulated 
in the appropriate context.  
 
SADC countries should also aggressively pursue the creation of special economic zones 
(SEZs), now widely used in most developing and many developed economies. Through SEZs, 
governments facilitate industrial activity through fiscal and regulatory incentives and 
infrastructure support. To date, there is an estimated 5 400 SEZs across 147 economies, which 
is an increase from 4 000 five years ago, and 500 new SEZs are being muted.  
 
However, policy focus should be directed at attracting FDI in those sectors that can lead to 
long-term economic growth, in particular the manufacturing sector. Governments must aim to 
attract specific types of FDI that are able to generate spillover effects in the overall economy. 
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Domestic policies, such as measures to develop human capital, as well as social, physical and 
institutional infrastructure, determine the effect and quality of FDI into the SADC region. Equally 
important, policy aimed at promoting human capital development through higher secondary 
school enrolment should be designed in a bid to spur rapid economic growth in the long run. 
An improvement in human development through education and skills development will also 
improve the investment environment and attract efficiency-seeking MNCs that require these 
factors.  
 
SADC countries should ideally work together and implement common policies that support and 
promote good quality institutions, for example, low levels of corruption, peace and stability in 
the region, reduced involvement of the military in politics, and improved rule of law. This is 
important to avoid the negative neighbourhood effect that might affect the efforts of the rest of 
the SADC countries to improve governance and other institutional indicators. 
 
Thus, efforts should be directed at improving good governance and minimising, if not 
eliminating, corruption and other forms of inefficiencies within the public sector to reduce the 
negative effects of excessive government spending on long-run growth. Countries in SADC 
should take lessons from South Africa and Zimbabwe, which set up agencies such as the State 
Capture Commission of Enquiry and Anti-Corruption watch, respectively, to fight corruption. 
This is a step in the right direction to improve efficiency if the recommendations are 
implemented. 
 
The policy implications from the study clearly indicate that the growth rate of the host country 
is important in attracting FDI inflows into the SADC region. Therefore, SADC countries need 
to promote growth-enhancing policies and initiatives to attract FDI. Furthermore, SADC 
countries should increase domestic capital investment to promote economic growth. 
Governments in SADC countries should ensure fully developed financial sectors to derive the 
maximum benefits from FDI inflows.  
 
To boost the stock of R&D via the increase in access to foreign capital, policies should be 
designed to open the SADC economies to trade. The study discovered that trade openness 
not only promotes a more efficient allocation of resources, but also opens the door to 
technological diffusion from abroad and undermines local monopolies. For example, SADC 
countries that adopted open trade by the early 1970s, such as Botswana, Mauritius, and 




In the case where the host country is endowed with strategic natural resources, the focus of 
institutional improvement should be on improving physical infrastructure and the legal system 
– especially with regards to issues of property, land and mineral rights. Furthermore, efforts 
should be made towards ensuring transparency of contracts as well as clear rules and 
regulations. The existence of strategic natural resources, for example, large mineral deposits, 
may outweigh all the other negative effects and hence no further incentives are required to 
attract FDI inflows.  
 
5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
Though the results are plausible and meaningful, the researcher was cognisant of the data 
limitations for SADC countries and the need for further work in this area. At various stages, the 
basic objective of the study was negatively affected because of the inadequacy of time series 
data from related agencies.  
 
Future studies should examine the sector-specific effects of FDI on host countries’ economic 
growth. This will assist policymakers in making informed decisions. Furthermore, 
disaggregated FDI data will promote research that estimates FDI effectiveness by sector. This 
will equip governments with the information necessary to establish policies that channel FDI 
to appropriate sectors of the economy. Furthermore, future studies should focus on country-
specific cases for policy-specific recommendations. 
 
PRS data services also do not calculate indices for all SSA countries; there is no data for 
Mauritius, Swaziland and Seychelles. This then led to the researcher developing the indices 
for the said countries for the first time in academic literature. Finally, future studies should 
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